

Many thanks for reading this paper, which I intend to publish as a journal article. I would welcome thoughts on which journal might be the most appropriate venue. The work is quite obviously interdisciplinary — in some ways, the conflicted history of interdisciplinarity is among its central themes — and it might court readerships in urban studies and urban planning, intellectual history, and/or the history of the social sciences specifically.

It condenses material from the second half of my book, which is under contract with Cornell University Press and in the throes of final revisions. The working title is *Timing the Future Metropolis: Foresight, Knowledge, and Doubt in America's Postwar Urbanism*, and the central institution through which I narrate that history is the one discussed here: the Harvard–MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies. (At last year's HISRESS, I presented an article that effectively condensed the first half of the book, with a focus on the codification of “organized urban research” at the Joint Center and a variety of other places.) The argument of this paper is substantially like the one advanced in the book. Naturally, in adapting even part of a much longer work to something at the scale of a single article, I am actively considering what must be done to ensure that the three distinct episodes flow smoothly into one another, and also what else would help contextualize the cases for readers who don't already have a sense of these names and debates.

My Ph.D. (from Berkeley) is in geography, and I now teach the history and theory of urbanism within a school of architecture (at USC). All of my work combines approaches to urban landscape that are more materially grounded — buildings, infrastructures, street plans, ecologies — with methods traditionally identified with intellectual history. The decision about audience will, of course, affect which elements I expound on at length and which I dial back, assuming readers' familiarity.

Needless to say, I am excited for our conversations in Uppsala.

“Future Metropolis” or “Future-Orientation”: Two Temporalities of Planning in Postwar America

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In July 1960, in the Pocono Mountains of Northeastern Pennsylvania, on the grounds of a summer resort established by New York’s Rand School of Social Science and popular since the 1920s with left-facing urban Jews, a group convened for the Tamiment Conference on the Metropolis. The meeting had been in the works since 1958, the initiative of MIT city planner Lloyd Rodwin, who had recently joined the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and, a first for someone of his professional background, the editorial board of its generalist organ, *Daedalus*. Rodwin had cycled through several possible titles for the event, the themed issue that would go to press later that year, and the related book that George Braziller would bring out in 1961. Passing over “The Metropolitan World: Nature and Potentials” and “Mastering the Metropolis,” he settled on “The Future Metropolis.”¹ The papers, Rodwin believed, demonstrated by simple adjacency the promise of a fully interdisciplinary urban studies, and although they pursued a range of specific goals, certain sentiments recurred. All were animated by an optimistic, basically liberal faith that the American city was amenable to expert-led improvement over time. The future was a metropolitan future; the city’s growth, both upward at the core and outward into the suburban hinterland, were all but assured; and the major intellectual and political challenges for that future would orbit how best to ensure degrees of “technological freedom,” particularly in the realms of transport and communication.² “Since they live in a time of change,” Stephen Graubard wrote of the amassed scholars by way of preface, “they are conditioned to expect change, even prepare for it.”³

The volume’s proposals were perhaps something other than utopian. “It is the utopian process that should be emulated rather than the utopian product,” opined city planner Martin Meyerson, based across town at Harvard, for “very rarely has a first-rate mind invented a utopia.”⁴ Yet, in all, *The Future Metropolis* broadcast a confidence about the future-facing temporality that, on their watch, would always inhere in the task of urban and regional planning. “The spirit of hopeful intervention,” Rodwin wrote, “should prove at least as effective as the

desire to escape present discomfort.” He called for “cautious projection, utopian fancy, and pragmatic recommendation” to proliferate in roughly equal measure.⁵ To think seriously about urbanization, they agreed, was to think *ahead*. The future metropolis was a place worth imagining before it came to fruition. Urbanism had to be understood as a futurism, and the future, until further notice, was open.⁶

Between his first proposal to the AAAS and the event at Tamiment, Rodwin’s institutional obligations had become more complex. In late 1959, he and Meyerson began serving as the inaugural directors of the Harvard–MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies, a novel interdisciplinary contraption, years in the making, that joined faculty from both ends of Cambridge, seeded with ample Ford Foundation money and in important respects the prototype for that philanthropy’s incursions into “urban studies,” a new field-of-fields codified at the precise moment that Ford and others in its emergent cadre of self-appointed experts began to pronounce the existence of something called “the urban crisis,” typically stated in the singular. The Joint Center brokered partnerships and attempted to “organize” the heterogeneous endeavor of urban research, quickly becoming critical infrastructure in far broader networks of scholarship, policymaking, and public intellect. More than any other interdisciplinary unit so constituted, within or without Ford’s sphere, it sought to supersede inherited tensions between those dedicated to the physical design of cities — many architects and planners, some landscape architects, some identified with the new field of urban design, in which Harvard had just opened the first degree program — and those enacting the social research needed to make those designs credible, grounding the unknowable future in methodically registered facts about cities present and past.⁷ Its list of contributors more reflective of the Center’s membership than the original meeting had been, *The Future Metropolis* became the group’s first collective statement. Rodwin and Meyerson understood it to be submitting for public consideration this broad-based vision of urban expertise rendered in an anticipatory key.

In the ensuing years, the mood at the Joint Center changed. Through its case, the paper explores a significant reorientation in how urbanists in the United States conceived the underlying temporality of what it is and should be *to plan*. It spans the long 1960s and demonstrates how visions of the so-called “future metropolis,” posited as a *place* or *state* to be achieved through coordinated action and design, gave way to an analytical focus on “future-orientation,” predicated on a more diffuse, equivocal, and easily deferred time *horizon* that

specified no intrinsic commitment to intervention on the built environment or its inhabitants. Recourse to the methodologies of social science, a hallmark of the Joint Center's approach to urban questions, ending up enabling some of the most enduring critiques of "physical planning" (itself a postwar epithet) articulated from, and formative of, a variety of positions on the political spectrum. In three parts, each focused on a distinct research program — one taking on federal Urban Renewal, one the transnational New Town movement, one the cognitive and moral dimensions of the putative urban crisis — the paper details the broadly neoconservative social science, ascendant at the Center by 1963, that took pains to foreshorten or disable the planning imagination as a fundamentally future-making proposition. The ensuing half-century of urban studies has struggled to recapture, much less institutionalize, such a commitment to the future, rendering this conflicted history of foresight a very present past.

I. The "Enigma" of the Long Term: Urban Renewal as Waiting Game

That the Joint Center would address Urban Renewal, the dominant style of urban redevelopment during the postwar period, in some depth was no surprise. The renewers' official rhetoric permeated public discourse on the fate of American cities, funds were plentiful in the wake of the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954, and the physical impact of demolition was everywhere apparent. "The city can no longer smile," wrote landscape architect Christopher Tunnard, "because so many of its teeth are missing."⁸ The Center had already consulted on or given cover to some federally supported redevelopment schemes afoot around metropolitan Boston. Before long, however — notably, under the direction of Harvard political scientist James Q. Wilson, who took over for Rodwin and Meyerson in 1963 — the Center became something like a central clearinghouse for social science expressly and bitterly critical of the program. The backlash to Renewal was politically heterogeneous, but increasingly at the Joint Center it faced right. Fundamental to that reorientation was the critics' tendency to reconceptualize physical interventions on urban space — whose basic instruments and stakes are architecture, infrastructure, and other components of the built environment — in terms of time and tense.

Martin Anderson's *The Federal Bulldozer* (1964), adapted from his MIT dissertation, joined the Joint Center's book series, the prestigious core of its publication program, and gave polemical form to what had been an inchoate current of conservative unease. The book did not speak for the entirety of the Center — no one author ever did or could — but it heralded a

pronounced shift toward social science conceived as a critique of the actual. Anderson questioned the premises, political administration, and physical record of Urban Renewal. Its justificatory keywords had little meaning, for one thing. “Blight” could mean whatever those bent on razing a neighborhood wanted it to mean: buildings’ dilapidation, population density, barely concealed animus about the “mixture” of racial or ethnic groups, or even an unsystematic street layout, as in the lesser-known case of San Francisco’s thinly populated Diamond Heights district. “Revitalization,” a term less ubiquitous than in the gentrifying early twenty-first century but often used as a synonym for “renewal,” nodded to the life sciences but, Anderson held, meant even less. Planners were “implying that the city is dead or dying. How does a city die? There are no precise definitions.” Anderson also painted Renewal as bipolar in its priorities, a strange fusion of the interests of rich and poor — those ostentatiously being-of-service with those supinely being-served. Yet, he sputtered, “today’s city...*is the city of the middle-income group!*” Because it bypassed the middle classes, the program could not stand. On his final page, Anderson called for its complete abolition.⁹

Versions of these points had surfaced in print since the late 1950s. The celebrity of Jane Jacobs, over and against New York’s master planner Robert Moses, was well established by the time Anderson finished his dissertation, Grady Clay (in *Landscape Architecture* magazine) and J. B. Jackson (in *Landscape*) had jabbed at the design politics of high Modernism, Herbert Gans had anatomized dispossession in Boston’s West End, and, without always publishing their criticisms in long form, a wide range of grassroots movements had enacted resistance to top-down planning through demonstration, occupation, negotiation, refusal, and sabotage.¹⁰ There were several, intellectually and politically diverse ways of being in some sense against “the planners.” But the critiques, Anderson felt, had not yet cut to the ontological core of the problem. “There is one fact about urban renewal that many of the people associated with the program would like to ignore, and which many of them do ignore. This is time.” As a process, Renewal “drags itself to completion.” It could only ever be “long and frustrating,” “long-drawn-out,” predicated on a “time lag” during which planners made no serious attempt to adjust initial designs to ambient changes in the city’s “character.” A typical project took nearly “*12 years*” in full. (Italics were critical to Anderson’s style.) In the interim, “while waiting for the buildings to rise,” officials squandered tax revenue. Urban Renewal was, in short, an unwinnable waiting game. The essence of its failures, Anderson argued, concerned pace, rate, and duration. “The

Land Lies Vacant,” read one chapter title.¹¹ It was not enough to rail against midcentury definitions of “progress” *in abstracto*. Nor was it sufficient to assert, as he also did, that most of the land assembled for Renewal would have been redeveloped eventually by the free market had the state not preempted it — i.e., that clearance had come *too soon*. By foregrounding the bulldozer itself, and by evoking (albeit without ever depicting) the visibly transitional landscapes it left behind, demolished but awaiting recapitalization, Anderson asked the public to consider, as Francesca Russello Ammon has put it, “what ‘progress’ looked like when it was ‘in progress.’”¹²

Anderson’s book brought a new species of notoriety to the Joint Center. An “immediate sensation,” *The Federal Bulldozer* was excerpted in *Reader’s Digest* and reviewed in all manner of non-scholarly venues. The response, James Q. Wilson wrote, was “so enormous as to impair the objectivity of Solomon.”¹³ In 1976, George H. Nash, author of (still) the most comprehensive intellectual history of postwar conservatism, could lead off his chapter on critics of domestic social policy — urban and otherwise — with Anderson’s “scholarly tour de force.” It was on the unique strength of its example, Nash argued, that ensuing commentators on the right would “frequently cit[e] urban renewal as a prime illustration of liberal folly,” and something about the jagged, sublime physicality of Renewal’s wreckage had made “the welfare state” less spectral than it would have otherwise seemed.¹⁴ Irving Kristol, the right-wing icon who proudly read no economics until 1976 — the year when he latched onto the Laffer curve as a new kind of ground truth — was by 1973 nominating city planning as one of the primary redoubts of “subterranean utopianism,” and he too stressed its temporal dimension. New Town builders, beautifiers, and renewers of all stripes “ai[m] to bring history to a stop”; no plan, he mused, ever happens to allot space for a cemetery.¹⁵

James Q. Wilson weighed in from his perch as director. He largely buttressed Anderson’s claims, writing that “Urban Renewal Does Not Always Renew” (1965) and venturing, outrageously, that, *pace* the rhetoric, “There is no urban problem in the United States except, perhaps, for the problem of urban aesthetics.” Though tucked away in the pages of Harvard’s alumni magazine, Wilson’s piece managed to stoke further controversy. Having read these words, HUD Secretary Robert C. Weaver declared to an audience at Harvard that spring that “I am forced to ask what the Center is studying, and why it should not be merged with the schools of fine art and architecture.”¹⁶ Catching wind of this exchange (and collecting materials for the next grant review), Malcolm Moos of Ford noted that Weaver was “so incensed” by Anderson’s

book that “he is going after it” — and the whole Joint Center — “with a meat ax.” Still, officially, the Center took no position on these matters. Wilson had not expressly called for Urban Renewal’s repeal, and Moos’s colleague Francis Rourke understood him to be “disassociating the Center from [Anderson’s] extreme attacks on the program” while continuing to promote the book. Moos concluded that, in the end, a conservative presence on Church Street was “a healthy matter.”¹⁷

It was in this spirit that the Center brought out *Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy* (1966), a thick volume of recent statements on the matter, along with some new, commissioned work. Charles Abrams considered “Some Blessings of Urban Renewal,” a program that “now makes the front page,” warning only that, due to drawn-out projects and ballooning costs, its temporality was coming to approximate that of “a treadmill when it should be a frontier.”¹⁸ The volume closed with an entire section organized to replay and extend the Anderson debate. Within it, Wilson included Wallace F. Smith’s 1965 review of *The Federal Bulldozer* as “a major, though not overwhelmingly skillful, heresy.” Importantly, Smith seized on Anderson’s attention to pacing and lag, seeing in this conceptual focus the book’s essential weakness: its author seemed “concerned only with the length of time involved” in building projects, without much to say about their actual value.¹⁹

Publishing Anderson and embracing the fallout was, perhaps, a master stroke of publicity. Yet the Joint Center also backed work that made compatible points far less polemically. MIT planner Bernard Frieden’s first monograph, *The Future of Old Neighborhoods* (1964) operated in this vein, and it, too, issued a temporal critique of Urban Renewal, whose fixation on newness was too often left unexamined. It was “premature,” Frieden contended, to clear even the “grayest” of urban areas. Sensible policy would “renovate and preserve” through “selective clearance and gradual renewal.” When possible, rebuilding “should be postponed” — not discounted out of hand, but always deferred until truly necessary. Indeed, for Frieden the *when* of urban policy, not the *where*, was the central question. His most basic plea was for scholars and officials “to govern the timing of new development.”²⁰ If one tendency united the Center’s disparate work on Renewal, it was this interest in querying its temporal politics. Having worked to present the city as a dynamic entity, one liable to develop, grow, and change, they then dwelled in conceptually novel ways on the very temporality of that change — and fretted over the timing of practical interventions. The “future metropolis” would never be built in a single

stroke. An *orientation* to the future was worth maintaining, the conservatives held, and the failures of liberal statism — of a bulldozer that was to be condemned *because it was federal* — lay in its tendency to prolong and defer.

This new skepticism echoed shifts underway beyond Cambridge. A wide range of scholars, commentators, and political operatives began to raise pointed objections to planning — not only to “top-down,” “comprehensive,” or “master” planning, but to planning as such. Scholars beyond the Joint Center engaged theoretical turns, in several disciplines, that resisted the ruse of the “rational” planner and elevated a different vision, most influentially sketched by Yale political scientist Charles Lindblom, of less-than-omniscient actors perpetually “muddling through” problems piecemeal.²¹ Anthropologist Lisa Peattie circulated a memo to her Joint Center colleagues that digested Lindblom’s recent work with Albert O. Hirschman and recommended that they think in terms of “disjointed incrementalism” — its deliverable being an “on-going activity” but, crucially, “not a plan.”²²

Plan or No Plan: this was the title chosen for a 1934 volume by the British sociologist Barbara Wootton, who took care to acknowledge the “achievements and possibilities” of the Soviet model. In certain ways, the debate over Urban Renewal returned urban discourse to stark, dichotomous framings last dominant during the New Deal. But it could have been otherwise. Nothing about the many and justified critiques of *bad* 1950s planning led inevitably to a rejection of *planning* per se. (Nothing about a turn against *city* planning, for that matter, necessitated disenchantment with other domains exercising foresight to regulate social or economic affairs.)²³ And the critiques themselves were politically underdetermined. Although partisans often claimed otherwise, to be anti-plan is in no sense inherently a left- or a right-wing stance. Because of this, opposition to Urban Renewal proved even more varied than the program itself, and its intellectual fault lines could be remarkably hard to map.

Eventually, the Center’s temporal politics, once enamored of complexity for its own sake, tilted decisively to the right. In its second decade, Church Street became one of the major incubators giving rise to neoconservative critiques of planning. More than any other academic institution, it carried out a broader chastening of urban studies, and it took unique and decisive measures to urbanize American conservatism more broadly. Again, it could have been otherwise, but at length *this* way of preferring not to plan, one among many on offer, won out.

The Joint Center's turn to the right was clinched in the early 1970s. Its funding from the Ford Foundation dried up in 1970, and its first post-Ford leader, Bernard Frieden, embarked, with MIT-trained planner Marshall Kaplan, on what they pitched as the definitive analysis of "the major Great Society program addressed to the problems of urban slums": Model Cities. Inaugurated in 1966, Model Cities presented the latest and most complete federal alternative to the tarnished legacy of Urban Renewal: averse to physical solutions pursued for their own sake, allergic (despite the confusing name) to didactic showpiece neighborhoods designed for visual consumption, predicated on the devolution of power to community organizations, and committed to coordinating anti-poverty action across unequal administrative scales. It was precisely the sort of federal program that the Joint Center was now in the habit of talking back to, and, indeed, Frieden and Kaplan asserted in 1971 that "today there is not a single model of [its] successful operation."²⁴

The Politics of Neglect (1975) was the resulting book, a study of "the nature and limits of federal performance" — as such, not only in urban affairs — and thus entirely consonant with the Center's new brand of skepticism. In the end Model Cities had one "single lesson" to impart: "avoid grand schemes." The authors' bottom-line prescription recalled Anderson's: "back to the drawing board." (As replacements, they favored revenue sharing and the "more flexible" Community Development Block Grant program.) Again the essence of the critique turned on epistemology: it was not that the federal scale of intervention needed to be abolished, but that the program's stewards would never know *enough* to know *whether* they were effecting legitimate change.²⁵

This new counsel of despair found various expressions. In the hands of Frieden and Kaplan, it was an essentially synchronic critique, one predicated on historical cases but abstracting to absolutes that would transcend time or circumstance: we *do not* know the city; we *cannot* ever claim certainty; we *must not* act as we have acted. Other renditions, however, asserted the impossibility of planning in an explicitly diachronic fashion, with questions of sequence, process, and tense at very their core. These are the critiques that have most endured, stoking skepticism among ensuing generations about planning's worth as a basic state capacity. The remade, reactive Joint Center, beginning with Wilson's ascent in 1963 and inflected by the edited volume *The Metropolitan Enigma* (1966), which probed "the urban crisis" and its limits of scrutability, advanced a neoconservative politics of knowledge and *time*.

Apart from his work with Frieden, Marshall Kaplan glossed one further concept in ways that would animate the reimagined Joint Center and profoundly color its public interventions. Kaplan had trained in planning at MIT but declined to pursue the Ph.D. By the 1970s, after a stint at HUD, he was based in San Francisco, helming the firm Marshall Kaplan, Gans, and Kahn and reacting to “Washington” from a few thousand miles off, his discontent piqued by proxies such as Oakland. In a series of essays brought out as *Urban Planning in the 1960s: A Design for Irrelevancy* (1973), Kaplan subjected issues of time *horizon* to a needling more direct and derisive than would surface in his monograph with Frieden.²⁶ Kaplan seized on the concept of the “long range” with a single-mindedness and, at times, a malice that fairly seeps from his pages. For one thing, he argued, planners leapt hastily to long-range thinking because acceptance of a lengthened *timescale* seemed also to validate a greater *spatial* scope for their power: “only in the distant future,” he wrote in one 1964 essay, “can the level of comprehensiveness posited [even] be defined.”²⁷ “Long-range” thinking also, he charged, seemed to have an elective affinity with “bigger,” more interdisciplinary social science, a style of research he deemed both “unproven” and, in the long 1960s anyhow, “uncritically elevated” to glory.²⁸ He, too, enrolled Lindblom to the cause, ostensibly as proof that long-range planning “can be described” but “cannot be practiced”: it “assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information” that do not exist.²⁹ By 1970, cut loose from HUD, Kaplan’s writings increased precipitously in pitch. He was openly fuming. Agencies had recourse to an easy solution for all those urging “long-range synoptic...linked...planning”: “simply fire” them.³⁰

The contention was not that the future, as an object of knowledge, was itself irrelevant, or that all forms of foresight were doomed to unreason. Rather, in ways surely informed by the Joint Center’s composite understanding of urban tense — of past, present, and future dynamically linked and cross-referenced — the Kaplan of 1970 demanded that planners “measur[e] the restrictions a current decision may place on one’s freedom to choose among alternatives at a later date. This is the approach that should underlie all public policy.”³¹ Some years later, several social sciences would adopt the term *path-dependence* to invoke this sense of the present’s sway over the future. Kaplan, however, went one step further. In his most prescriptive passages, he urged a focus on the *immediate*. This became Kaplan’s keyword, one he repeated *ad nauseum*. Planners could legitimately bear the future in mind, but their practice had

to “concentrate on the here and now,” supplying “immediate answers for [even] the ephemeral endeavor.”³² Here *and* now: “immediate” signified in both spatial and temporal dimensions. It called for smaller and more localized interventions, at the scale of neighborhoods and households rather than cities, regions, or nations. Cognitively, it called for much shorter timescales and nearer futures than those with which 1960s planners had gotten comfortable. It also privileged a theory of knowledge that was inductive, never deductive, in character.³³ With this aggressive turn to the present, Kaplan and his confreres, reacting to Renewal from the right, parted company with usual understandings of what it fundamentally is to *plan*.

II. “Many Cities in One”: Reallocating Urban Reason at Ciudad Guayana

The next significant fracture developed out of one of the more peculiar episodes in postwar urbanism’s attempted merger between planning and the social sciences — and the only instance in which the Joint Center got involved in directly building a new metropolis into existence. Following on from an incidental contact that Lloyd Rodwin had made in the context of his international consulting work, the Center signed on for a five-year partnership in newly democratized Venezuela with the Corporación Venezolana de Guayana (CVG), a regional-development body modeled on the Tennessee Valley Authority and constituted as a signature initiative for the notably developmentalist, credibly anti-Communist administration of Rómulo Betancourt, in power since the 1958 coup that had deposed dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez. The CVG had been tasked with building Ciudad Guayana, a New Town sited on a putative “resource frontier” and, according to Betancourt’s economists, a compelling “growth pole” that would decant at least some population and jobs from Caracas, four hours away on irregular roads, and diversify Venezuela’s industries beyond oil. (The projected population was 650,000, larger than Boston at the time.) Between 1961 and 1966, a team of urban designers and social scientists cycled between Cambridge and Venezuela; graduate students in planning, would, as likely as not, spend at least one summer at the site. The Center postulated that the city might provide a kind of laboratory for urban form and a generalizable prototype for higher-level conclusions about “the city” as a settlement type.³⁴ It was an “entrepreneurial coup,” Rodwin exclaimed; it would build his reputation and the university’s at the high tide of the Cold War; it was an “opportunity for professional development”; it was, at length, “an opportunity to learn.”³⁵

Extensive debate attended the question of the new city's physical form. Where would the center of town be located? *Would* there be just one center of town? Should it coincide with an existing settlement of Spanish or American provenance, or was it better to construct a new focal point from scratch? Would a "twin cities" structure, spanning the Caroní River near its junction with the Orinoco, make sense? A cross-axial form? A figure eight? Monocentric and polycentric forms, wrote MIT urban designer Donald Appleyard, one of the project's principals, would lead to different sorts of "exposure" to the environment, different "symbolism" of community structure, different "sensuous impact" as residents and visitors traversed the city, different degrees of formal "plasticity," intellectual "challenge," and the possibility of "withdrawal" from public space.³⁶ Venezuelan designers had a say, but they were vastly outnumbered by a long list of prominent Americans: alongside Appleyard, there were Edmund Bacon, Philadelphia's planning director since 1949 and a master publicist of Renewal schemes in the face of criticism; Kevin Lynch of MIT, whose already-classic *Image of the City* (1960) had been the first entry in the Joint Center's marquee book series; Charles Abrams, the noted "houser" with roots in New York; German émigré Willo von Moltke of Harvard's GSD, who superintended the project; and many more besides.³⁷ They finally decided upon a form that was linear (or "lineal") above all, and if it could be said to have a center, that center was a fifteen-mile (25-kilometer), decidedly American-looking highway, the Avenida Guayana, that linked up a "series of nodes which are *intervisible* and which further continuity of activities along it." A fragmentation of visual experience, von Moltke held — echoing contemporaries such as Lynch's collaborator György Kepes, himself based at MIT — would produce a lack of social solidarity at anything approaching the urban or regional scale.³⁸ The Avenida afforded visitors the chance to experience the city as an elapsing sequence of approaches and arrivals — to the nearest monument, the all-important steel mill, or perhaps, they wagered, to industrial modernity itself.³⁹

Yet, for the Joint Center, the city always had a second, more diffuse and portable life as an object of study. Ciudad Guayana was a designed environment and a generator of economic development, but it was also configured to be a generator of knowledge, the focal point for a whole series of books and technical reports — the CVG having given the Center's social scientists *carte blanche* in exchange for their assistance. Together, the scholars purported to use the case of *this* city, Ciudad Guayana, to explicate *the* city as such. Targeted monographs emerged on the order of Noel McGinn and Russell Davis's *Build a Mill, Build a City, Build a*

School (1969); Richard Soberman's *Transport Technology for Developing Regions* (1966); and, most significantly, the first monograph by planner John Friedmann, which pronounced on *Regional Development Policy* (1966) as such — and, textbook-like, included a glossary of terms — while the subtitle gave away its genesis as *A Case Study of Venezuela*.⁴⁰ City became curriculum. Meyerson, citing Diderot, imagined an entire “encyclopedia” of urban studies issuing from the new city–laboratory, and Rodwin concurred: “The nature of our field required” such breadth “because it was a horizontal, not a vertical, field.”⁴¹ The Center’s leadership instructed staff, again and again, that each act of research would be judged by “the extent to which the resulting volume is likely to qualify as a sociological classic.”⁴² Anthropologist Lisa Peattie, whose ethnography of the eastern *barrio* La Laja was underway, bristled. The directors had begun speaking of “Great Books.” She wrote from the field, “Although I fully sympathize with the Joint Center’s wish to see a series of ‘great books’ emerge from the present project, and although [I] have every incentive personally to write a ‘great book’ if within my powers (indeed, the reiteration of this phrase is not comforting), it seems clear to me that the demands of a program such as this on the participants are such as to practically insure that no ‘great books’ will issue.”⁴³ Yet, Peattie aside, scarcely a note of self-criticism was detectable in these works; the administered future, they insisted, could be inferred from their methodical studies of Venezuela’s past and elapsing present.

The situation became more complex, though, with the last official Joint Center monograph on Venezuela: *Planning a Pluralist City: Conflicting Realities in Ciudad Guayana*, by the British-born planner and urban designer Donald Appleyard, trained at MIT and installed on its faculty in 1961. Its completion was severely delayed, not least because of Appleyard’s departure for Berkeley in 1967. The book did not go to press until 1976, a full decade after the Center had ended its contract with the CVG.⁴⁴ He had carried out the main body of research, however, in 1964, and all evidence suggest that the ideas were substantially worked out by 1967. As published, it was the Joint Center’s first avowed, full-scale study of “urban knowledge” — as such — “and its implications for urban design,” as well as a limit case in the transnational portability of the critique of planning’s temporality.⁴⁵

Read nearly a half-century later, *Planning a Pluralist City* remains a highly distinctive work of scholarship. By “urban knowledge,” Appleyard means primarily sensory perception in

and of cities. His debt to Lynch is frankly stated, and at the core of his empirical research stands a body of long-form, exacting interviews with inhabitants of the city-under-construction. Appleyard questioned locals on their overall “perceptions of change”; on the city’s four main districts (Puerto Ordaz, San Félix, El Roble, Castillito) and the “kinds of people” (in quotes) they associated with each; and, before anything else, on the city’s overall spatial structure. Each respondent drew for him a map and narrated, from memory, what it felt like to make a journey down the Avenida. “Many subjects,” Appleyard noted in an appendix, “had never drawn a map before and were either reluctant or unable to attempt one. Consequently, ways were developed to assist them.”⁴⁶

Plainly, by “knowledge” Appleyard does not mean “expertise” but ordinary, vernacular styles of perception and reasoning. The pluralism to which his title refers is a cognitive pluralism, and, indeed, he points up profound incongruities in how different populations process the same landscape. Two axes organize the analysis: one counterposes top-down CVG–Joint Center planners to the collectivity of on-the-ground locals; the other makes a finer-grained, within-city accounting of perceptual variations by class, education, and other criteria that tacitly become proxies for racial, national, or civilizational difference. “Ciudad Guayana was many cities in one,” Appleyard states on the first page. “Different people knew it in different ways.” Appleyard’s conviction is that it ought to be possible to bridge them, to integrate this very diversity into the process of environmental design: “to structure an entity to be comprehended at different levels [at once] and to sustain attention — and affection — after repeated contact.” Systematic acquaintance with multiple “urban vocabularies” and “cognitive and life-styles,” he writes, would enable a vital “imaginative pluralism” and strengthen the city as a collective artifact. Too often, “the chosen ignorance of the elite...an almost deliberate turning away” from mess and complexity, undercut these hopes. “The city’s future sometimes seemed more real [to them] than the present.”⁴⁷

In the execution, though, Appleyard finds reasons for concern. Perhaps designers should *not* be consulting locals for thoughts on the city’s future, as “they might not understand” which options are actually feasible. “Evidence of individual perceptions” is of course welcome in the name of basic research, but it also “may reveal a degree of ignorance that may be limiting opportunities.... In these cases, policies of *changing* perceptions and expectations may be justified.” “The city environment itself” is, for Appleyard, “analogous to movies, dramas, and

poetry”; it could be configured so as to invite rich participation in imagining Ciudad Guayana’s future. But Appleyard also proves amenable to “the diffusion of information about future change” that experts have decided on in advance: “shift the citizens’ perceptions toward...development,” he writes, and use “environmental means” such as fences, plantings, and signs to indicate where the city is headed.⁴⁸ Tense could be given a physical existence, encoded into the built environment. As MIT architect William Porter wrote of Ciudad Guayana, the object world “could make evident not only what is happening but also what had happened and, perhaps, some of the more important things that *are going to happen*.”⁴⁹ The gap between Appleyard’s two pluralisms widens as the text proceeds. *Planning a Pluralist City* gradually incites searching reflection on the compatibility of the Center’s 1960s ambitions with its eventual 1970s self-critique, of expertise with other, less quiescent forms of urban knowledge.

Appleyard deals with perceptions of space and time in separate chapters, titled “The Spatial Structure” and “Change.” Appleyard diagnoses severe spatial fragmentation, on one hand — both real and clearly perceived — and, on the other, perhaps more threatening for his data, fuzzier zones of illegibility, devoid of memorable landmarks or “structural clarity” that would aid navigation. He is noticeably concerned about the differentials in power and mobility that the cognitive maps he has elicited are laying bare, and he enters impassioned pleas that designers first ascertain and then expand the “environment of common knowledge” defined by those areas where the sketches produced by Ciudad Guayana’s disparate, segregated groups overlap. (No citywide map was on display in any public place at the time of Appleyard’s research.) For guidance he looks back to the idealized medieval city, where “people actually met each other,” and socializes von Moltke’s key design concept, “intervisibility.” For Appleyard, the aim of the designer, without ever assuming a pregiven “public,” must be to make different groups *intervisible to one another*.⁵⁰

In developing these arguments, Appleyard draws richly and eclectically on literature in the psychology of perception: Magdalen Vernon’s general account of perception; sundry Gestalt approaches to “cognitive economizing,” after Fred Attneave; Jean Piaget on children’s understandings of space; and Edward Tolman’s contribution to the Parsons and Shils volume positing *A General Theory of Action* (1951).⁵¹ Appleyard also engages the psychology of art and aesthetics (Rudolf Arnheim, Ernst Gombrich); a budding literature in environmental psychology (Kenneth Craik, Harold Proshansky); the latest theories of cognitive mapping worked out by

human geographers (David Lowenthal, Roger Downs, Peter Gould); and even Aldous Huxley's 1954 psychedelic memoir *The Doors of Perception*.⁵²

Appleyard classifies his respondents' maps into two broad groupings defined by their "style" of spatial perception. One he dubs "sequential" and associates empirically with the city's working and lower classes. A sequential map hangs together by virtue of its paths: it represents a remembered journey through the city, by a moving observer, in which there is one overall directional trend. To this, Appleyard opposes the "spatial" style of perception (an awkward coinage, as both styles obviously concern physical space). If paths, roads, passages, and flows define the former style, the latter is grounded in the rather more static landmarks and district boundaries that tend to register on most official maps in the Western tradition. Appleyard sees "spatial" maps as "more objectively" rendered, as if drawn from high above the city rather than within it. He associates them with the educated, the affluent, and planners themselves. At this juncture, Appleyard's text becomes visually quite complex, and his will to typologize is apparent: sequential maps have "fragmented," "chain," "branch and loop," and "netted" variants, while spatial maps can be "scattered," "mosaic," "link[ed]," or "patterned."⁵³ Like any self-respecting typologist, he grants that, in practice, sequential and spatial approaches usually appear in combination. The socioeconomic coordinates he assigns, however, stand undisturbed: abstraction belongs to the better off.

Sequence was already a central concept in the planners' understanding of visual experience on the Avenida Guayana, the developmental march from "backwardness" to "modernity," and the ways in which these two levels might mutually reinforce. It is a temporal concept, and an incautious reading of the above might suggest that Appleyard deemed non-experts and non-planners more systematically attuned to the staged emplotment of urban development. In fact, he took a version of the opposite position, and as the book pivots formally from spatial to temporal perception, Appleyard argues that society's lower registers are, in effect, radically present-oriented: "They seldom inferred beyond their immediate experience, clinging to the known and concrete world.... There was, therefore, a desire for future change but no way of conceiving the future." *Inference* about the incompletely known urban world and its future — a leitmotif in the Joint Center's originary merger of planning and social science — becomes a keyword for Appleyard. Venturing one more binary, he distinguishes "inferential" from merely "responsive," which is to say passive, "modes" of perception. He finds examples of the latter in

disparate and unlikely places: George Santayana's naturalistic *The Sense of Beauty* (1896), a progenitor of affective approaches to aesthetics; Huxley's popular mescaline narrative; and just "[a]ccepting what is there — the viewpoint of Taoism." Under properly *inferential* perception, by contrast, "Our direct and indirect sources of information are matched with each other. The environment is viewed as a communications medium, and we infer beyond the information given," probabilistically. The educated and the comfortable will "begin to infer, extending his action and thought beyond the visible field. His awareness of motivation and choice increases, as does his planning behavior."⁵⁴ The middle classes, in short, can see into the future. They alone can see the world as planners do.

Planning a Pluralist City is not vindictive in tone. Appleyard is careful to note that "planning behavior" seems to increase with formal education — not just that it *is* unequally distributed at the time of writing, but that it can be taught and might yet expand. Among other "differentiating variables," Appleyard accounts for perceptual differences according to sex, occupation, mode of habitual transport, and the primary medium by which respondents acquire "urban information": e.g. official meetings, official maps, newspapers, radio, television.⁵⁵ And yet, owing to its immersion in psychology, its transnational verve, and its theses on the unequal distribution of urban reason, Appleyard's book could easily be read as giving empirical ballast to the "denial of coevalness" that Johannes Fabian would soon identify as the hallmark of pre-critical anthropology. Anthropologists and their subjects, Fabian famously argues in *Time and the Other* (1983), share space and time during the fieldwork experience — ethnography, inherently present-oriented, is about *being there* — but anthropological prose is almost without exception ahistorical, committed to the unending present tense supposedly inhabited by "the people without history."⁵⁶

Within the design fields, Appleyard's statement on Guayana has been overshadowed by his other late-period writings: a book on the preservation of European cities, a diffuse corpus on environmental symbolism and behavior, and above all *Livable Streets* (1981), a plea for pedestrianism made especially poignant after he was killed the next year by a motor vehicle.⁵⁷ *Planning a Pluralist City*'s belated arrival in print meant that what was supposed to be an immersive report from within a fast-developing city became, in effect, a work of recent history. Still, Appleyard's compendium throws the temporal politics of the Guayana project into stark relief. It demonstrates an acute interest in non-Western temporalities and draws them out

inductively, adding complexity to the radiant, too-neat futures promised by the CVG and their American adjuncts.⁵⁸ Unlike the fulminations of Martin Anderson or Marshall Kaplan, Appleyard's cognitive critique of planning as futuring maintains a deep commitment to the promise of physical design. It also, however, entrenches racialized notions of a cognitive separation between planners and the planned-for, and it despairs at the prospect of ever compelling subject populations to "orient" themselves to the imperatives of design. Appleyard's analysis stresses these lines of fracture, and he satisfies himself with opposed, composite pictures of industrial society's historically conscious, future-oriented upper stratum and its present-oriented "underclass," inert and abandoned to itself.

III. New Horizons: Unheavenly Cities and the "Crisis of Uncertainty"

In 1970, a new kind of book arrived bearing the title *The Unheavenly City: The Nature and Future of Our Urban Crisis*, and although its author, Harvard's Edward Banfield, took his business to a trade publisher, it remained a Joint Center creation through and through. Little, Brown correctly sensed a hit in the making and moved 225,000 copies of the first edition — an astonishing figure for a work of social science, especially one by an author who confessed on the first page that he could easily be mistaken for "an ill-tempered and mean-spirited fellow." Banfield had developed his arguments over many years of conversation with Martin Meyerson, his closest friend since the late 1940s, when as UChicago colleagues they co-authored *Planning, Politics, and the Public Interest* (1955), a classic study of public housing; James Q. Wilson, with whom he wrote *City Politics* (1963); and many other Center regulars. He acknowledged its financial support "over a considerable period."⁵⁹ Although he never took on a formal administrative role with the Joint Center, he was a fixture from its founding in 1959. With *The Unheavenly City*, Banfield outgrew the senescent Center and for the remainder of the 1970s occupied an entirely new plane of notoriety, "like the professional athlete who is always dubbed 'controversial' by the sports writers," as one undergraduate journalist wrote in 1975. "He wears the label but few really know how he earned it."⁶⁰ Let us count the ways.

In *The Unheavenly City*, Banfield modeled a skepticism far more despairing and extreme than anything yet on offer. He set out to demonstrate that "the urban crisis" was neither worsening nor improving: it *did not exist*. Banfield posed the question as one of semantics and epistemology: "*in what sense* are we faced with" a crisis? The usual evidence adduced to worry

the public, he pointed out on the first page, was visual in nature: “many square miles of slums and even more miles of dreary blight and chaotic sprawl.” All of this had “a certain plausibility.” Banfield then asked readers not to believe their eyes. He had long been involved in the broader postwar turn away from physical planning — attempts to *design* the future metropolis into existence — as the strategy of first resort. Yet whereas the new generation of “participatory” planners rejected architectural solutions in the name of building “community power” instead, Banfield did so in order to argue for the futility of *any* solution to urban ills. There was no “crisis,” there was no “problem,” and “no disaster impends.” A problem, he reasoned, can be said to exist only if a solution is known to exist; and because he *just knew* that the American city was insoluble, the entire shorthand of interventionist Great Society urbanism had been conceived by way of a basic category mistake. “What is to be done?” was the Leninist slogan appropriated in partial jest across the political spectrum. Banfield offered a replacement: “What *can* be done?”⁶¹

This was the title he appended to the penultimate chapter, and its spirit permeates the text. Banfield relentlessly minimizes crisis after putative crisis, mocking reformers, splitting hairs, and redefining ordinary words with no particular gusto. “Sprawl” and “blight” are not expansionary “cancers” — a common biological trope at the time, especially for those committed to organicist ontologies of the city — but a “bad cold.” The “inner” city — which Banfield saw as *de facto* black, plus “a few” Puerto Ricans in the Northeast and Mexican Americans in the Southwest — is troubled, but it represents “only” ten to twenty percent of the whole. The defining feature of his rhetoric, though, is the insouciance with which Banfield lets the slightest gap in positive knowledge about urban life dilate into the deepest, most permanent gulf of unknowability. “In the absence of an adequate specification of the means by which they are to be brought about,” he writes of prevailing approaches to reform, “*it must be presumed* that no one knows how.” There is no crisis but the “crisis of uncertainty,” and Banfield is its prophet.⁶²

Denigrations of cities’ “decay,” “obsolescence,” or general turpitude had long been commonplace in American life. There are pessimists of all political persuasions, and “decline” is easy to prophesy, even or especially when confirmatory evidence is lacking. Yet, as Robert Beauregard has written, it was “still another [thing] to question the bases on which those judgments were made” — to extinguish any shred of epistemological faith that problems could have solutions or could even be proven to exist. After 1970, the wider discourse on the abandonment of American cities took precisely this turn, and it was “built mainly...on a single

book.”⁶³ Following Banfield, a long tradition of skepticism began to look quite a bit more like nihilism. Doubt gave way to a willed disbelief.

The Unheavenly City also had a more positive program of study to advance. Poverty and inequality were facts of urban life, and Banfield endorsed cultural, cognitive, and motivational explanations for their persistence. Personal “discipline,” not “skill,” differentiates strata of workers, and it manifests in different styles of dress and consumption. Income differences exist, but they are *felt* as status differences, and so the latter must lead the way in social analysis. Class is class *culture*. “Lower-class poverty...is ‘inwardly’ caused,” Banfield writes, citing anthropologist Oscar Lewis, to such a degree that any sudden infusion of income would only compound opportunities to squander it. These forms of qualitative poverty close the poor in on themselves and, for Banfield, are “normal representations of a class culture that is itself abnormal.” In turn, “the lower-class poor cannot be organized” (as either Marxists *or* the Chicago School sociologists would use the term).⁶⁴

The most original and jarring sections, by far, of Banfield’s tract return questions of policy and planning to their temporal foundations. The aspect of class cultures that most interested and worried him, he referred to as their *time horizons*. Indeed, Banfield’s key innovation was to redefine three major classes — “upper,” “working,” and “lower” — in terms of what he saw as their divergent and incompatible ways of thinking about the future. “Ability, not performance,” was his criterion: Banfield seemed earnestly to believe that the poor *could* neither abstractly imagine a future unlike the past nor practice the self-discipline necessary to “sacrifice” present pleasures for future gains. The lower-class urbanite “lives from moment to moment” as “impulse” reigns a “radically improvident” life of “action,” risk, and violence. At one point he likened the adult working-class mindset to “youth culture” in its disinclination to save, invest, defer, or be anywhere but “where the action is.” Lest Banfield’s tone leave any doubt, he specified that present-orientation was not only different but degraded: “In the chapters that follow, the term *normal* will be used to refer to class culture that is not lower class. The implication that lower-class culture is pathological seems fully warranted both because of the relatively high incidence of mental illness in the lower class and also because human nature seems loath to accept a style of life that is so radically present-oriented.”⁶⁵ Fighting words, but how ever to assess the validity of a diagnosis that hinges on the phrase “human nature seems”?

It was only through this vindictive sieve of class and time that he reengaged questions of the built environment with any specificity. “Each class culture,” he postulated, “implies — indeed, more or less requires — a certain sort of physical environment” to support it. Each time horizon, that is, has its own spatial correlate. “Having lots of space,” Banfield decided, was a need that followed from the acquisition of upper-class culture; it would never “suit” or be well spent on the poor. “The lower-class individual lives in the slum and sees little or no reason to complain” (and Banfield’s implication is that if resistance were to arise, it would be by definition unwarranted). “Nothing happens there by plan and anything may happen by accident...feeling that something exciting is about to happen is highly congenial to people who live for the present and for whom the present is often empty.”⁶⁶ For present-oriented people, then, a present-oriented city. No planning, please — we’re hedonists.

These arguments unfold over the course of two non-consecutive chapters, spaced some 144 pages apart. When Banfield brought out *The Unheavenly City Revisited*, in 1974, his major editorial decision in a very lightly updated text was to make the relationship between his Chapters 3 and 10 more explicit.⁶⁷ In both discussions, Banfield made recourse to an extensive and entirely postwar literature drawn from psychology and the natural sciences. Psychotherapy would be no help for anyone but the affluent, he claimed: the (lumpen)proletariat made for “bad subjects.” But psychology — not sociology, not urban studies, not his home discipline of political science — held the methodological key to his counsel of despair. He appealed at length to Basil Bernstein’s “Some Sociological Determinants of Perception: An Enquiry into Sub-Cultural Differences” (1958) for confirmation that only the middle and upper classes possess the category of the “long-term” or seek to “order” space and time.⁶⁸ Banfield drew on NIMH-funded work on the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) coming out of Harvard’s Department of Social Relations, the better to distinguish time orientation (i.e., to the past, present, or future) from time span (i.e., long or short) and to justify his focus on the former. David Epley and David Ricks, its authors, gave further cover to the notion that the better-off segments of society were unique not only in forming thoughts about the future, but in knowing how to think causally and inferentially about the linkages among past, present, *and* future.⁶⁹

Banfield’s eclecticism of citation is one of the more intriguing aspects of the book. He read widely if not deeply, and the resulting work exemplifies the interdisciplinary mandate evident in so many precincts of the postwar American research university. The *bio-* and the

psycho- weigh so heavily on his analysis, however, that it becomes difficult to credit Banfield's denial, 200 pages in, that "when the author uses the words 'lower class' what he has in the back of his mind is 'Negro.'" Banfield's scheme had summarily redefined class in terms of culture. Culture, for him, operates as a version of nature. Given what he presumes about culture's modes and mechanisms of perpetuation, for Banfield classes *are* discrete races of people.⁷⁰

If Banfield had stopped there, his work might have ranked as merely heterodox, a peculiar but ambitious attempt to retheorize some of the basic categories that had long anchored social science but could always use more specification. As he converted "time horizon" into an independent variable, however, and used the concept to weigh in on "Several Kinds of Crime," things soured. The "cult of the present," he argued, included a heightened "propensity to crime." Shorter time horizons produced an illicit "taste for risk." They also, Banfield asserted but of course could not prove, were the unique source of the "foray[s] for pillage" he had watched unfold during the "long, hot summers" of 1960s rebellion. Banfield devoted a justly criticized chapter to what he claimed was "Rioting Mainly for Fun and Profit" — motives undercut on the fifth page by his declaration that "the culture of the lower class renders it incapable of the planning and organization that would ordinarily be necessary to start a riot by design." The question of "rioting" at once activates all of Banfield's most distinctive concepts and explodes whatever loose coherence they may have had. He continues to tread lightly when it comes to explicit racial denigration, but he also traffics in the language of nonhuman wildness and savagery, characterizing "the rampage" as "an outbreak of animal...spirits." Awed by visual signifiers of "prosperity" in ways he thought had sworn off — having exchanged a meliorist commitment to physical planning for cognitive and behavioral approaches, "future metropolis" for "future-orientation" — Banfield proves genuinely unable to understand how Watts, built as a working-class suburb of detached homes and yards some ten miles south of downtown Los Angeles, or low-slung Detroit could ever have incubated dissent.⁷¹

The Unheavenly City does come around to some concrete policy proposals — Banfield was never content just to sling mud. Some of the proposals seek mainly to modify prevailing rhetoric: do not "raise expectations"; deemphasize "white racism"; substitute absolute for relative measures of deprivation. Others verge on the eugenic: "Give *intensive* birth-control guidance to the incompetent poor," and quarantine them, too, in a supervised "institution or semi-institution." The ones devised as responses to lawlessness, however, best digest Banfield's

theses on time before turning them to new and punitive ends. Television coverage of riots, he insists, shall always be retrospective, never present-oriented; “live” coverage (a term he still puts in quotes) will only “provoke them.” For more ordinary forms of street crime, Banfield calls a different tune: “curbstone justice” (also in quotes), “meted out on the spot,” is the only way. He advocates policing on the “stop and frisk” model, and he calls for the broader justice system to “[r]educe drastically the time elapsing between arrest, trial, and imposition of punishment.” Banfield is explicit about the conceptual underpinnings of his conclusions: the point is to “bring punishment within the time horizon of the most present-oriented.”⁷²

One strand of Banfield’s temporal theory, then, led to a renewed focus on patience, self-discipline, and the enforcement of order — traditional concerns of a prescriptive, values-minded conservatism. The other strand saw creeping disorder and, despite it, urged policies of *non*-planning that would guarantee further starvation: stall, debate, demur, disavow, and finally abandon the city to itself. The former, to use a distinction common to twenty-first-century scholarship, was perhaps Banfield’s neoconservative face, the latter his neoliberal id. The positions are not easily distinguished, the Joint Center corpus showed them to be compatible, and each entails a politics of time.

The conceptual shift signaled by *The Unheavenly City*, however, was broader still. Any number of neoconservative urbanists had over the 1960s rebranded themselves as professional short-termists, harping on the notion that it was either ill advised or impossible for experts to get a grip on the future before it came to pass. Banfield preserved this basic argument but transposed it, insisting that the defective time orientations of ordinary, inexpert urban subjects — more than the foibles of planners or other *soi-disant* experts — would forever constrain the possibility of action. In his own way, and domesticating conclusions drawn by the liberal Donald Appleyard two thousand miles to the south, Banfield brought questions of social difference directly to the heart of the matter: Who can plan? Who can see as planners see?

A surfeit of public debate swirled around Banfield’s book well into the 1970s. In both quantity and vigor, it exceeded that which had greeted Anderson’s *Federal Bulldozer*. For a moment, *The Unheavenly City* was ubiquitous. It saw coverage in *Fortune*, the *Atlantic*, and *Time*, whose review ended by uncritically quoting James Q. Wilson’s assertion that Banfield had written the “only serious book” on cities in recent memory.⁷³ It surfaced in the “little magazines,” becoming

the subject of a symposium in *Trans-Action* and mostly positive coverage in *Commentary*.⁷⁴ Numerous authors would later credit the book with having converted them to conservatism, and Patrick Allitt has argued that Banfield's work had the unique capacity to bridge the constituencies of *National Review* and *The Public Interest*, the traditionalist right and the one solicitous of social science.⁷⁵

The book would, in fact, quite directly affect the craft of right-wing social policy. A decade after the fact, Robert C. Weaver singled out Banfield and Wilson for having spread "absolutely false information" on Urban Renewal in work that Nixon's *agonistes* cited when finally announcing the moratorium that ended the program in 1973.⁷⁶ Banfield denied to the hilt that his theses on class as time had anything at all to do with race, but his "cantankerous, irritating tone," coupled with more than enough damning textual evidence, rendered his efforts unpersuasive to most.⁷⁷ In the *New York Review of Books*, freshly minted Ph.D. Richard Sennett sensed "an emotional deadness" in Banfield's formulations, an absolute inability to understand why social movements coalesce outside the usual channels of "political influence." "I believe him" when he denies racist intent, Sennett wrote, but the text did racist things with words; it was "unspeakable naïveté" to think that this "tough-minded passivity" could simply pass itself off as "realism." Banfield "looks at poor people as essentially a different race of beings from you or me."⁷⁸ In the first issue of the journal *Social Policy*, William Ryan, who would soon find a public profile with *Blaming the Victim* (1971), put it simply: "Is Banfield Serious?"⁷⁹

Banfield's ruthless counterintuition and tone-deaf prose led readers in a remarkably wide range of disciplines to conclude that, in fact, he was not. From his perch atop UMass, political scientist Robert C. Wood, who had briefly led the Joint Center in 1969, escalated his attacks on the rebranded, post-Ford Foundation, apostatic Joint Center, and Banfield was often his proxy. In *The Necessary Majority* (1972), Wood noted Banfield's reliance on a concept of "hereditary class."⁸⁰ The biologizing impulse in *The Unheavenly City* — class as culture, class as race — is no peripheral concern, and it attracted critical attention from some surprising quarters. Banfield's impressionistic forays into cognition and time orientation elicited reviews from the *Archives of Internal Medicine* — a notable feat for a work of urban studies — and the *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, which deplored his "sordid and perhaps pernicious vision."⁸¹ A reviewer from *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine*, finding Banfield's appeals to Malthus and the birth rate

racializing if not racist, could not admit *The Unheavenly City* to the annals of genuine science: he “jerry-builds” his arguments out of mere “anecdotes.”⁸²

On university campuses, the response took yet another direction. Although Banfield had become a popular lecturer, drawing some 700 students (and selling them copies of *The Unheavenly City*) for his course on “urban problems,” upon the book’s release he became a target for protesters, who seized on the eugenic-sounding parts of his proposals, self-described as “feasible” if “undesirable.” He was not a “fascist” in any straightforward sense, but this was the language to which period leftists defaulted and it is difficult to imagine that when he left Harvard to join the faculty of Penn under the new President Meyerson, a decision announced at the end of 1971, it was “not because of *any* grievance or complaint.”⁸³ When, after three years, he departed Penn and rejoined Harvard’s government department, student radicalism was most definitely the decisive “push” factor. By 1973, a small group had begun traveling from city to city in order to shout Banfield down in lecture halls at Penn, Chicago, and the University of Toronto, and in at least one case to present him with a mock “Racist of the Year Award.”⁸⁴ He made the trip to Chicago to give an American Enterprise Institute–sponsored lecture on “The City and the Revolutionary Tradition” — the American Revolution — and when the talk was rescheduled for a month later in Philadelphia, AEI decided to hold it at the Franklin Institute, off campus.⁸⁵ (In 1986, AEI named as its new chairman a Banfieldian, Christopher DeMuth, who had sought him out while a Harvard undergraduate.)⁸⁶ *The Unheavenly City* became a basic reference on urban policy in the para-academic world of Washington think tanks.

The scope of his claims, however, was never confined to the United States. *The unheavenly city* of Banfield’s nightmares was a composite of American places, but to understand the provenance of his theses on time orientation it is necessary to look abroad — not to the Global South engaged by Appleyard, but to a South nonetheless. Banfield’s caricature of the present-oriented American poor had its conceptual roots in ethnographic work he carried out in Italy in 1955 and published as *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (1958). His subject was Chiaromonte, a tiny, secluded hill town in the Lucania (or Basilicata) region that he renamed Montegrano. He spoke scarcely any Italian, authoring the book “with the assistance of” his American wife, Laura Fasano Banfield, the daughter of immigrants. Its title-as-argument, however, was pure Banfield: “backward” signaled a set of assumptions about the normal, forward course of development

toward modernity. Postwar theories of modernization always depended on counterexamples of people seemingly suspended in the atemporal world of “tradition,” and Banfield likened the people of twentieth-century Chiaromonte to no less than the early Indo-European culture as described by Fustel de Coulanges, “of which the Greeks and Italians are branches.”⁸⁷

The alleged malady that needed fixing — and still one of Banfield’s best-known coinages — he called “amoral familism.” The townsfolk, he judged, evinced an “inability...to act together for their common good or, indeed, for any end transcending the immediate material interest of the nuclear family.” *Immediate*: as in the work of Marshall Kaplan and other short-termists, this word had both spatial and temporal coordinates. Chiaromonte’s poor were, in a word, present-oriented: they would not and could not envision a future world different from the one they had known. For Banfield, this alone was sufficient to explain their “underdevelopment”: culture preceded and conditioned all economic life. His sequel to this claim was that Chiaromonte’s futureless culture would forever depress development. He formalized this contention in a “predictive hypothesis” said to “make intelligible all of the behavior about which questions have been raised.” Namely: “The Montegratesi act as if they were following this rule: Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; *assume that all others will do likewise*.”⁸⁸ If the poor would not project what the future held, Banfield would do it for them.

Banfield’s exposure to “Montegrano” cast the die for his appraisal of all other “underdeveloped” countries, and it supplied him with a list of traits he could look for in American cities among migrants from those countries and their progeny.⁸⁹ The Joint Center performed many ad hoc conceptual transpositions between cities in the South and the North. Perhaps Appleyard, no social scientist in any conventional sense, was channeling Banfield as he designed his research into Ciudad Guayana and processed the data it bore — even as he himself celebrated the plurality of urban life to a degree that Banfield, the arch-pessimist, never would. Perhaps Banfield, expounding on “the” crisis of the *Unheavenly City*, was reinscribing Venezuela onto a domestic canvas. Perhaps “Montegrano” and Ciudad Guayana, *Moral Basis* and *Pluralist City*, were both offshoots of a growing, right-led but politically promiscuous rejection of the certainties encoded into prevailing postwar styles of urban redevelopment and indexed by the figure of the *Bulldozer*, *Federal* or otherwise. The lines of influence and translation that connect up these works are difficult to ascertain with precision. But all of their authors, in different ways, had forgone the basically liberal faith in improvability that had understood the “future

metropolis” as a place capable of being envisioned, known, and eventually materialized in three dimensions. Their alternative was not, as is often alleged of the long 1970s, a simple disavowal of foresight — a presentist resignation to period slogans that would admit “no future.” All, instead, had opted to inquire into the variable workings of future-*orientation*. As was true of the practice and subsequent critique of Renewal, the vexed New Town movement, the phenomenology of highway design, the institutionalization of “organized” interdisciplinary research, and so many other shifts that the Joint Center oversaw or intensified within the urbanist academy, these adventures in temporality moved along transnational circuits maintained by people convinced that there was a global urban crisis or none at all.

IV. Coda: Scaling Postwar Urbanism

Each of these three cases can be understood as having contributed to an epistemology of the urban short term. With it came new forms of doubt about the knowledge claims required to equip a richly futurist planning imagination. Simply by placing the politics of planning’s timescale at the heart of the analysis, this paper has offered a revision to the prevailing historiography, which tends to phrase debates on postwar urbanism in terms of either spatial scale (large vs. small units of analysis) or the directionality of planning power (“top-down” vs. “bottom-up”). The confrontation between the “big urbanism” of a Rexford Tugwell — or a Robert Moses, Le Corbusier, Daniel Burnham, Baron Haussmann — and the “vital little plans” of a Jane Jacobs has had pride of place, and it has settled into a familiar set of dichotomies that orient but can ossify.⁹⁰ When it is acknowledged, the timescale of planning tends to covary with spatial scale: “comprehensive” planners elaborating “whole” new cities and regions have seemed to be inveterate long-termists, while local, neighborhood, or community planners set more modest, near-term goals.

The case of the Joint Center also allows us to consider reperiodizing the development of urban theory and urban studies across the long twentieth century. In this historiography, the postwar period remains somewhat enigmatic. It has been abundantly studied — some might contend overstudied — in terms of its physical record, political coordinates, and institutional context; Urban Renewal, undertaken amid the conjoined phenomena of deindustrialization at the urban core and racialized capital flight to suburbs, has anchored a literature too vast to enumerate here. Yet, as a matter of intellectual history, it is far harder to distill the postwar situation into a

single dominant dispensation, diagram, -ism, or “school” akin to Robert Park and the Chicago sociologists, whose prominence crested in the 1920s; the postmodern Los Angeles School, whose rejection of Chicago’s hegemony was unignorable by the end of the 1980s; or, perhaps, the itinerant Urban Theory Lab founded in 2014 by Neil Brenner, itself both a continuation of and sidelong commentary on the foregoing history of attempts to “organize” research. Perhaps this paper has furnished the materials to nominate the Joint Center for that role, or at least positioned it as a privileged node articulating the relevant intellectual networks, such connectivity being another prevalent motif in the historiography of postwar social science. Here, too, questions of scale have helped organize the usual sequence of urban-theoretic “begats”: the Chicago sociologists ontologized “the city” as the naturally given, bounded (if expanding) unit, categorically distinct from its hinterland; the Joint Center and its peers thematized the “metropolis” or “metropolitan region,” which enlaced the urban core with its many and jurisdictionally chaotic suburban fringes; the Angelenos posited a multicentered “post-metropolis” of megaregional scope, responsive to the foundational influence of the automobile in imparting structure to their base of operations; and the Brenner circle, channeling a selective reading of Henri Lefebvre, has announced a fully “planetary urbanization” and indicted all foregoing schools on the charge of a sedentary “methodological cityism.”⁹¹ In this sequence, the basic unit of study and object of intervention has only grown larger in horizontal extent — with the postwar shift from *city* to *metropolis* marking the first key dilation.

It seems significant, then, that one of the central institutions invested in codifying a metropolitan focus for nominally “urban” studies at midcentury came to proliferate forms of social science that would foreshorten the planner’s timescale — and, in the process, make planning’s variable time horizon a matter of theoretical contestation in its own right. The Joint Center, having enrolled social science to render urban knowledge in an anticipatory key, turned its methodologies in on themselves and reemerged as anguished, self-defeating merchants of urban doubt.

¹ Transcript, Tamiment Conference on the Metropolis, 1960, Box 4, “Daedalus, 1960” folder #2; Outline for “The Metropolitan World: Nature and Potentials,” 24 July 1958; Outline for “Mastering the Metropolis,” November 1958, Box 4, “Daedalus, 1958–1959” folder #1, Lloyd Rodwin papers, MC 490, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Institute Archives and Special Collections (hereafter ‘Rodwin papers’); “The Future Metropolis,” *Daedalus* 90 (Winter 1961). Both social science and the built environment were areas that *Daedalus* had thus far neglected. One index of their inattention: asked, on a questionnaire required of all new editors, which “additional main topics should be covered” in the future, Rodwin could plausibly nominate “The Social Sciences,” “Architecture Today,” and “Race Problems Today.” Lloyd Rodwin, “Information Concerning Associate Editors” questionnaire, 17 September 1958, Box 4, “Daedalus, 1958–1959” folder #1, Rodwin papers.

² Lloyd Rodwin, ed., *The Future Metropolis* (New York: Braziller, 1961); see especially Kevin Lynch and Lloyd Rodwin, “A World of Cities,” 9–16; Kevin Lynch, “The Pattern of the Metropolis,” 103–128; György Kepes, “Notes on Expression and Communication in the Cityscape,” 190–213; Edward C. Banfield, “The Political Implications of Metropolitan Growth,” 80–99; and Raymond Vernon, “The Economics and Finances of the Large Metropolis,” 42–63. Rodwin’s original vision for the conference imagined a highly eclectic group of commentators: from established urbanist circles, Catherine Bauer Wurster, William H. Whyte, and the ubiquitous Lewis Mumford; from other social sciences, Robert Merton and, curiously, the psychoanalytic Marxist Erich Fromm; from the top tier of the literary life, Lionel Trilling of Columbia, W. H. Auden (who wintered in New York during the 1950s), and Alfred Kazin, whom Rodwin imagined writing on natural landscape and the city.

³ Stephen R. Graubard, “Prefatory Note to the Issue ‘The Future Metropolis,’” *Daedalus* 90 (Winter 1961): 3.

⁴ Martin Meyerson, “Utopian Traditions and the Planning of Cities,” in *The Future Metropolis*, ed. Rodwin, 233–250, at 237, 235. *Daedalus* later brought out an issue on the utopian tradition: “Utopia,” *Daedalus* 94, no. 2 (Spring 1965); republished as Frank E. Manuel, ed., *Utopias and Utopian Thought: A Timely Appraisal* (Boston: Beacon, 1967). Contributors included Lewis Mumford, Northrop Frye, Crane Brinton, Judith Shklar, Paul Sears, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Mircea Eliade, and Paul Tillich.

⁵ Lynch and Rodwin, “A World of Cities,” 16, 11.

⁶ Few in this circle identified as “futurists” or “futurolologists,” the subject of Jenny Andersson, *The Future of the World: Futurology, Futurists, and the Struggle for the Post–Cold War Imagination* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). Their ideas amount to a futurism, but it is one articulated as distinct from the then-emerging field of “futures studies.” From that milieu, Kenneth Boulding appeared in a later collection, Martin Meyerson, ed., *The Conscience of the City* (New York: Braziller, 1970), and his work was cited by those involved in the South American project discussed in the second section of this paper.

⁷ For general accounts of the Joint Center, see Eugenie L. Birch, “Making Urban Research Intellectually Respectable: Martin Meyerson and the Joint Center for Urban Studies of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1959–1964,” *Journal of Planning History* 10 (2011): 219–238; Lawrence J. Vale, *Changing Cities: 75 Years of Planning Better Futures at MIT* (Cambridge, Mass.: SA+P Press, 2008), 30–36; and Christopher Klemek, *The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 179–184, 202–207. On “organized research,” see *inter alia* Ethan Schrum, *The Instrumental University: Education in Service of the National Agenda after World War II* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019); and Roger L. Geiger, “Organized Research Units: Their Role in the Development of University Research,” *Journal of Higher Education* 61 (1990): 1–19. On Ford’s urban programs, the state of play in 1959 is best captured by the brochure *Metropolis* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1959).

⁸ Christopher Tunnard and Boris Pushkarev, *Man-Made America: Chaos or Control?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), n.p.

⁹ Martin Anderson, *The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949–1962* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964), 191, 174, 208, 230; emphasis original. On the antinomies of “blight,” see Wendell E. Pritchett, “The ‘Public Menace’ of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain,” *Yale Law and Policy Review* 21 (2003): 1–52; Themis Chronopoulos, “Robert Moses and the Visual Dimension of Physical Disorder: Efforts to Demonstrate Urban Blight in the Age of Slum Clearance,” *Journal of Planning History* 13 (2014): 207–233; and Richard Brandi, “San Francisco’s Diamond Heights: Urban Renewal and the Modernist City,” *Journal of Planning History* 12 (2012): 133–153, at 137.

¹⁰ The literature of aesthetic anti-Modernism is too enormous to enumerate. For one amusing recent take on its afterlives, see Max Holleran, “Concrete Monsters of the Welfare State: Discussions of Brutalist Architecture on Social Media,” *Space and Culture* (2021, online).

¹¹ Anderson, *Federal Bulldozer*, 73, 9, 88, 163, 179. In the introductory chapter, Anderson claimed the usual project duration was ten years, not twelve. Note that Anderson, along with many other commentators, writes “urban renewal” without initial capital letters. The present account capitalizes the phrase, the better to distinguish references to work sponsored by the federal Urban Renewal Administration from more casual usages that might naturalize the verb “renew,” insulating it from critique.

¹² Francesca Russello Ammon, *Bulldozer: Demolition and Clearance of the Postwar Landscape* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 146. And many arch-conservatives did seize on aesthetics. The sociologist Ernest van den Haag — best known for his enthusiastic defense of the death penalty — wrote that Renewal only deposited new slums “built as slums,” and that “neophilia” must be resisted at all costs; Ernest van den Haag, “Notes on New York Housing,” *Dissent* 8 (Summer 1961): 277–281, at 277, 279. Alfred Kazin, for his part, saw a different temporality of architectural “waiting” at work in midcentury New York, where “[u]rban removal and burial are everywhere.” Scanning the “rows of low red houses (soon to be demolished)” along Fulton Street in downtown Brooklyn, he generalized: “What has not been torn down is waiting to be torn down”; *New York Jew* (New York: Knopf, 1978), 210.

¹³ Steven Conn, *Americans against the City: Anti-Urbanism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 160; James Q. Wilson, Letter to the editor, *Harvard Today* (Spring 1965).

¹⁴ George H. Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945* [1976], third ed. (Wilmington, Del.: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2006), 354, 281.

¹⁵ Irving Kristol, “Forty Good Years,” *The Public Interest* 159 (Spring 2005): 5–11, at 9; Irving Kristol, “Utopianism, Ancient and Modern” [1973], in *Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 184–199, at 185, 186. Kristol was borrowing the cemetery example from William H. Whyte.

¹⁶ James Q. Wilson, “Urban Renewal Does Not Always Renew,” *Harvard Today* (January 1965): 2–8; Robert C. Weaver, “Urban Renewal,” Godkin Lecture, 30 March 1965, Box 13, Folder 5, Ford Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York (hereafter ‘FF records’).

¹⁷ Malcolm Moos memo, 29 March 1965; Francis E. Rourke to Malcolm Moos, 25 March 1965; Box 13, Folder 5, FF records. His notoriety did not prevent Anderson from a long and consequential career spent at the highest levels of right-wing politics. He served as Nixon’s director of policy research, and after advising two Reagan campaigns, in 1976 and 1980, he signed on as the actor’s chief advisor on domestic policy. The specter of Urban Renewal haunted a far broader set of cutbacks in federal spending.

¹⁸ Charles Abrams, “Some Blessings of Urban Renewal” [1965], in *Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy*, ed. James Q. Wilson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), 558–582, at 582; and see Charles Abrams, *The City Is the Frontier* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).

¹⁹ Wallace F. Smith, “*The Federal Bulldozer: A Review*,” *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 31 (1965): 179–180.

²⁰ Bernard Frieden, *The Future of Old Neighborhoods* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964), 4, 154, 153; emphasis added. *Timing* connotes an orientation to discrete moments of action; *time* or *temporality* can evoke a smoother, less eventful flow.

²¹ Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’” *Public Administration Review* 19 (1959): 79–88. For reviews specific to the field of planning, see Ernest R. Alexander, “After Rationality, What?: A Review of Responses to Paradigm Breakdown,” *Journal of the American Planning Association* 50 (1984): 62–69; and Richard E. Klosterman, “Arguments for and against Planning,” *Town Planning Review* 56 (1985): 5–20.

²² Lisa Peattie, “Notes on the Concept of ‘Disjointed Incrementalism’ as Applied to Regional Planning,” 7 November 1962 (Report C18), Box 1, Joint Center for Urban Studies, Reports on Ciudad Guayana (1960–1965), Special Collections, Frances Loeb Library, Graduate School of Design, Harvard University (hereafter ‘CG reports’).

²³ William Alonso, “The Unplanned Paths of Planning Schools,” *The Public Interest* 82 (Winter 1986): 58–71, at 65, makes this distinction. “Planning in general had always been a suspect activity” for conservatives, while city planning retained “broad political support.”

²⁴ Bernard Frieden, Marshall Kaplan, and Charles Haar, “Analysis of Federal Role in the Model Cities Program: A Case Study in Policy Analysis” (1971), Grant PA72-65, Reel 1749, Grants L–N (FA 732E), FF records. The authors secured funding from the Ford Foundation; note that this was project-specific funding, separate from the recently extinguished grant that had sustained the Center as a unit. At first, Model Cities was known as Demonstration Cities, but the 1966 bill that committed funds changed course. “By that time,” Frieden and Kaplan wrote, “city demonstrations had an unpleasant overtone”; Bernard J. Frieden and Marshall Kaplan, *The Politics of Neglect: Urban Aid from Model Cities to Revenue Sharing* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1975), 64–65.

²⁵ Frieden and Kaplan, *Politics of Neglect*, 234, 238, 240.

²⁶ Marshall Kaplan, *Urban Planning in the 1960s: A Design for Irrelevancy* (New York: Praeger, 1973). Kaplan's personal investment in the Center as an institution seems not to have been intense. In a 2020 interview, he recalled a meeting in Cambridge at "the Urban Institute, I think it was called"; Marshall Kaplan, "A First-Hand Account of the History of HUD," *Trailblazers Impact* (July 2020), available at <https://trailblazersimpact.com/2020/07/marshall-kaplan/>. Moynihan was a friend, however, and was so taken with Kaplan's own analysis of implementation in Oakland that he enjoined his entire CUA staff to read it. Kaplan had also chaired a HUD Task Force on Simplification and Consolidation, and here he quipped that, due to the byzantine structure he was describing, his final writeup was "the only book on simplification that took five hundred pages" to do the job.

²⁷ Marshall Kaplan, "The Planner, General Planning, and the City" [1964], in *Urban Planning in the 1960s*, 14–23, at 18.

²⁸ Kaplan, Preface to *Urban Planning in the 1960s*, v–vii, at vii.

²⁹ Marshall Kaplan, "New Communities and Public Policy" [1970, with Edward Eichler], in *Urban Planning in the 1960s*, 24–42, 39. For his fullest account of New Towns up to the Great Society era, see Edward P. Eichler and Marshall Kaplan, *The Community Builders* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

³⁰ Marshall Kaplan, "Random Thoughts on Planning, Problems, and Approaches: Small Cities" [1970], in *Urban Planning in the 1960s*, 104–108, at 107. For more on this motif, clearly a preoccupation for Kaplan, see 61, 62, 65, 92, 107, and *passim*.

³¹ Kaplan, "New Communities and Public Policy," 40.

³² Marshall Kaplan, "Comments on the Demonstration Cities Program" [1966], in *Urban Planning in the 1960s*, 80–84, at 84; Kaplan, "An Overview and Summary," in *Urban Planning in the 1960s*, 129–130, at 130.

³³ A similar notion of intervention in the "here and now," contra any politics of deferral, is a staple of anarchist thought. See, e.g., Simon Springer, *The Anarchist Roots of Geography* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 3, 7, 13, and *passim*. See also Lucie Laurian and Anthony Inch, "On Time and Planning: Opening Planning by Cultivating a 'Sense of Now,'" *Journal of Planning Literature* 34 (2019): 267–285, who appeal to Walter Benjamin's concept of a redemptive *Jetztzeit* out of which the future "explodes."

³⁴ For a fuller account, see Peter Ekman, "Sequencing Like a State: Ciudad Guayana and the Infrastructures of Arrival, 1961–1976," in *Infrastructural Times: Temporality and the Making of Global Urban Worlds*, eds. Jean-Paul Addie, Michael Glass, and Jen Nelles (Bristol, U.K.: Bristol University Press, forthcoming). See also Simone Rots and Ana María Fernández Maldonado, "Planning Ciudad Guayana, an Industrial New Town in Oil-Rich Venezuela," *International Planning Studies* 24 (2019): 353–368; Eric Mumford, "From Master Planning to Self-Build: The MIT–Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies, 1959–1971," in *A Second Modernism: MIT, Architecture, and the "Techno-Social" Moment*, ed. Arindam Dutta (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2013), 288–309; Ijlal Muzaffar, "Fuzzy Images: The Problem of Third World Development and the New Ethics of Open-Ended Planning at the MIT–Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies," in *A Second Modernism*, ed. Dutta, 310–341; Christopher P. Loss, "'The City of Tomorrow Must Reckon with the Lives and Living Habits of Human Beings': The Joint Center for Urban Studies Goes to Venezuela, 1957–1969," *Journal of Urban History* 47 (2021): 623–650; Robert H. Kargon and Arthur P. Molella, *Invented Edens: Techno-Cities of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008), 113–123; and Felipe Correa, *Beyond the City: Resource Extraction in South America* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2016), 89–110.

³⁵ Lisa Peattie, *Planning: Rethinking Ciudad Guayana* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1987), 35, 36.

³⁶ Appleyard, "The Future Form of Santo Tomás," December 1962, Box 57, Donald Appleyard folder, Rodwin papers; Arthur H. Fawcett and J. N. Kise, "Alternative Forms for Ciudad Guayana," 14 July 1962 (Report E54), Box 1, CG reports.

³⁷ Willo von Moltke, "The Visual Design of Ciudad Guayana" (June 1965), Box 1, Wilhelm von Moltke folder #1, Joint Center for Urban Studies, Records of the Guayana Project, AC 292, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Institute Archives and Special Collections (hereafter 'Guayana records'); Willo von Moltke, "The Evolution of the Linear Form," in Lloyd Rodwin and Associates, *Planning Urban Growth and Regional Development: The Experience of the Guayana Program in Venezuela* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), 126–146. And see Kevin Lynch, *The Image of the City* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960).

³⁸ Willo von Moltke, Lecture in Ciudad Guayana, 1972, Box 6 (DL24HB), Papers of the Estate of Willo von Moltke Special Collections, Frances Loeb Library, Graduate School of Design, Harvard University; emphasis added. And see Donald Appleyard, "Motion, Sequence and the City," in *The Nature and Art of Motion*, ed. György Kepes (New York: Braziller, 1965), 176–192.

³⁹ The resonances with modernization theory, a framework which informed — but was seldom directly cited by — many working within the Joint Center, are apparent. On that tendency, see *inter alia* Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the*

Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); and David C. Engerman et al., eds., *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).

⁴⁰ Noel F. McGinn and Russell G. Davis, *Build a Mill, Build a City, Build a School: Industrialization, Urbanization, and Education in Ciudad Guayana* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969); Richard M. Soberman, *Transport Technology for Developing Regions: A Study of Road Transportation in Venezuela* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966); John Friedmann, *Regional Development Policy: A Case Study of Venezuela* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966). See also John Friedmann, "Regional Planning as a Field of Study," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 29 (1963): 168–175, at 169, which leads with Ciudad Guayana; and, for further theoretical development, John Friedmann and John Miller, "The Urban Field," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 31 (1965): 312–320.

⁴¹ Interview with Lloyd Rodwin, 11 June 1994, *Pioneers in Housing: An Oral History Project*, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

⁴² Norman Williams, Jr., to Daniel Lerner, 19 January 1962 (Report C12), Box 1, CG reports.

⁴³ Roderick and Lisa Peattie, "Some Notes on the Organization of the Joint Center Guayana Project," 19 July 1962 (Report F25), Box 5, Guayana records.

⁴⁴ Donald Appleyard, *Planning a Pluralist City: Conflicting Realities in Ciudad Guayana* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976). John S. MacDonald, *Planning, Implementation, and Social Policy: An Evaluation of Ciudad Guayana, 1965 and 1975* (New York: Pergamon, 1979), by a researcher present at the townsite in the 1960s, also arrived in the late 1970s. Some things change: in 1974, the CVG finally opened its Alta Vista headquarters building, sited where the Avenida split in two and drivers were encouraged to rubberneck. Some stay the same: most of the CVG staff stayed put in Caracas and managed the main steel mill remotely. Peattie, *Planning*, 48.

⁴⁵ Donald Appleyard, "Styles and Methods of Structuring a City," *Environment and Behavior* 2 (1970): 100–117, at 100.

⁴⁶ Appleyard, *Planning a Pluralist City*, 281.

⁴⁷ Appleyard, *Planning a Pluralist City*, 1, 232, 231, 42, 190. Lisa Peattie conducted the first round of interviews for Appleyard's book.

⁴⁸ Appleyard, *Planning a Pluralist City*, 289, 291, 4, 5, 200, 201. In this last quotation, Appleyard meant literally *where*: the proximate task was to make the case to residents of the eastern *barrios* that the westerly extension toward Alta Vista, steel mill, and airport was inevitable.

⁴⁹ William Porter, "Changing Perspectives on Residential Area Design," in *Planning Urban Growth and Regional Development*, 252–269, at 264–265; emphasis added.

⁵⁰ Appleyard, *Planning a Pluralist City*, 44, 233, 223, 245, 243.

⁵¹ Magdalen Dorothea Vernon, *The Psychology of Perception* (London: Pelican, 1962); Fred Attneave, "Some Informative Aspects of Visual Perception," *Psychological Review* 61 (1954): 183–193; Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder, *The Child's Conception of Space* [1948] (New York: Norton, 1967); Edward C. Tolman, "A Psychological Model," in *Toward a General Theory of Action*, eds. Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), 279–361.

⁵² Rudolf Arnheim, *Art and Visual Perception* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); Ernst Gombrich, "On Physiognomic Perception," *Daedalus* (Winter 1960): 228–241; Kenneth Craik, "Environmental Psychology," in *New Directions in Psychology* 4 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970), 1–121; Harold Proshansky et al., *Environmental Psychology: Man and His Physical Setting* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970); David Lowenthal, ed., *Environmental Perception and Behavior*, Department of Geography Research Paper No. 109 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1967); Roger M. Downs and David Stea, eds., *Image and Environment: Cognitive Mapping and Spatial Behavior* (Chicago: Aldine, 1973); Peter Gould and Rodney White, *Mental Maps* (Middlesex, U.K.: Penguin, 1974); Aldous Huxley, *The Doors of Perception* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1954).

⁵³ Appleyard, *Planning a Pluralist City*, 158–159, 161, 163. He shows that the master distinction is native to Lynch's work: in *The Image of the City*'s famous fivefold scheme, paths and nodes are sequential, while landmarks, districts, and edges are spatial (182). And the typology continues: cross-cutting the two "styles" are three "methods" by which people imaginatively structure the city: "associational," "topological," and "positional" (167).

⁵⁴ Appleyard, *Planning a Pluralist City*, 210, 211, 205, 206, 221; George Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty* (New York: Scribner, 1896). Appleyard's claim was not that non-elites denied that growth and change were in the offing. In talking about the future, however, the working and lower classes seldom moved the conversation beyond population figures, whereas middle-class respondents tended to speculate on housing, infrastructure, economic trends, and administrative decisions (194).

⁵⁵ Appleyard, *Planning a Pluralist City*, 218, 223.

⁵⁶ Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 33, 80; Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). For a critique that alleges Fabian's own metaphysics of presence, see Berber Bevernage, "Tales of Pastness and Contemporaneity: On the Politics of Time in History and Anthropology," *Rethinking History* 20 (2016): 352–374. On Fabian and geopolitics, see Ian Klinke, "Chronopolitics: A Conceptual Matrix," *Progress in Human Geography* 37 (2012): 673–690. For the claim that late-Enlightenment concepts of Europe and the United States as "contemporaries" denied the coevalness of "most of the rest of the rest of the world," see Peter Fritzsche, *Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 217, 258n3.

⁵⁷ Donald Appleyard, ed., *The Conservation of European Cities* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979); Donald Appleyard, "The Environment as a Social Symbol," *Ekistics* 278 (1979): 272–281; Donald Appleyard, *Livable Streets* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). The first retrospective summary of his work after his death, in what had become his home journal, Kathryn H. Anthony, "Major Themes in the Work of Donald Appleyard," *Environment and Behavior* 15 (1983): 411–418, at 412, calls *Planning a Pluralist City* "important" but treats it primarily as an "application" of Lynch's imaging method.

⁵⁸ The literature on non-Western understandings of time, though not tapped directly by Appleyard, itself experienced a boom in midcentury anthropology. Many authors alleged that their "primitive" subjects either had abnormally short time horizons or, due to cyclical rather than linear understandings of time's passage, had no horizons at all. On this trend, see Barbara Adam, *Time and Social Theory* (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 1990), 96; and on Piaget and Lévi-Strauss specifically, see Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory* [1977], trans. Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Claman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 4, 7. For leading postwar examples, see Edmund R. Leach, "Two Essays Concerning the Symbolic Representation of Time," in *Rethinking Anthropology* (New York: Humanities Press, 1961), 108–116; and Marian W. Smith, "Different Cultural Concepts of Past, Present and Future," *Psychiatry* 15 (1952): 395–400. These studies had roots in prewar anthropology, chiefly E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "Nuer Time-Reckoning," *Africa* 12 (1939): 189–216; and A. Irving Hallowell, "Temporal Orientation in Western Civilization and in a Pre-Literate Society," *American Anthropologist* n.s. 39 (1937): 647–670.

⁵⁹ Edward C. Banfield, *The Unheavenly City: The Nature and the Future of Our Urban Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), vii, viii, 23–44. For sales figures, see Patricia McLaughlin, "Is the Author of *The Unheavenly City* Really Diabolical?," *Pennsylvania Gazette* (November 1973): 25–30, at 29. On Meyerson and Banfield's friendship, see Rodwin to Abrams, 14 March 1966, Box 10a, Charles Abrams papers, #3086, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library; Meyerson to Banfield, 25 May 1986, Box 34, Folder 45; Martin Meyerson, Eulogy for Edward Banfield, Memorial Church, Harvard University, 9 December 1999, Box 34, Folder 45, Martin Meyerson Papers (UPT 50 M613M), University Archives and Records Center, University of Pennsylvania; Richard Bernstein, "E. C. Banfield, 83, Maverick on Urban Policy Issues, Dies," *New York Times*, 8 October 1999.

⁶⁰ James Cramer, "Banfield Redux," *Harvard Crimson*, 15 September 1975. This is the same Jim Cramer who would loudly grace the American television channel CNBC in the early twenty-first century, first on *Kudlow & Cramer* and then on *Mad Money*.

⁶¹ Banfield, *Unheavenly City*, 4, 1, 5, 261; emphasis added. See also Edward C. Banfield, "A Critical View of the Urban Crisis," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 405 (January 1973): 7–14; Irving Kristol, "Is the Urban Crisis Real?" [reply to Jerome Zukofsky], *Commentary* (November 1970): 40–48; and, on the diversity of this phrase's uses between the 1950s and the 1970s, Timothy Weaver, "Urban Crisis: The Genealogy of a Concept," *Urban Studies* 54 (2017): 2039–2055.

⁶² Banfield, *Unheavenly City*, 6, 12, 240, 17; emphasis added. See also Irving Kristol and Paul Weaver, "Who Knows New York? — and Other Notes on a Mixed-Up City," *The Public Interest* 16 (Summer 1969): 41–59. On the folk biology of sprawl, see Peter Ekman, "Diagnosing Suburban Ruin: A Prehistory of Mumford's Postwar Jeremiad," *Journal of Planning History* 15 (2016): 108–128.

⁶³ Robert A. Beauregard, *Voices of Decline: The Postwar Fate of U.S. Cities* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 204, 203.

⁶⁴ Banfield, *Unheavenly City*, 105, 102, 119, 126, 125, 130.

⁶⁵ Banfield, *Unheavenly City*, 47, 48, 53, 54, 112; emphasis original. For a partially consonant argument about age and future-orientation, see Lewis Coser and Rose Laub Coser, "Time Perspective and Social Structure," [1973], in *A Handful of Thistles: Collected Papers in Moral Conviction* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1988), 167–179, at 174–175.

⁶⁶ Banfield, *Unheavenly City*, 59, 60, 62. On "the duality of planning and accident that was the study of his career," see Samuel P. Huntington, Arthur Maass, James Q. Wilson, and Harvey C. Mansfield, "Memorial Minutes: Edward C. Banfield: Faculty of Arts and Sciences," *Harvard Gazette*, 18 January 2001.

⁶⁷ Edward C. Banfield, *The Unheavenly City Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), vii; Edward L. Glaeser, “The Life of the City,” *New York Sun*, 14 May 2008; B. Jeffrey Reno, “Rethinking Horizon Theory: Culture vs. Nature,” *Perspectives on Political Science* 36 (2007): 84–90. *Revisited* sought to rebrand Banfield’s position on the temporality of class as “an heuristic hypothesis, but it was taken by many readers as an assertion of fact.” In 1974, Banfield admitted he had no data — and had never had data — that would demonstrate the explanatory power of time horizon (vii). He qualified some of his more inflammatory claims as being only “plausible,” sketches of ideal types of social action and actors (e.g. 54, 73), but this seemed only to embolden him on questions of race: “it is not implausible to conjecture that some genetic factor may influence” IQ, even as Banfield *personally* stressed non-biological sources. “Cultural difference...and conceivably even biological ones as well...account in some degree for the special position of the Negro, as they do for every ethnic group. If there is something about Jewish culture that makes the Jew tend to be upwardly mobile, there may be something about Negro culture that makes the Negro tend not to be” (84). Also new in the 1974 edition: a tendentious distinction between the “Census Negro,” who underperforms on every measure, and what Banfield calls the “Comparable Negro” (80–84), and a tone-deaf thought experiment on “how matters would change if overnight all Negroes turned white.” Resistance to these “New Whites,” Banfield argues, would persist on cultural grounds — and his locution resonates in preventable ways with the backlash politics of “white ethnics” experiencing “indignities and humiliations not so different from those to which the Negro is now subject” (85–87).

⁶⁸ Basil Bernstein, “Some Sociological Determinants of Perception: An Enquiry into Sub-Cultural Differences,” *British Journal of Sociology* 9 (1958): 159–174; Banfield, *Unheavenly City*, 275. Banfield admitted it was at least plausible that the poor could *conceptualize* the future, but he was firm in underlining that population’s lack of control in planning for it (274). See also Lawrence L. LeShan, “Time Orientation and Social Class,” *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 47 (1952): 489–492; and Louis Schneider and Sverre Lysgaard, “The Deferred Gratification Pattern: A Preliminary Study,” *American Sociological Review* 18 (1953): 142–149.

⁶⁹ David Epley and David R. Ricks, “Foresight and Hindsight in the TAT,” *Journal of Projective Techniques and Personality Assessment* 27 (1963): 51–59; Banfield, *Unheavenly City*, 305. For a more recent discussion, see Harro van Lente, “Navigating Foresight in a Sea of Expectations: Lessons from the Sociology of Expectations,” *Technology Analysis and Strategic Management* 24 (2012): 769–782.

⁷⁰ Banfield, *Unheavenly City*, 211.

⁷¹ Banfield, *Unheavenly City*, 159, 169, 162, 189, 187, 195. His naïveté on suburban landscape — on spatial order as apparent guarantor of social order — is the more surprising in light of his acquaintance with James Q. Wilson, “A Guide to Reagan Country: The Political Culture of Southern California,” *Commentary* (May 1967): 37–45, which Banfield (277) cites. Wilson was a native-born Californian, and on homes and cars this is one of his more perceptive pieces; see also Lisa McGirr, *Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). On the longstanding “segregated diversity” of suburban America, and on the blurriness of the city–suburb distinction, especially in California, the literature is now vast; for overviews, see Richard Harris and Robert Lewis, “Constructing a Fault(y) Zone: Misrepresentations of American Cities and Suburbs, 1900–1950,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 88 (December 1998): 622–639; Richard Harris and Robert Lewis, “The Geography of North American Cities and Suburbs, 1900–1950: A New Synthesis,” *Journal of Urban History* 27 (March 2001): 262–292; and Greg Hise, *Magnetic Los Angeles: Planning the Twentieth-Century Metropolis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). On similar acts of resistance, some of them suburban, since Banfield wrote, see Elizabeth Hinton, *America on Fire: The Untold History of Police Violence and Black Rebellion since the 1960s* (New York: Liveright, 2021).

⁷² Banfield, *Unheavenly City*, 244–246, 178. Banfield only dug in as the decade ripened. His tone became ever more polemical; his positions were unchanged. By 1977, in an edited volume of criminology, he was calling present-orientation a form of “psychopathy” and turning to Henry Mayhew’s lurid survey of Victorian London for support; Edward C. Banfield, “Present-Orientedness and Crime,” in *Assessing the Criminal*, eds. Randy E. Barnett and John Hagel III (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977), 133–142. In his 1974 revision, there are thirteen proposals, not twelve. The newest of them calls for “equal access” to polling places and, in a possible echo of his friend Milton Friedman, various “markets”; Banfield, *Unheavenly City Revisited*, 269.

⁷³ Irving Kristol, “The Cities: A Tale of Two Classes,” *Fortune* (June 1970); Richard Todd, “A Theory of the Lower Class: Edward Banfield, the Maverick of Urbanology,” *The Atlantic* (September 1970); “Environment: Rethinking Cities,” *Time*, 1 June 1970.

⁷⁴ Duane Lockard et al., “Banfield’s *Unheavenly City*: A Symposium and Response,” *Trans-Action* 8 (1971): 69–78; T. R. Marmor, “Banfield’s ‘Heresy,’” *Commentary* (July 1972): 86–88.

⁷⁵ James Nuechterlein, “The Unheavenly Urban Philosopher,” *First Things* 98 (December 1999): 7–8; Patrick Allitt, *The Conservatives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 208; Jeffrey Hart, “The City and the Alchemist,” *National Review*, 19 May 1970; Nash, *Conservative Intellectual Movement*, 340–342. Nuechterlein claims that Banfield’s book answered questions lingering in his mind since 1967, when as a young white Detroit he had seen (footage of) the city’s black neighborhoods in flames.

⁷⁶ Interview with Robert C. Weaver, 19 December 1985, *Pioneers in Housing: An Oral History Project*, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

⁷⁷ Marmor, “Banfield’s ‘Heresy,’” 88. Marmor’s review was otherwise broadly sympathetic — this was *Commentary* in the 1970s — but he denied Banfield’s genuine “brilliance,” something his defenders had without exception “exaggerated.”

⁷⁸ Richard Sennett, “Survival of the Fattest,” *New York Review of Books*, 13 August 1970.

⁷⁹ William Ryan, “Is Banfield Serious?,” *Social Policy* 1 (November–December 1970): 74–76; William Ryan, *Blaming the Victim* (New York: Pantheon, 1971).

⁸⁰ Robert Wood, “Academe Sings the Blues,” *Daedalus* 104 (1975): 45–55, at 47. Wood clarified that “I differ professionally” from Banfield and Moynihan, “but in the context of genuine admiration and personal friendship”; Robert C. Wood, *The Necessary Majority: Middle America and the Urban Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), x. Daniel Patrick Moynihan headed the Joint Center from 1966 to 1969, and he considered Wood’s 1975 article libelous. He circulated a letter to Nathan Glazer, James Q. Wilson, Christopher Jencks, Norman Podhoretz, Clark Kerr, Seymour Martin Lipset, and representatives of American Academy of Arts and Sciences seeking to have Wood — “not...a man to be taken seriously” — publicly censured. Even the usually conciliatory Martin Meyerson weighed in from Penn, calling Wood’s work “lightweight.” See DPM to Gino Ballotti, 16 December 1974; DPM to Clark Kerr, 28 February 1975; Robert C. Wood to DPM, 3 February 1975, Box I:201, Folder 7, Daniel P. Moynihan papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Wood’s sharpest criticisms of Moynihan centered on Daniel P. Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), which he read as asserting the biological inevitability of racial inequality.

⁸¹ Charles D. Aring, “Review of *The Unheavenly City*,” *Archives of Internal Medicine* 129 (March 1972): 502–505; Leonard J. Duhl and Stephen R. Blum, “Review of *The Unheavenly City: The Nature and Future of Our Urban Crisis* and *Blaming the Victim*,” *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 41 (1971): 853–855.

⁸² Julian H. Levi, “Review of *The Unheavenly City*,” *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine* 14 (Winter 1971): 341–344.

⁸³ “Banfield Redux”; “Banfield Quits Harvard, Takes Position at Penn,” *Harvard Crimson*, 2 December 1971; emphasis added.

⁸⁴ Mark J. Penn, “Urban Expert Edward C. Banfield to Return to Government Department,” *Harvard Crimson*, 29 July 1975; James Cramer, “Banfield’s Back,” *Harvard Crimson*, 1 August 1975; “Banfield Redux”; McLaughlin, “Diabolical?”; Tom Lancot and Andrew Vought, “Banfield Deserves Forum at Penn,” *Daily Pennsylvanian*, 11 April 1973. McLaughlin’s position was that Banfield’s list of proposals was supposed to act as a half-serious spur to a serious discussion of the policymaking process. The ringleader behind Banfield’s “award” ceremony, Bonnie Blustein, had been suspended from Harvard for her antagonism of Richard Herrnstein, the psychologist notorious for positing racial differences in IQ. It was only during her leave of absence that other radical groups brought Banfield, the “real racist,” to her attention. Conveniently, by 1973–74 she was a master’s student at Penn.

⁸⁵ Jon Ziomek, “Protestors Disrupt Prof’s U. of C. Talk,” *Chicago Sun–Times*, 21 March 1974; Edward C. Banfield, “The City and the Revolutionary Tradition” (11 April 1974), available at <https://www.aei.org/research-products/book/the-city-and-the-revolutionary-tradition/>. On Banfield, federalism, and the Federalists, see Kimberly Hendrickson, “Edward Banfield on the Promise of Politics and the Limits of Federalism,” *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 34 (2004): 139–152, which disputes his standing as a full-on conservative.

⁸⁶ “Christopher DeMuth Transcript,” *Conversations with Bill Kristol* (19 March 2014), available at: <https://conversationswithbillkristol.org/transcript/christopher-demuth-transcript/>. DeMuth has become one of the major caretakers of Banfield’s legacy in the think-tank world. In 1974, he celebrated Banfield’s “saint-like restraint” in not using *The Unheavenly City Revisited* as a vehicle to seek vengeance on his critics; Christopher DeMuth, “Banfield Returns,” *The Alternative* (November 1974). DeMuth’s notion that Banfield now “had the data,” however, strikes the careful reader as risible: Banfield had plumped up the text with many more (and more recent) citations, due in large part to *The Unheavenly City*’s widespread adoption in college courses, but on the crucial nexus of class and time he was, by his own admission, still in “essay” mode; *Unheavenly City Revisited*, 302–303n6. On Banfield

as a critic of the New Deal, see Daniel DiSalvo, “Edward Banfield Revisited,” *National Affairs* 32 (Summer 2017): 171–187, at 173.

⁸⁷ Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), 164; Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City* [1864], trans. Willard Small (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1956), 15. This was perhaps not the Global South as scholars now define it, the “Orient,” or certainly the Eastern Bloc, but one author has argued that Banfield’s use of the Mezzogiorno to conjure a premodern social world belongs to a period literature on the not-quite-Western “Cold War Mediterranean”: Jane Schneider, “Anthropology and the Cold War Mediterranean,” *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development* 41 (2012): 107–129; and see David H. Price, *Cold War Anthropology* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2016). Her other leading example is Julian Pitt-Rivers, *The People of the Sierra* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), a study of one pseudonymous village in Andalucía. The *questione meridionale*, or Southern Question, has preoccupied Italian politics and scholarship since at least Gramsci.

⁸⁸ Banfield, *Moral Basis*, 166–167, 10, 85; emphasis added.

⁸⁹ Alice O’Connor, *Poverty Knowledge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 115, notes his “stunningly facile leap” from case to population. In 1974, amid the resurgence of popular interest in “white ethnic” identity, one sociologist noticed that “Banfield 1958” had somehow become the “single most influential work” that scholars were citing to shed light on the ways of Italian Americans; William Muraskin, “The Moral Basis of a Backward Sociologist: Edward Banfield, the Italians, and the Italian-Americans,” *American Journal of Sociology* 79 (1974): 1484–1496. Muraskin’s leading examples were Herbert Gans, Gerald Suttles, and Humbert Nelli. Banfield’s rendition of “backward” Chiaromonte has long provoked debate in Italian social science but, unsurprisingly, found few adherents; see Emanuele Ferragina, “The Never-Ending Debate about *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*: Banfield and ‘Amoral Familism,’” *Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford* 1 (2009): 141–160. For one mystifying example of a contemporary Italian political movement that appeals to his work, and his alone, to chart a path forward, see “Edward Christie Banfield: Un americano nel Mezzogiorno,” *Montegrano Revolution*, available at: <http://montegranorevolution.weebly.com/edward-c-banfield.html>.

⁹⁰ See, e.g., Garrett Dash Nelson, “Rexford Guy Tugwell and the Case for Big Urbanism,” *Places* (January 2018), available at <https://placesjournal.org/article/rexford-guy-tugwell-and-the-case-for-big-urbanism/>; Thomas S. Hines, *Burnham of Chicago* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); Jane Jacobs, *Vital Little Plans: The Short Works of Jane Jacobs*, eds. Samuel Zipp and Nathan Storrer (New York: Random House, 2016); and Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015).

⁹¹ See, *inter alia*, Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *The City: Suggestions for Investigation of Human Behavior in the Urban Environment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925); Martin Bulmer, *The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and the Rise of Sociological Research* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Ulf Hannerz, “Chicago Ethnographers,” in *Exploring the City* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 19–58; Allen J. Scott and Edward W. Soja, eds., *The City: Los Angeles and Urban Theory at the End of the Twentieth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Michael Dear and Steven Flusty, “Postmodern Urbanism,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 88 (1998): 50–72; Michael Dear, “The Los Angeles School of Urbanism: An Intellectual History,” *Urban Geography* 24 (2003): 493–509; Neil Brenner, ed., *Implosions/Explosions: Toward a Study of Planetary Urbanization*, (Berlin: Jovis, 2013); and Hillary Angelo and David Wachsmuth, “Urbanizing Urban Political Ecology: A Critique of Methodological Cityism,” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 39 (2015): 16–27.