Flower Power Positivists: David Hawkins, Joseph Weis & the Social Development Model, 1963-1981

In the late 1960s, J. David Hawkins "shared many of the counter culture's value orientations and criticisms of life in the dominant society."[1] Interested in starting a commune of his own, he dedicated his doctoral research to understanding the role of values and ideology in the maintenance of communal life on a variety of countercultural communes. By the early 1980s, however, Hawkins had changed his tune. Working as a Prevention Specialist alongside sociologist Joseph Weis at the University of Washington, Hawkins championed a model of delinquency prevention that sought to strengthen young people's "moral bonds" with the "conventional order."[2] Further, Hawkins and Weis positioned their model as a triumph of empirical data over the ideological commitments and intuitive assumptions that had beleaguered previous prevention efforts.

What accounted for this dramatic U-turn? Upon closer inspection, Hawkins' drift from the critical sociology and the countercultural communes of the 1960s into the neoconservative criminology of the 1970s is perhaps less surprising than it may initially seem. This chapter argues that the ambiguous politics of the "flower power" sociology in which both Hawkins and Weis had been trained made the route to their later, neoconservative position shorter than one might expect. Moreover, I argue that the implicit conservativism of Hawkins' and Weis' theory of delinquency prevention was not motivated by any explicitly conservative political commitments of their own. Both were, arguably, motivated by progressive intentions. Looking beyond personal intentions to the wider historical context in which they worked, it becomes possible to understand how their research took on the shape that it did.

This chapter begins by exploring the political and ideological underpinnings of the interactionist school of sociology in which Hawkins' was trained. It then outlines how Hawkins grappled with his academic training during his doctoral research on countercultural communes. Next, it follows Hawkins into his first professional roles as a probation officer and a program evaluator in the rapidly expanding juvenile justice system of the 1970s. From there it situates his collaboration with Joseph Weis at the University of Washington within the broader juvenile justice reforms that were underway during the 1970s. Thereafter, it charts how Hawkins and Weis came to adopt the positivistic methods being championed by criminologist Travis Hirschi at the time. Finally, it illustrates how Hawkins' and Weis' respective trajectories lead them to articulate their influential Social Development Model of delinquency prevention.

[I have yet to boil down the historiographic contributions that this chapter makes into a succinct, introductory paragraph. It would be helpful to hear everyone's thoughts on how best to position this vis a vis the existing literature!]

[1] J. David Hawkins, "Utopian Values and Communal Social Life: A Comparative Study of Social Arrangements in Four Counter Culture Communes Established to Realize Participants' Values" (Doctor of Philosophy Northwestern University, 1975), 1.
[2] Joseph G. Weis and J. David Hawkins, *Preventing Delinquency* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981).

Flower Power Sociology

David Hawkins began his graduate studies in sociology at Northwestern University in 1968. In the acknowledgements of his doctoral dissertation, published in 1975, David Hawkins thanked his supervisor Howard Becker for teaching him "most of what [he knew] about approaching the world as a sociologist."[3] Howard Becker, was a prominent advocate for rethinking some of the core assumptions and ideology that upheld the structural functionalist sociology of the 1950s. Through the cracks that were beginning to appear in the structural functionalist establishment during the early 1960s, voices like Howard Becker's began to advance more critical, constructivist approaches to studying deviance.

Published in 1963, Becker's landmark study of social deviance, *Outsiders,* argued against the positivist drive to discover original causes of deviance.[4] Rather than approaching "deviants" as a homogenous group and seeking to uncover the common, underlying causes of their deviance, Becker focused on understanding the processes through which specific individuals or communities, in certain situations, came to be labelled as "deviant" by dominant social groups and institutions. Published in 1963, Becker's book *Outsiders* presented a portrait of the marihuana users and dance musicians that he had interviewed and observed during the 1950s. In it, he argued that "deviance" ought to be understood as the consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions. Or, as Becker put it, that "the deviant is one to whom the label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior people so label."[5]

Becker encouraged his fellow sociologists to turn their gaze away from the individuals that had previously been the focus of studies of deviance and focus instead on the authorities responsible for labeling them as "deviant."[6] In this approach to the study of deviance, Becker saw an opportunity to break the alliance that had formed between sociologists and the state during decades after the war. No longer were sociologists to produce the kind of practical, professionalized knowledge that laypersons and lawmakers demanded as part of their campaigns to stamp out crime and disorder. Rather, by pursuing the more critical, constructivist agenda that Becker proposed, sociologists were to reconnect the study of deviance with what he saw as the original, critical orientation of the sociological project.[7]

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, other influential American sociologists took up different tools and shifted the scale at which they analyzed the social world. In contrast to the totalizing, systematizing drive of structural functionalist sociologists and behavioral scientists, sociologists such as Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel took up qualitative, ethnographic methods to gain insight into the micro-sociology of everyday life. Much like Becker, they were not motivated to unearth universal laws of human behavior or sociality. Rather, they worked to shed light on

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[3] Hawkins, "Utopian Values and Communal Social Life: A Comparative Study of Social Arrangements in Four Counter Culture Communes Established to Realize Participants' Values."
[4] Howard Becker, *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance* (New York: Free Press, 1963).
[5] Becker, *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*, 4.
[6] The Jessors were aware of Becker's work as they articulated the theoretical framework that guided the Tri-Ethnic Study. They were, however, skeptical of this approach. In their eyes, these theories accounted for too narrow a portion of the general domain of "deviant behavior," by focusing only on individuals who were *formally* labeled as deviant. Motivated to uncover a universal theory of *all* deviant behavior (whether officially detected or not), the Jessors' thus rejected Becker's approach in favor of Merton's more systematic account of deviance. See Richard Jessor et al., *Society, Personality and Deviant Behavior: A Study of a Tri-Ethnic Community* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), 28-30.
[7] Howard Becker, ed., *The Other Side: Perspective on Deviance* (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 1.

the contingent, constructed and highly localized processes through which social order and identities were performed.[8]

While Becker and his contemporaries were certainly not the first to take the abovementioned approaches to studying the social world, their ideas had the fortune of resonating with wider cultural shifts.[9] During the 1960s, the growing premium that many Americans began to place on self-expression and self-realization gave rise to a new visions of politics based less on traditional party politics or organized labor and more on culture and lifestyle.[10] Within such a climate, Becker, Goffman and Garfinkel found a receptive audience and all three sociologists quickly rose to prominence.[11]

In reconnecting the study of deviance with a more critical sociological project and in framing the labelling of deviance as an interactional, power-laden process, Becker and his contemporaries politicized of the sociology of deviance. Yet, as both their contemporary critics noted and later historians have affirmed, the political commitments underlying their "labelling" perspective were not necessarily as clear or radical as they seemed.[12] In his history of the sociology of deviance, for example, Colin Sumner has argued that while theorists like Becker helped register the role of power and politics in the labelling of deviance, they did so—at least initially—within what he terms a "flower power mode" of politics. That is, they operated on the implicit assumption that by exposing the bias and bigotry of the institutions of social control through critique, these institutions would learn from their mistakes and auto-correct. Trained as their analyses were on situational, micro-level interactions, Becker, Goffman and Garfinkle shied away from any substantial engagement with the longstanding economic, political and ideological structures that underpinned the inequities and injustices they exposed. Theirs was not a revolutionary project. Rather, its primary motivation seemed to be to protect personal expressions of freedom and everyday life from the intrusion of the state. As Sumner put it, these were

> the politics of the West Coast, Haight-Ashbury and the hippie: […] not an aggressive politics committed to the overthrow of anything, but a defensive politics to justify the enjoyment of some personal space…man.[13]

These, too, were the politics—both disciplinary and cultural—that shaped Hawkins' initial training as a sociologist under Howard Becker's supervision. As the following section illustrates, however, Hawkins' embrace of this program was never complete. Despite his supervisor's

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[8] Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in ethnomethodology* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Erving Goffman, *The presentation of self in everyday life* (New York: Anchor Books, 1959).
[9] For a longer genealogy of the labelling perspective, see Colin Sumner, *The Sociology of Deviance: An Obituary* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994), 198.
[10] See e.g. Thomas Frank, *The Conquest of Cool: Business Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise of Hip Consumerism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 29-31; Ellen Herman, "Being and Doing: Humanistic Psychology and the Spirit of the 1960s," in *Sights on the Sixties*, ed. Barbara L. Tischler (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992); *The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), Chapters 9-11; Allen Matsusow, *The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984); Theodore Roszak, *The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and its Youthful Opposition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), xxiii-xxvi; Sumner, *The Sociology of Deviance: An Obituary*, 198-206.
[11] For a more indepth account of the rise of 'labelling' perspectives during the 1960s see Stephen Pfohl, *Images of Deviance and Social Control: A Sociological History* (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1985), Chapter 9; Sumner, *The Sociology of Deviance: An Obituary*, Chapter 9.
[12] For contemporary criticisms of Becker see e.g. Alvin W. Gouldner, "Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology," *Social Problems* 9, no. 3 (1961); "The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State," *The American Sociologist* 3, no. 2 (1968).
[13] Sumner, *The Sociology of Deviance: An Obituary*, 205.

disdain for applied sociology, Hawkins' approach to sociological research was a practical one, motivated primarily by a desire to solve the problems of everyday social life rather than by a desire to advance critical social theory.

"Communities where people really care about each other"

Before it became the topic of his doctoral dissertation, Hawkins' research on countercultural communes began "as a personal exploration."[14] Interested in starting a commune with their friends, Hawkins and his wife, Maureen, set out on a road trip in 1969 to learn from existing communes in Washington, Oregon, California and Texas. Reflecting on the experience in the introduction to his dissertation a few years later, Hawkins noted the fact that he and Maureen "dressed, spoke and acted like other counterculture visitors" had aided them in gaining access to the communes they visited: they drove a used VW bus; wore their hair long; spoke in the idiom of the counterculture, and presented themselves as fellow-participants in "the movement."[15]

Historians have noted that far from a monolithic movement, "the counterculture" was in fact an "inherently unstable collection of attitudes, tendencies, postures, gestures, 'lifestyles,' ideals, visions, hedonistic pleasures, moralisms, negations, and affirmations."[16] Hawkins' own descriptions of "the movement" he counted himself a part of at the time are helpful in situating him within this "unstable collection." In the introduction of his doctoral dissertation, Hawkins described the countercultural commune movement as one through which "young people, predominantly middle class whites, separated themselves from identification with the existing social order and became participants in a movement which they believed would give radically new meaning to their lives."[17] Elsewhere, he noted that the residents of the communes that he and Maureen visited

> rejected all participation in the dominant society, including political activity aimed at directly changing it. They believed they could best achieve their desired goal culture by separating and isolating themselves from the undesirable influences of the existing order and institutionalizing their code in the here and now.[18]

In other words, this was "flower power" at its finest—a defensive politics of dropping out and tuning in, motivated by a desire to find self-actualization and personal meaning.

After returning from their road trip to Chicago, David and Maureen set up their own commune but by the spring of 1970, their experiment in communal living collapsed when they were evicted from their house for a zoning violation. Wanting to leave the city, David and Maureen decided return to some of the communes they had visited the summer prior to conduct further field work on the challenges of communal living. They hoped this research could help them "and perhaps others, avoid problems and recognize inevitable realities in setting up new communal groups."[19]

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[14] Hawkins, "Utopian Values and Communal Social Life: A Comparative Study of Social Arrangements in Four Counter Culture Communes Established to Realize Participants' Values," 1.
[15] Hawkins, "Utopian Values", 6.
[16] Peter Braunstein and Michael William Doyle, eds., *Imagine Nation: The American Counterculture of the 1960's and 70's* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 10.
[17] Hawkins, "Utopian Values", 73-74. Hawkins' understanding of the counter culture was informed by Ken Keniston, *The Uncommitted* (New York: Dell, 1965); *The Young Radicals* (New York: Harcourt, 1968); Keith Melville, *Communes in the Counter Culture* (New York: Morrow, 1972); Lewis Yablonsky, *The Hippie Trip* (New York: Pegasus, 1968).
[18] Hawkins, "Utopian Values", 91-92.
[19] Hawkins, "Utopian Values", 8-9.

Initially, David Hawkins wanted to publish his doctoral research in the form of a how-to "handbook for other counter-culture people interested in living in communes." He liked the idea of producing a practical manual that would be accessible to a popular audience. He thus wrote a draft of his dissertation that "avoided discussing the sociological points explicitly" fearing that "such 'rational' discussion would appear academic to counter-culture readers and 'put them off.'" Unfortunately, this draft of his practical handbook received a less than enthusiastic response from both general readers and sociology professors alike. Hawkins thus opted to render his research into a more traditional doctoral dissertation written for an academic audience.[20]

Hawkins' dissertation consisted in a comparative, longitudinal analysis of the participant observation and interviews he conducted at four different communes between 1970-73. In it, he explored how the different communities made trade-offs between the competing values of freedom, openness and togetherness, and how their differential prioritization of these values resulted in different social structures and practices. Hawkins' analysis bore the stamp of the relativizing, constructivist currents that were in vogue in American sociology at the time. Relying on the work of his supervisor, Howard Becker, for example, he analyzed the mercurial and context-specific ways in which commune members labelled certain behaviors or individuals as deviant.[21] When making sense of the different strategies that commune residents employed when they interacted with outside authorities such as the local police, he drew on the dramaturgical insights of Erving Goffman.[22] Likewise, in interpreting how commune members managed to enact social control, conformity and cooperation even in the absence of explicit rules for behavior, Hawkins invoked Garfinkel's microsociology of everyday life.[23]

Hawkins ultimately theorized that the counterculture communes he studied could be understood as a kind of secular revitalization movement. He argued that the founders' impulse to drop out of mainstream society and create a new social system of their own was a utopian one.[24] As soon as residents attempted to put their utopian values into practice, compromises had to be made. If they were unwilling to make such compromises, their communes were likely to unravel. If they did opt to make compromises, they were prone to develop an ideology to mask the value conflicts generated by the new social arrangements they created.[25] In this way, like religious revitalization movements, Hawkins concluded that communes faced an almost inevitable drift toward conservatism. That is, until a new set of utopians emerged amid their ranks to challenge the established organization of social life and set the whole cycle into motion once more.

By the end of Hawkins' fieldwork, one of the four communes he studied—Pepperland—had collapsed. Of the four communities, Pepperland had taken the laxest approach to visitors and newcomers, effectively allowing anyone and everyone to come and go from the commune as they pleased. So too had it resisted imposing any formal rules to govern the commune for fear that this would curtail residents' freedom. At the same time, its members had founded the commune hoping to create a sense of togetherness and community among its residents. When the highly transient and unregulated space of the resulting commune failed to produce the sense of unity originally hoped for, feelings of frustration mounted until, eventually, its members disbanded. Hawkins was struck by the fact that for members of the disbanded commune, giving

[20] Hawkins, "Utopian Values", 41.
[21] Hawkins, "Utopian Values", 93, 128, 143-44, 227-239, 246, 255-58, 266-67, 270-278, 474-75.
[22] Hawkins, "Utopian Values", 128-141.
[23] Hawkins, "Utopian Values", 214-15, 238-42, 277.
[24] Hawkins, "Utopian Values", 70
[25] Hawkins, "Utopian Values", 68-69.

up on that particular community did not necessarily imply giving up their values or on the promise of communal living as a means of realizing them. Months after the commune had dissolved, a former member told Hawkins of his intention to start another commune. As his informant put it: "our real business is to be building communities where people really care about each other."[26]

By the time he finished his doctoral dissertation, Hawkins himself had given up on the promise of countercultural communal living. Before long, we would also begin to move away from the critical, interactionist sociology in which he had been trained. He would, however, carry forward elements of the "flower power" ethos that shaped his formation as a sociologist and his interest in countercultural communal living. Like the interactionist sociologists in vogue during the 1960s, his analysis of the social world remained trained at a fairly local level and at a remove from wider considerations of history and political economy. Like the residents of Pepperland, Hawkins subsequent work evinced a continued commitment to the idea that building "caring communities" held the solutions to the problems of American social life. If these commitments had constituted a perceived countercultural stance during the 1960s, they began to take on an increasingly conservative character in the changed political landscape of the 1970s.

The Age of Accountability

While David Hawkins spent the late 1960s exploring a movement motivated by a politics of disengagement, other wings of the counterculture were expressing their discontent with the status quo through more direct confrontations with the state. As it became clear that the reforms proposed under Kennedy's New Frontier and Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society had not gone far enough in addressing the deep roots of economic inequality and racial segregation in the US, many took to the streets to express their frustration and rage. Some of these protestors began to organize into more militant, radical formations that eventually coalesced into the Black power movement.[27] Meanwhile, the anti-War movement sparked widespread protests and galvanized an increasingly radical student movement on university campuses across the nation.[28]

Faced with rising urban unrest and the perceived threat of growing Black and student militancy, liberal lawmakers began passing new legislation and mandating new institutions designed to curtail the mounting sense of disorder. As historian Elizabeth Hinton has detailed, the response devised by these lawmakers blurred the boundaries between the welfare and criminal justice systems in ways that ultimately widened the number of poor, Americans of color living under police surveillance.[29] When the American public voted in Richard Nixon on a platform of law and order in 1968, this trend only intensified.[30]

As Hawkins approached the end of his PhD, he began to find work in the government-funded service agencies that had grown out of the state's response to the perceived crime crisis of the

[26] Hawkins, "Utopian Values", 255-256
[27] Jeffrey Ogbar, *Black Power: Radical Politics and African American Identity* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019).
[28] See e.g. Van Gosse, "A Movement of Movements: The Definition and Periodization of the New Left," in *A Companion to Post-1945 America.*, ed. Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002); Kenneth J. Heineman, *Campus Wars: The Peace Movement At American State Universities in the Vietnam Era* (New York: NYU Press, 1994).
[29] Elizabeth K. Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The making of mass incarceration in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).
[30] Michael Flamm, *Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

1960s. It was in the context of these agencies that Hawkins' approach to delinquency prevention began to take shape.

In 1972, while he was writing up his dissertation, David Hawkins left Chicago and moved to Friday Harbor, Washington where he found work as a probation officer for the San Juan County Juvenile Court. Mirroring national trends, the number of young people caught up in Washington state's system for juvenile corrections had risen dramatically during the 1960s, nearly doubling from 873 in 1960 to 1539 in 1967. The rise was attributed, at least in part, to county governments' attempts to keep their costs down by committing troubled young people to state-level correctional facilities rather than investing in local community services. In a bid to counteract this trend, the Washington state legislature passed a law in 1969 that incentivized county juvenile courts to keep youngsters in their local communities. State funds were provided to county governments on the condition that they invest in local services. For small, rural counties like Friday Harbor, whose extractive industries had, by the late 1960s, all but dried up, these funds were often the only available source to pay for probation officers.[31] Thus, while the new law helped cut the number of youth committed to state juvenile detention facilities, it did little to develop community resources beyond those of the county courts. Indeed, more than 85% of the funding that the new legislation made available was directed toward hiring probation officers like David Hawkins in rural counties like San Juan.[32]

In his role as a probation officer, Hawkins was frustrated by the realities of working in such an underfunded system. As he later recalled, its failure to rehabilitate many of the youth caught within it lead him to wonder whether there was anything that could be done to prevent young people from getting into trouble in the first place.[33] The following year, in 1973, Hawkins left Friday Harbor and moved to Seattle for a job as an Evaluation Specialist at the King County Youth Service Bureau. On the face of it, the mission of Youth Service Bureaus (YSBs) was better aligned with Hawkins' growing interest in prevention. Beginning in the late 1960s, YSBs were established across the US at the recommendation of the Lyndon B. Johnson's Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Envisioned as part of a wider strategy to tackle juvenile delinquency, the bureaus were created with the goal of linking law enforcement with local social services so as divert "pre-delinquents" away from the criminal justice system and toward the social services they needed.

Seen in historical perspective, however, the YSBs played a key role in the dramatic expansion for the US carceral state during the latter decades of the twentieth century. YSBs were emblematic of the enmeshment of social welfare and criminal justice that took place during the late 1960s. Although the Bureaus remained outside the formal criminal justice and penal systems, their close linkage with law enforcement served to normalize the presence of police in the lives of young Americans living in segregated poverty. As such, YSBs ultimately widened the net of the criminal justice system by using the provision of social services as a vector for law enforcement to surveil a much larger pool of *potentially* delinquent youth.[34]

For a sociologist trained in Becker's interactionist approach to "deviance," agencies like the Youth Service Bureaus might have been fertile ground to research how new institutions of social

[31] Mike Vouri, Julia Vouri, and San Juan Historical Society and Museum, *Friday Harbor* (Charleston, SC: Arcadia Publishing, 2009), 113.
[32] Mary Kay Becker, "Washington State's New Juvenile Code: An Introduction," *Gonzaga Law Review* 14, no. 2 (1979): 293-94.
[33] Uplift Families, "J David Hawkins TIPS Talk 2018," (3:15-4:10, March 15, 2022 2018). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hwE5dI4wfRA.
[34] Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The making of mass incarceration in America*, Chapter 6.

control produced new deviant subjects. Indeed, some of Hawkins' contemporaries positioned in academic departments of sociology and criminology did in fact pursue precisely such lines of inquiry.[35] Notably, these scholars came to many of the same conclusions about the Youth Service Bureaus net-widening effects that have since been more recent historical work. Hawkins' experiences did not lead him toward these same insights. Having accepted a job as an Evaluation Specialist for the King County YSB, he was no longer in the position championed by his doctoral supervisor Becker—that of the critical sociologist, distanced from the pragmatic concerns of lawmakers and layperson. Instead, he had stepped into a role that demanded the production of precisely the kind of professionalized, practical knowledge that Becker had encouraged sociologists to abandon a decade earlier.

That Hawkins found work as an evaluator of a federally funded social program in the mid-1970s was reflective of wider political shifts underway at the time. The unprecedented (though ultimately insufficient) federal funds that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had pumped into the US welfare system during the 1960s greatly increased the number of service providers and those tasked with managing them. As a result, practitioners and administrators within the field of social work began calling for a more refined set of tools to manage, evaluate and improve upon the provision of social welfare services.[36] As the political climate veered rightward during the late 1960s, a growing chorus of conservative lawmakers, commentators and social scientists argued that taxpayers' money was being wasted on social services that were in fact exacerbating both poverty and crime.[37] Reflecting this sentiment, the Nixon and Ford administrations pushed for further scrutiny of federally-funded social programs.[38]

The cumulative effect of these developments made room for a class of expert evaluators, whose ranks were joined by academically trained social scientists like David Hawkins. The authority of these specialists stemmed less from their frontline experience offering direct service, than it did from their ability to master statistical methods and the growing academic literature on evaluation research. New journals dedicated to the evaluation, administration and management of social work sprung up during the 1970s to facilitate the circulation of knowledge within these rapidly professionalizing domains.[39] In these, as well as older journals of social work, contributors began to refer to the period coinciding with the Nixon and Ford presidencies as "the Age of Accountability."[40]

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[35] Thomas Blomberg, "Diversion and Accelerated Social Control," *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 68, no. 2 (1977); Thomas Blomberg, "Widening the net: an anomaly in the evaluation of diversion programs," in *Handbook of Criminal Justice Evaluation*, ed. Malcolm Klein and Kathie S. Teilman (Belaverly Hills: Sage, 1979); Kenneth Polk, *Youth Service Burreaus: The Record and Their Prospects*, The School of Social Service Administration (University of Chicago, 1981); Cheryl H. Ruby, "Theoretical Orientations of Diversion Staff" (University of Oregon, 1974), as cited in Polk, Youth Service Bureaus.

[36] Suan Ostrander Ostrander, "A Short and Selective History of Evaluation Research in the United States," in *Making a difference: the practice of sociology*, ed. Irwin Deustcher (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 30-33.

[37] Marisa Chappell, *The War on Welfare: Family, Poverty, and Politics in Modern America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Alice O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), Chapter 8.

[38] Maoz Brown, "Constructing Accountability: The Development and Delegation of Outcome Evaluation in American Social Work," *Social Science Review* 93, no. 4 (2019); Sarah Katherine Mergel, *Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 113-19.

[39] George F. Madaus and Daniel L. Stufflebeam, "Program Evaluation: A Historical Overview," in *Evaluation models: Viewpoints on educational and human services evaluation*, ed. Daniel L. Stufflebeam, George F. Madaus, and Thomas Kellaghan (New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 15; "Editorial," *Administration in Social Work* 1, no. 1 (1977).

[40] E.g. Scott Briar, "The Age of Accountability," *Social Work* 18, no. 1 (1973); George Hoshino, "Social Services: The Problem of Accountability," *Social Service Review* 47, no. 3 (1973); Harold Lewis, "The future role of the social service

Hawkins' first two academic articles were indicative of the new directions his work as an evaluator was taking him. One was a quantitative exploration of the different measures delinquency prevention programs could use to capture rates of recidivism rates among the young people they served.[41] The other, published in the newly established journal *Administration in Social Work*, laid out "an interactive strategy for designing, mounting, carrying out, and reporting evaluation studies" that sought to overcome some of the major challenges confronting the evaluation researcher.[42] In contrast to the attention his doctoral research had paid to the inevitable role of values and ideology in processes of social control, Hawkins described the ideal evaluator as someone who could enter a social program "in the *neutral* role of facilitator."[43] In this capacity, the evaluator's task was to work with funders, administrators, program staff and clients to determine what the desired outcome of a given intervention was and how this was to be measured. Hawkins acknowledged that, in the context of delinquency prevention, there were many ways to define and measure "success."[44] However, according to his understanding of the evaluator's role, such definitional matters were best settled by those between those being evaluated and those commissioning the evaluation—not by the evaluator.

When it came to evaluating the King County YSB, Hawkins followed the lead of the federal lawmakers who commissioned the evaluation. These commissioners were interested in a understanding the YSBs "effect on reducing the *total* number of acts which are at odds with official legal norms, either as committed by those individuals served by a program or in the geographical area (target area) in which the program operates." This meant looking beyond official records, which captured only the behavior that some agency of social control had registered as "delinquent," and finding new, quantitative measures for "*all* acts which are at odds with official legal norms."[45]

From the perspective of the Youth Service Bureau, this approach to measuring rates of delinquency and recidivism made sense. Given that their entire *raison d'être* was to engage youth *before* they were officially adjudicated by the criminal justice system, the Bureaus needed to look beyond official police records if they were to prove their effectiveness. From a conceptual perspective, however, this was a marked departure from the "labelling" approaches that had informed Hawkins doctoral training. An interactionist, for example, might have studied the situational and institutional dynamics of the YSB that lead certain youth to be labelled as "delinquent" or "pre-delinquent." By contrast, Hawkins now found himself in the position of the labeler, having to define deviant behavior *ex ante* so that its incidence and variance could be calculated in the general population served by the King Count YSB.

Driven as it was by the immediate and pragmatic demands of a government funded agency seeking to prove its efficacy in an increasingly fiscally conservative climate, Hawkins' initial

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administrator," *Administration in Social Work* 1, no. 2 (1977): 116; Emmanuel Tropp, "Expectation, Performance, and Accountability," *Social work* 19, no. 2 (1974). For a broader account of the rise of a culture of accountability in the Anglo-American world during the 1970s and 1980s, see Michael Power, *The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[41] J. David Hawkins et al., "Interpreting Official Records as Indicators of Recidivism in Evaluating Delinquency Prevention Programs," *Criminology* 15, no. 3 (1977).

[42] J. David Hawkins and Donald Sloma, "Recognizing the Organizational Context: A Strategy for Evaluation Research," *Administration in Social Work* 2, no. 3 (1978).

[43] Hawkins and Sloma, "Recognizing the Organizational Context: A Strategy for Evaluation Research," 288. Emphasis added.

[44] Hawkins et al., "Interpreting Official Records as Indicators of Recidivism in Evaluating Delinquency Prevention Programs," 398.

[45] Hawkins et al., "Interpreting Official Records as Indicators of Recidivism in Evaluating Delinquency Prevention Programs," 398. Emphasis added.

evaluation research paid little attention to the interplay between values and ideology—let alone the wider political economy—that was shaping federal anti-delinquency policymaking at the time.[46] If the YSBs were widening the net of the law enforcement and setting the stage for an era of racialized mass incarceration, such concerns did not appear in the academic publications that resulted from his evaluation research at the King County Bureau.[47] The task at hand was, rather, a technical one, oriented toward helping a rapidly expanding law enforcement system arrive at measures that would help justify its hold over growing swathes of the population. For Hawkins, honing the skills to conduct such research paid off. As the demand for evaluation studies continued to grow through the 1970s and into the 1980s, having such skills opened up a world of professional opportunity.

"Juvenile Injustice Prevention Perhaps?"

In 1976, the technical skills that Hawkins had developed evaluating the King County YSB landed him his next job at the School of Social Work at University of Washington, Seattle. He was hired to evaluate the state of Washington's drug treatment system. Funded by soft money from the recently created National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), the project was the first in a series of NIDA-grants that Hawkins would receive. Much like his experience working as a probation officer, Hawkins observed high rates of relapse among the clients coming out of these therapeutic communities. This further confirmed his growing conviction that prevention, rather than treatment or rehabilitation, was the way forward.[48]

Shortly after starting his evaluation of drug treatment systems, Hawkins was hired by sociologist Joseph Weis to work concurrently as a Prevention Specialist at the University of Washington's newly founded National Center for the Assessment of Delinquent Behavior and Its Prevention (hereafter CADBIP). Like Hawkins, the Center's founder, Joseph Weis, had studied under some of the leading interactionist sociologists during his graduate studies at Berkeley.[49] After graduating, however, Weis had similarly drifted away from the interactionist, "flower-power" sociology of his doctoral training to pursue a more applied, quantitative research agenda at the University of Washington. Describing CADBIP's research agenda, for example, Weis wrote of wanting to "help practitioners, researchers, policy makers and the public in establishing a theoretically sound framework for the understanding of delinquency behavior that will lead to

[46] E.g. John Clegg and Adaner Usmani, "The Economic Origins of Mass Incarceration," *Catalyst*, no. 3 (2019), https://catalyst-journal.com/2019/12/the-economic-origins-of-mass-incarceration/; Elizabeth Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Ruth Wilson Gilmore, *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis and Opposition in Globalizing California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

[47] Also noteworthy is the fact that, reflecting the general demographics of King County during the 1970s, the clientele served by the King County YSB at the time was 94.1% White. The racialized dynamics of the wider YSB system may therefore have been less evident from the standpoint of the King County YSB, Nancy Kurfiss et al., *The King County Youth Service Bureau System: A Preliminary Evaluation*, Division of Youth Affairs (Seattle, WA 1974), EVD 1; "Mapping Race Seattle/King County 1940-2020," 2017, accessed December 15, 2022, https://depts.washington.edu/civilr/maps_race_seattle.htm.

[48] J. David Hawkins and N. Wacker, "Verbal Performances and Addict Conversion: An Interactionist Perspective on Therapeutic Communities," *Journal of Drug Issues* 13, no. 2 (1983).

[49] Randolph R Myers and Tim Goddard, "The Berkeley School of Criminology: The Intellectual Roots and Legacies," in *The Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Criminology*, ed. Ruth Ann Triplett (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018); Joseph G. Weis and David Matza, "Dialogue with David Matza," *Issues in Criminology* 6, no. 1 (1971).

sound decision on preventive measures."[50] Elsewhere, CADBIP researchers spoke of developing "an effective technology for delinquency prevention."[51]

The CADBIP received its mandate from the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. Among the many reforms the Act had ushered in was the stipulation that the juvenile justice bureaucracy ought to systematically gather and assess "data on the causes, prevention, and treatment of juvenile, delinquency to serve as a foundation for planning prevention policies and programs."[52] The University of Washington's CADBIP was one of four National Assessment Centers established by the federal juvenile delinquency bureaucracy to fulfill this mandate. For Jospeh Weis, then, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act mobilized the funds to found a nationally-recognized research center. For David Hawkins, it created a job opportunity.

By contrast, for economically disadvantaged teenagers—many of them youth of color—the Act created the conditions for heightened contact with the criminal justice system. Historian Elizabeth Hinton has documented how the Act effectively bifurcated the American juvenile justice system along racial, class, and gender lines. Its passage marked the culmination of competing calls to reform the juvenile justice system that had been growing since the 1960s. On the one hand, racially biased research on the criminality of Black urban youth contributed to a growing consensus among scholars, politicians and law enforcement that the social welfare policies of the War on Poverty had in fact made the crime problem worse. Those who subscribed to this view took young Black offenders living in neighborhoods of segregated poverty as being beyond any hope of preventive or rehabilitative interventions.[53] On the other hand, concern was also growing over the rising number of merely "troubled" youth getting caught in the criminal justice system on the basis of minor offences. Not only would such contact risk turning these otherwise harmless youth into hardened criminals, it also threatened to distract an already overburdened justice system from focusing on incarcerating more serious offenders.[54]

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 sought to address both these concerns. For youth detained for minor, non-violent acts it created pathways of diversion away from the criminal justice system into foster care, community-based detention and rehabilitation programs. Crucially, however, the Act left it up to the discretion of judges to determine which youth would be diverted from the criminal justice system and which would be incarcerated. Predictably, the results of this policy lead to a far greater percentage of White, middle-class, female young offenders being diverted toward rehabilitative services. By contrast, a far greater proportion of economically disadvantaged, male offenders of color were sent to prison. As a result, many of the preventive diversion programs that grew out of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act ended up catering to the needs of middle-class, White youth. Where preventive or rehabilitative social service programs *did* target racially and economically marginalized constituencies, they arguably did not target the root causes of their marginalization and offered what might, at best, be characterized as band-aid solutions.[55]

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[50] E.g. John S. Wall et al., *Juvenile Delinquency Prevention: A Compendium of 36 Program Models* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), vi.
[51] E.g. Wall et al., *Juvenile Delinquency Prevention: A Compendium of 36 Program Models*, vii, 3.
[52] J. David Hawkins et al., *A Typology of Cause-Focused Strategies of Delinquency Prevention* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), Foreward.
[53] Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The making of mass incarceration in America*, 223-30.
[54] Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The making of mass incarceration in America*, 230-35.
[55] One such program, for example, incentivized "hard-to-reach" teens to behave themselves by offering them limited access to "mini bikes." Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America*, 232-35.

Even as it created pathways to divert youth away from the criminal justice system, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act greatly expanded the budget allocated to urban police forces and authorized new forms of surveillance via urban public schools, public housing, and public assistance programs for low-income families.[56] With the youth who were seen as "less dangerous" being handled by preventive and rehabilitative programs, those perceived as more seriously delinquent became the target of these newly empowered police forces. The Act also allowed the courts to try as adults certain sixteen-year-olds whose offenses were deemed serious enough. Once again, a disproportionate number of economically disadvantaged teenagers—many of them youth of color—fell into the cross hairs of this provision.[57] In other words, as Elizabeth Hinton has argued, the punitive arm of the youth crime control apparatus that emerged during the mid-1970s became "the lynchpin of the mass incarceration of Black and Latino citizens."[58]

Some of the research that was funded by the provisions of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act called attention to the racism of the new federal youth crime control regime. As early as 1975, for example, Frank Zimring, a law professor at the University of Chicago funded by the new federal juvenile justice bureaucracy, sounded his alarm over the racial disparities he predicted the new system was going to create.[59] CADBIP-founder Joseph Weis was similarly attuned to the racial and class disparities of the juvenile justice system.[60] This awareness was reflected in an early working paper that Weis wrote for the federal juvenile delinquency bureaucracy. The paper appeared in a volume that "intended to transmit to government officials, criminal justice planners, juvenile justice personnel, legislators, and concerned citizens information about delinquency prevention" in an effort to overcome "the separation of theory and practice in the prevention area."[61]

For his contribution, Weis was commissioned to provide an overview of "social control" theories of delinquency. His paper offered a balanced summary of the state of "social control" scholarship, detailing both the available evidence that supported such theories and the critiques that called them into question. In his conclusion, however, Weis expressed his own misgivings about "social control" theories. He was upfront about the fact that, ideologically, they pointed toward "liberal reform efforts." Such efforts, he explained, took "the conventional order" as a given and did their best to ameliorate the lot of juveniles caught within it.[62] Were such liberal reform efforts really the way forward though? Weis was not convinced. Echoing the critical criminologists under whom he had studied at Berkeley, Weis concluded his working paper remarking,

> There is evidence elsewhere which suggests that criminologists should concentrate less on the juvenile delinquency problem and its prevention and more on the problems that the social structure, culture, and institutions create for juveniles and on the issue of social

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[56] Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The making of mass incarceration in America*, 222.
[57] Ibid, 236-242.
[58] Ibid, 242.
[59] Frank E. Zimring, *Dealing with Youth Crime, National Needs and Priorities*, Office of Juvenile Justice (LEAA) (1975). as quoted in Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, "The Justice Department's Fight Against Youth Crime" (1978); see also Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The making of mass incarceration in America*, 241.
[60] E.g. Joseph G. Weis, "Book Review: Delinquency in a Birth Cohort: by Marvin E. Wolfgang, Robert M. Figlio, and Thorsten Sellin," *Journal of Criminal Justice* 2, no. 1 (1974).
[61] National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, *A Comparative Analysis of Delinquency Prevention Theory*, Preventing Delinquency, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1977), 3.
[62] National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, *A Comparative Analysis of Delinquency Prevention Theory*, 44.

> justice for juveniles (juvenile injustice prevention perhaps?). Ultimately, we may be deluding ourselves in thinking that something can be done to prevent delinquency within the current social order.[63]

Despite having such misgivings, Weis nevertheless found himself at the helm of a federally-funded research center charged precisely with concentrating on "the juvenile delinquency problem." Moreover, as the political climate in the US continued to veer rightward during the late 1970s, proposals to change "the social structure, culture and institutions" of US society were increasingly seen as an outmoded, utopian hangover from the 1960s. Furthermore, concurrent to founding CADBIP, Weis had embarked on a collaboration with Travis Hirschi and Michael Hindelang, two criminologists who were vehemently opposed to the radical, politicized criminology of the early 1970s. As the next section illustrates, all these factors converged to set CADBIP's research agenda on a more positivistic, conservative course.

Revitalizing Positivism

During the 1970s, thanks to the activism of a newly founded networks of thinktanks and free-market economists, "supply side" economics began to prevail over the Keynesian macroeconomic policies that had been in place since the Great Depression.[64] Although Jimmy Carter began his term pursuing a broadly Keynesian agenda, by the end of his time in Office, his Administration had largely embraced the tenets of supply side economics in an effort to revive the US economy. The growth of neoliberal economics coincided with the growing popularity of neoconservative intellectuals who, since the mid-1960s, had been mounting attacks on the New Deal welfare state and the anti-authoritarian ethos of the New Left.[65] A nascent right wing Christian movement opposed to the sexually liberal politics of the 1960s and committed to restoring traditional family values was also gaining steam.[66] Important differences aside, by the end of the 1970s, proponents of these various movements increasingly converged on a consensus that the New Deal welfare state had contributed to the economic and moral collapse of the nation by disincentivizing work, undermining the traditional family and fostering crime.[67] Adherents of this new consensus saw individual enterprise, family self-sufficiency and the retrenchment of the federal welfare state as key to restoring moral and economic order in the US. Even as they repackaged many "old right" principles, the leading proponents of the "new right" rebranded the movements as a force for progress, hope and change while casting New Deal liberals as the retrograde defenders of a discredited and dysfunctional era of Big Government collectivism.[68]

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[63] National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, *A Comparative Analysis of Delinquency Prevention Theory*, 44.

[64] On the rise of supply-side economics see e.g. Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds., *The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); James T. Patterson, *Restless Giant: The United States From Watergate to Bush V. Gore* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 155; Jamie Peck, *Constructions of neoliberal reason* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

[65] On the rise of the neoconservatives, see e.g. Mark Gerson, *The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars* (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1996); Patterson, *Restless Giant: The United States From Watergate to Bush V. Gore*, 132; Justin Vaïsse, *Neoconservatism: the biography of a movement*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).

[66] On the rise of the religious right, see e.g. Patterson, *Restless Giant: The United States From Watergate to Bush V. Gore*, 134-45.

[67] Melinda Cooper, *Family Values: Between Neoliberalism and the New Social Conservatism* (New York: Zone Books, 2021).

[68] Sean Wilentz, *The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008* (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 23, 91-92.

Social theorists have noted that, in parallel with these broader societal changes, various neoconservative or "revanchist" strands of criminological research took off in reaction to what its proponents saw as the relativistic and critical excesses of criminological theory during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Proponents of this neoconservative turn were guided by a Hobbesian understanding of human nature which assumed that, in the absence of social control, harmful, self-interested and immoral behavior was par for the human course. As a result, they framed the central problem of American society as a dangerous unravelling of its social fabric and institutions of socialization that threatened to unleash the latent criminality that lurked in everyone.[69]

Criminologist Travis Hirschi was an influential contributor to this revival. Like Joseph Weis, Hirschi had completed his PhD at Berkeley where he studied under some of the leading interactionist sociologists of the 1960s. Disdainful of the critical, activist scholarship produced by Berkeley's School of Criminology during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Hirschi expressed relief to have left prior to its radicalization.[70] Speculating in an interview conducted in 2000, Hirschi wondered, "Who knows what would have happened had I applied later? Would I have become a flaming radical?"[71]

Published in 1969, Hirschi's doctoral dissertation-turned-criminological-classic, *Causes of Delinquency*, argued that the question criminologists should ask was not, "Why do criminals commit crimes?" but rather, "Why *don't* law abiding citizens commit crimes?" In his view, there was much evidence to suggest that most humans would commit crimes if given the chance to do so. However, Hirschi argued that those who abided by the law do so because they are bonded to "conventional" society through a constellation of attachments, commitments, involvement and beliefs. These, Hirschi argued, were secured primarily at the level of the family, the school and peers.[72] Due to their emotional investment in such bonds, law-abiding citizens refrained from committing crimes for fear of jeopardizing these relationships.

Hirschi's "control theory" of deviance was meant to be abstract and universal. He rejected what he called the "typological definitions of delinquency" advanced by those who argued that different types of delinquent acts (e.g., smoking marijuana vs. pushing cars over embankments) required different explanations. For Hirschi, the fact that both acts were illegal, was reason enough to treat them as tokens of the same type.[73] So too was he opposed to the prospect of offering different explanations for the delinquent behaviors of different groups (e.g., youth of color living in urban neighborhoods of segregated poverty vs. the middle-class youth living in the suburbs). As he explained in *Causes of Delinquency,*

> [a]ctually, the diversity of the perpetrators of delinquent acts is irrelevant in judging a theory of delinquency unless such diversity if precluded by the theory. If it is unreasonable to attempt to explain delinquent acts because they are committed by girls, the children of rich men and the children of farmers, then, by the same token, it makes

[69] David Garland, *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Dario Melossi, "Changing Representations of the Criminal," *British Journal of Criminology* 40, no. 2 (2000); "Theories of social control and the state between American and European shores," in *The Blackwell Companion to Criminology*, ed. Colin Sumner (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004); Guido Giacomo Preparata, "Suburbia's "Crime Experts": The Neo-Conservatism of Control Theory and the Ethos of Crime " *Critical Criminology* 21, no. 1 (2013).
[70] Myers and Goddard, "The Berkeley School of Criminology: The Intellectual Roots and Legacies."
[71] Travis Hirschi and John H. Laub, *The Craft of Criminology: Selected Papers* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), xiv.
[72] Travis Hirschi, *Causes of delinquency* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 34.
[73] Hirschi, *Causes of delinquency*, 51-53.

> little sense to try to explain urban lower-class male delinquency, because some urban lower-class male delinquents are tall, some have red hair, and some are of Italian extraction.[74]

Given his commitment to developing a general, universal theory of delinquency, Hirschi also rejected the "labelling" theories of deviance that had been popular during the 1960s. He did so on the grounds that they captured too narrow a domain of delinquent acts. Why certain youth came to be officially labelled as "delinquents" while others escaped official sanction was not a question that much interested him.[75] By Hirschi's definition of delinquency, a delinquent act was a delinquent act, regardless of who committed it or whether it was detected by institutions of social control. Accordingly, he looked beyond official statistics and relied on self-report surveys to capture what he saw as the "true" incidence of delinquent acts within a given population.

The political implications of Hirschi's research were ambivalent. On the one hand, his finding that self-reported delinquency appeared to be equally distributed across race and class lines, led him to conclude that the race and class discrepancies observed in official statistics were indeed the result of a biased criminal justice system.[76] On the other hand, his theory suggested that the answer to preventing delinquency lay in socializing all youth—regardless of race or class—into that very same racist, classist "conventional order." In other words, the prevention of delinquency lay not in addressing America's racialized class structure or criminal justice system, but rather in ensuring that individuals were sufficiently bonded to that "conventional order." Moreover, his insistence that delinquency could be prevented at the level of the individual, the family and the school meshed conveniently with the increasingly "small government" ethos of the 1970s.

Hirschi himself was largely unconcerned with the political or ideological dimensions of his work. He fashioned himself as a dispassionate positivist that was above irrational forces of ideology that had compromised the sociological enterprise during the 1960s.[77] Given the polarized climate of the 1970s, Hirschi advocated for a "free and open competition" between the different criminological theories with all their attendant values and ideologies. In his view, the outcome of such a competition would ultimately be settled by submitting the contending theories to impartial, empirical tests. As he wrote in a 1973 polemic addressed to his fellow criminologists, "simply let the data decide."[78]

In 1976, Hirschi embarked upon a collaboration with criminologist Michael Hindelang and CADBIP-founder Joseph Weis on a project to develop more valid and reliable measures of delinquency. The three criminologists were troubled by the ongoing debate between those who claimed there was no meaningful relationship between social class, race and delinquency and those who claimed there was.[79] With funding from the National Institute of Mental Health, they set out to determine whether the roots of such disagreements in fact lay in discrepancies in the measures that different social scientists used to capture rates of delinquency. The result was the Seattle Youth Study, a largescale comparative research project that used both self-reported and

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[74] Hirschi, *Causes of delinquency*, 52.
[75] Hirschi, *Causes of delinquency*, 231-32.
[76] See e.g. Hirschi, *Causes of delinquency*, 67-69, 78-81.
[77] See e.g. Travis Hirschi and Michael R. Gottfredson, eds., *Positive Criminology* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1987).
[78] See e.g. Travis Hirschi, "Procedural Rules and the Study of Deviant Behavior," *Social Problems* 21, no. 2 (1973): 160 n2.
[79] Michael J. Hindelang, Travis Hirschi, and Joseph G. Weis, *Measuring Delinquency* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981), 10.

official arrest data to explore what each kind of data could be trusted when measuring delinquency.

The Seattle Youth Study sought to re-establish the measurement of deviance as a primarily technical endeavor. As one reviewer of the study's resulting monograph described it,

> *Measuring Delinquency* reports in painful detail an attempt to reconcile two radically disparate views of the distribution of juvenile delinquency in society, each rooted in the results derived from a particular approach to measuring delinquency. It is, as the title suggests, a book about social measurement, and it is written in a style that anyone without specialized technical training is likely to find forbidding.[80]

Published in 1981, *Measuring Delinquency* concluded that there was a negligible relationship between social class and delinquency, but that there was in fact a relation between race and delinquency.[81] After reverse record checking the self-reported data of Black youth against what they took to be "perfectly valid official measures," Hindelang, Hirschi and Weis found that Black youth significantly underreported their involvement in the kind of serious delinquent acts that were picked up by official police records. This, they argued, was what accounted for the discrepancy between the stark racial differences that appeared in official data and the lack of any such difference in self-reported data. In turn, they concluded that "although racial discrimination in criminal justice processing undoubtedly exists, the available evidence clearly indicates that for the offenses examined [by the Seattle Youth Study], there are true black/white differences in offending behavior." [82]

In short, *Measuring Delinquency* concluded that self-reported delinquency data collected from White, middle-class youth could be trusted. By contrast, in the case of Black youth, police statistics were more reliable than self-reported data. Black youth committed more serious offences than White youth; yet, apparently, this had nothing to do with social class. Concerned as they were with strictly technical questions of measurement, however, Hindelang, Hirschi and Weis did not offer any explanation of these differences.[83] How it was that "race" could emerge as a significant variable while "social class" did not, for example, was not a question they addressed. The task of reassessing the causes of delinquency in light of the findings presented in *Measuring Delinquency* as one they would take up elsewhere.[84] For his part, Joseph Weis took up this task through the research he oversaw at the CADBIP. As the CADBIP began publishing its first reports in the early 1980s, the influence of Hirschi's positivistic approach to criminology on the Center's research agenda was palpable.

[As someone without specialized technical training in social measurement, I myself have found Measuring Delinquency to be quite forbidding. Accordingly, I'm still unsure on whether my reading of its conclusion are correct/fair. On the off chance that anyone is familiar with this work (or Hirschi's oeuvre more broadly), I would appreciate your thoughts!]

[80] David Seidman, "Review: Delinquent Measures," *Michigan Law Review* 80, no. 4 (1982): 823.
[81] Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis, *Measuring Delinquency*, Chapters 8-9.
[82] Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis, *Measuring Delinquency*, 180.
[83] Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis, *Measuring Delinquency*, 180.
[84] Michael Hindelang died of a brain tumor a year after *Measuring Delinquency* was published. Hirschi put forward his own updated theory of delinquency in Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi, *A General Theory of Crime* (Standford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).

The Social Development Model

When Joseph Weis first founded the CADBIP in 1977, he had been willing to acknowledge the ideological underpinnings of "social control" theories and to discuss the misgivings he had about them. Four years into his collaboration with Travis Hirschi and Michael Hindelang, however, Weis's research output struck a very different tone. One of the Center's first major published reports noted, for example,

> Like many primary prevention programs in other fields, delinquency prevention programs have often been founded on an *ideological commitment* to primary prevention. Prevention activities have been based on *intuitive assumptions* about delinquency and its causes which remain unspecified. As a result, much work in the prevention area has failed to add to the development of a knowledge base regarding which of the many proposed causes of delinquency are most important and which can be successfully addressed. [85]

By the early 1980s, then, Weis was presiding over a research agenda that framed ideological commitments as an impediment to gaining sociological knowledge.

Following in the steps of Hirschi, Weis directed a research program that sought to transcend the ideological baggage of previous criminological research by setting up a free and open competition of existing theories of delinquency and then "letting the data decide." As such, the Center's first official report put forward a system for classifying and comparing existing prevention strategies based on the different causes of misbehavior they targeted. Authored by David Hawkins and his fellow CADBIP researchers, the report surveyed the theoretical literature on delinquency and articulated a typology that specified 12 putative causes of delinquency (Figure 1). Ranging from the physiological to the economic, these causes were derived from a plurality of theories that included both interactionist, labelling and social control perspectives.[86]

Hawkins and his colleagues used their newly minted typology to classify and evaluate existing delinquency prevention efforts. After surveying 512 delinquency prevention initiatives around the country, they published a second report that provided a compendium of 36 programs. Three criteria were used to select the 36 programs featured. First, to be featured, a program needed to address at least one empirically supported cause of delinquency specified by the CADBIP's new typology (Figure 1). Second, only those programs showing the most promising evaluation results were included. Third, Hawkins and his colleagues sought to represent "a range of programs focusing on the major institutions affecting the lives of youths during the developmental process."[87]

For a report that was meant to "stimulate creative thought and action by those concerned with youth crime," the resulting compendium presented a relatively limited imaginative panorama.[88] More radical and creative thinking about how to respond to crime in the US certainly existed at the time.[89] However, the narrow criteria that CADBIP researchers used to admit programs into their compendium effectively barred such thinking from their consideration. Thus, although

[85] Hawkins et al., *A Typology of Cause-Focused Strategies of Delinquency Prevention*, 6. Emphasis added.
[86] Hawkins et al., *A Typology of Cause-Focused Strategies of Delinquency Prevention.*
[87] Wall et al., *Juvenile Delinquency Prevention: A Compendium of 36 Program Models*, 3.
[88] Wall et al., *Juvenile Delinquency Prevention: A Compendium of 36 Program Models*, 3.
[89] E.g. Angela Y. Davis and Dylan Rodriguez, "The Challenge of Prison Abolition: A Conversation," *Social Justice* 27, no. 3 (2000); Thomas Mathieson, *The Politics of Abolition* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1974); Mark Morris, ed., *Instead of Prisons: A Handbook for Abolitionists* (Syracuse, NY: Prison Research Education Action Project, 1976).

Hawkins and his CADBIP colleagues imagined themselves to be staging a free and open competition of theories and data, they were rather more selective in determining what kinds of theories and data were to be admitted onto the positivist playing field in the first place.

As a result, of the thirty-six programs featured, only one was dedicated to confronting the "exclusionary social response" of the juvenile justice system via a strategy of "abandoning legal control" (Figure 1, last row). Based in Tucson, Arizona the program focused on organizing the local county to divert young female offenders away from the local juvenile justice system.[90] Similarly, just five of the thirty six programs addressed "economic need" (Figure 1, tenth row) by equipping youth with job training, entry level jobs and/or "realistic individual and career goals."[91] While some of these programs sought to place youth in jobs that would lead to careers, others reported "major difficulties in finding a sufficient number of jobs for enrollees that satisfy their interests and aspirations."[92] Hawkins and his co-authors also noted that unless employers were able to offer youths "meaningful employment with advancement potential and a reasonable starting salary, the motivation to use criminal means to attain income may be difficult to offset and job retention may remain a problem." Indeed, an evaluation of one of the five programs addressing "economic need" found that starting wages for the jobs offered to the youth were between $3.10 and $3.25 per hour, while another study found that youth in the same city could make between $150 and $450 per week selling drugs."[93]

Of the thirty-six programs featured in the compendium, twenty-three intervened at what Hawkins and colleagues denoted an "individual" or an "interactional" level—that is, they sought to change the behaviors individual adolescents and/or modify their face-to-face interactions with teachers, parents and peers.[94] Of the remaining thirteen programs deemed to address delinquency at an "institutional" or "structural" level, the majority were focused on implementing alternative education and extracurricular programs in individual classrooms or schools. The one example of a community-wide effort to implement system-wide changes across schools, service agencies and law enforcement took place in a small, rural community in Maine whose residents were 100% White. Even here, the kinds of "structural" change sought by the program did not exceed the local level.

The researchers at CADBIP were not unaware of the structural determinants of crime. In the opening of a third CADBIP report on alternative education programs, Hawkins and his colleague John Wall conceded that the relationship between delinquency and schooling had roots in various structural transformations that had occurred in what they termed the "post-Sputnik era." Rapid technological advances since the 1940s had made secondary education a reality for more l4-to-17-year-olds than ever before. As more students had entered public high schools, the increasing cost of providing a quality, public, K-12 education to all Americans became a matter of fiscal concern. Policymakers had responded by creating larger schools and consolidating school districts in an attempt to create an economy of scale capable of balancing public spending with the need for a more highly educated citizenry. But these larger, more impersonal institutions, however, appeared to foster greater rates of failure, truancy, violence and vandalism.[95]

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[90] Wall et al., *Juvenile Delinquency Prevention: A Compendium of 36 Program Models*, 78-80.
[91] Wall et al., *Juvenile Delinquency Prevention: A Compendium of 36 Program Models*, 107.
[92] Wall et al., *Juvenile Delinquency Prevention: A Compendium of 36 Program Models*. 108, 130.
[93] Wall et al., *Juvenile Delinquency Prevention: A Compendium of 36 Program Models*, 62.
[94]Wall et al., *Juvenile Delinquency Prevention: A Compendium of 36 Program Models*, 7-16.
[95] J. David Hawkins and John S. Wall, *Alternative Education: Exploring the Delinquency Prevention Potential* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 3-4.

Hawkins and Wall saw reform at a systemic, school district-wide scale as a "conceptually promising" avenue for the prevention of delinquency. However, the pressure to produce tractable solutions within a climate of increasing fiscal conservatism, however, lead them to put forward more modest proposals. In their view, systemic reforms would be costly to implement, as would be the large-scale, long-term evaluation studies that would be needed to test their efficacy. They further reasoned that even with system-wide alternatives in place, some behavior problems were likely to continue to occur. Moreover, according to their assessment of the empirical data,

> high school students' experiences of academic failure, weak commitments to educational pursuits and attachments to school, and association with delinquent peers appear more closely related to delinquency than do family, community, or social structural variables.[96]

As such, in the interest of identifying "an effective technology of prevention," school- or classroom-based interventions targeted at disruptive youth appeared the most promising way forward.

In the absence of systemic reform, Hawkins and Wall's report for the federal juvenile justice bureaucracy promoted alternative education programs as a promising vehicle for the prevention of delinquency. Such programs, they argued, could heighten struggling students' academic success; increase their attachment to school, teachers, and "conventional" peers; and decrease their attachment to delinquent peers. This was to be achieved through a mix of individualized instruction; the implementation of token or credit economics within the classroom to incentivize academic progress; goal-oriented learning; and improving the physical and human factors in the specific classrooms where such programs were to take place.[97]

The CADBIP's research agenda culminated with the publication of Hawkins' and Weis' own prevention strategy in 1981. Guided in large part by Travis Hirschi's control theory of delinquency, Hawkins and Weis baptized their theory the "Social Development Model" (SDM) of delinquency (Figure 2). The SDM was informed by a developmental vision of delinquency that charted the processes by which youth formed (or failed to form) "moral bonds to the conventional order."[98] This process began in the family during early childhood; shifted to the school as children moved beyond the bounds of their family as they began their educational journey; and, finally, settled around peer relations during the adolescent years. Weis and Hawkins conceptualized the model as a "series of passages from one institution of socialization to another during which the preceding institution gradually decreases in importance as a socializing force while the next institution becomes increasingly salient."[99]

Based on the findings of Joseph Weis's collaboration with Travis Hirschi and Michael Hindelang, the SDM was premised on the understanding that there were "two sets of correlates of delinquent behavior which theory and, therefore, prevention should take into account." One set of correlates was primarily "causal" and consisted of family, school, and peer variables. The other set consisted in what Hawkins and Weis took to be more "more properly 'sociodemographic' controls, including sex, age, and race." Citing the literature on self-reported delinquency, Hawkins and Weis reasserted the claim that there was no meaningful connection between socioeconomic status and delinquency, and thus consigned it to the status of

[96] Hawkins and Wall, *Alternative Education: Exploring the Delinquency Prevention Potential*, 6.
[97] Hawkins and Wall, *Alternative Education: Exploring the Delinquency Prevention Potential.*
[98] Weis and Hawkins, *Preventing Delinquency*, 9.
[99] Weis and Hawkins, *Preventing Delinquency*, 18.

"sociodemographic background."[100] Although Hawkins and Weis conceded that processes of socialization would likely be differentially affected by "sociodemographic background variables," for "heuristic purposes" these were placed "outside of the direct causal relationships" specified by the SDM.[101] Framed as "sociodemographic givens" sex, race and socioeconomic status (SES) were quite literally bracketed from Hawkins' and Weis' explanation of delinquency (Figure 2).[102]

Using the SDM as the basis for their comprehensive prevention strategy, Hawkins and Weis envisioned a set of interventions that would track children in their passage from early childhood through adolescence. These would target what Hawkins and Weis took to be the most salient vectors of socialization at each developmental stage. Hence, during early childhood, interventions would target the family; during elementary school, the school; and during adolescence, peer relationships. During each phase, the goal of these interventions would be to secure the bond between the young person and the "conventional order."

A good portion of the interventions they proposed were directed at enhancing individual competencies. For example, youth would be offered "affective skills" training; families, effective parenting classes; and teachers, classroom management workshops. Other interventions were more ambitious in nature. Struggling families, for example, would be provided with childcare support and child development specialists would be placed in schools to advocate on behalf of students in need of learning supports or other services available in the community." [103] Hawkins and Weis accepted that "fiscal pressures" made certain interventions impossible. For example, although they cited class size as a factor that could improve relationships between students and teachers, they accepted that reducing student-to-teacher ratios was not an option.[104]

Having articulated their vision of a comprehensive delinquency prevention strategy, Hawkins and Weis secured funding from the federal juvenile delinquency bureaucracy to submit it to empirical test. By 1981 they were poised to launch a large scale, seven city, randomized trial of their proposed delinquency prevention strategy. In keeping with the revived positivist tradition in which they worked, they would "let the data" collected by this trial decide whether the SDM was in fact the blueprint for the "effective technology of prevention" that they sought. As the following chapter will outline however, other visions of prevention more attuned to the systemic injustices at the heart of the American social order were also vying to shape the contours of preventive research in the US.

Conclusion

At first glance, David Hawkins' trajectory from counterculture hippy to promoter of the "conventional order" seems an unlikely one. However, in this chapter I have argued that, by attending to the institutional and political contexts in which Hawkins worked, his path is less paradoxical than it first seems. A number of continuities connect Hawkins' early research with the vision of prevention that went on to promote later in his career. For one, the countercultural communes he inhabited as a doctoral student were animated by an ethos that sought to disengage from traditional politics and seek solutions to the problems of the American social order at the level of autonomous communities. Even as Hawkins came to champion "the

[100] Weis and Hawkins, *Preventing Delinquency*, 7.
[101] Weis and Hawkins, *Preventing Delinquency*, 14.
[102] Weis and Hawkins, *Preventing Delinquency*, 14, 26.
[103] Weis and Hawkins, *Preventing Delinquency*, 23-29.
[104] Weis and Hawkins, *Preventing Delinquency*, 30.

conventional order," he remained committed to the basic idea that social problems could be fixed by building caring communities rather than by organizing broad based political struggle.[105]

Second, Hawkins, his collaborator Joseph Weis, and even Travis Hirschi received their sociological training from some of the leading American sociologists who turned away from the structural functionalism and embraced a more reflexive, interactionist approach to the study of deviance during the 1960s. Historians have charted how this generation of sociologists laid the foundation for the radical and Marxist approaches to the sociology of deviance that emerged during 1970s.[106] Less well documented have been the ways in which their approach to the social world enabled a return to older, more conservative visions of social control. As Hawkins', Weis' and Hirschi's trajectories all suggest, a less structural, more contextual approach to the social world could just as easily be put into the service of neoconservative and neoliberal political agendas that stressed the importance of family self-sufficiency and individual responsibility.

Third, from his initial interest in authoring a "how-to" manual for communal living to his later work authoring a "how-to" manual for delinquency prevention, Hawkins' basic interest in producing usable social is another common thread that helps make sense of his trajectory. His affinity with a more pragmatic vision of sociology was well-suited to a political climate that demanded quantifiable, actionable results from federally-funded social programs and research. Coming into the world of professional social work during the "Age of Accountability" seems to have further trained Hawkins' focus away from critical questions of systemic injustice toward more immediate concerns of measuring program effectiveness.

Finally, Hawkins' and Weis' proximity to Travis Hirschi provided them with a positivistic framework that crystalized all of the above influences into a coherent, scientifically-motivated program of research. The seemingly objective, anti-ideological tone of that program fared well in an era that sought to abandon the polarized politics of the 1960s and 1970s and pursue a more technical approach to social problems. Seen in historical perspective, however, the ideological underpinnings of their research are clear. Precisely as changes to the economic, political and demographic structure of the US were bringing the racist, classist and gendered contours of the world's largest prison system into being, Hawkins and Weis came to champion a color-, class- and gender-blind theory that located the causes of delinquency in the individual, the family and the school.

[105] To be clear, I don't think these are mutually exclusive. In Hawkins' work, however, it often feels as if they are. Tellingly, the hugely successful prevention program that Hawkins has gone on to champion is called "Communities That Care," see Abigail A Fagan et al., *Communities That Care: Building Community Engagement and Capacity to Prevent Youth Behavior Problems* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

[106] E,g, Sumner, *The Sociology of Deviance: An Obituary*; Myers and Goddard, "The Berkeley School of Criminology: The Intellectual Roots and Legacies."

FIGURE 1
CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY
AND ASSOCIATED STRATEGIES OF DELINQUENCY PREVENTION

PRESUMED CAUSE	STRATEGY	GOAL OF STRATEGY
PHYSICAL ABNORMALITY/ ILLNESS	BIOLOGICAL-PHYSIOLOGICAL -Health Promotion -Nutrition -Neurological -Genetic	Remove, diminish, control underlying physiological, biological or biopsychiatric conditions.
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTURBANCE DISORDER	PSYCHOLOGICAL/MENTAL HEALTH -Epidemiological/early intervention -Psychotherapeutic -Behavioral	Alter internal psychological states or conditions generating them.
WEAK ATTACHMENTS TO OTHERS	SOCIAL NETWORK DEVELOPMENT -Linkage -Influence	Increase interaction/involvement between youth and non-deviant others; increase influence of non-deviant others on potentially delinquent youth.
CRIMINAL INFLUENCE	CRIMINAL INFLUENCE REDUCTION -Disengagement from criminal influence -Redirection away from criminal norms	Reduce the influence of delinquent norms and persons who directly or indirectly encourage youth to commit delinquent acts.
POWERLESSNESS	POWER-ENHANCEMENT -Informal influence -Formal power	Increase ability or power of youth to influence or control their environments, directly or indirectly.
LACK OF USEFUL WORTHWHILE ROLES	ROLE DEVELOPMENT/ ROLE ENHANCEMENT -Service roles -Production roles -Student roles	Create opportunities for youth to be involved in legitimate roles or activities which youth perceive as useful, successful, competent.
UNOCCUPIED TIME	ACTIVITIES/RECREATION	Involve youth in non-delinquent activities.
INADEQUATE SKILLS	EDUCATION/SKILL DEVELOPMENT -Cognitive -Affective -Moral -Informational	Provide individuals with personal skills which prepare them to find patterns of behavior free from delinquent activities.
CONFLICTING ENVIRONMENTAL DEMANDS	CLEAR AND CONSISTENT SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS	Increase consistency of expectations/ messages from institutions, organizations, groups which affect youth.
ECONOMIC NECESSITY	ECONOMIC RESOURCES -Resource maintenance -Resource attainment	Provide basic resources to preclude the need for delinquency.
LOW DEGREE OF RISK/ DIFFICULTY	DETERRENCE -Target hardening/removal -Anticipatory intervention	Increase cost, decrease benefits of criminal acts.
EXCLUSIONARY SOCIAL RESPONSES	ABANDONMENT OF LEGAL CONTROL/ SOCIAL TOLERANCE -Explicit jurisdictional abandonment -Implicit jurisdictional abandonment -Covert jurisdictional abandonment -Environmental tolerance	Remove certain behaviors from control of the juvenile justice system; decrease the degree to which youths' behaviors are perceived, labeled, treated as delinquent.

Figure 1 *CADBIP's cause-based typology of delinquency prevention.*



Figure 2 *The theoretically and empirically most important units (family, school, law, peers) and elements (attachment, commitment, involvement, belief) of socialization are depicted in the "causal order" of relationships among these variables. (The arrows and valences indicate the direction of the relationships, the causal chain moving from left to right with a "+" indicating a positive association and a "-" indicating a negative association between variables.)*

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