From the Language of National Development to the Language of Commerce: The Economics of English in U.S. Foreign Relations, 1945-1990

Diana Lemberg, University of St. Andrews
dll4@st-andrews.ac.uk

Note: This draft chapter forms part of a larger book project, tentatively titled The Weapon of Words: Language Training in the American Century. While this chapter focuses primarily on English-language training, the book covers American investments in both English and other languages, so I address both in the framing discussion below. Thanks in advance for reading, and for your clemency regarding the current state of the endnotes.

It takes a village to learn a language—often, a village school: Language acquisition is a social and political process that rarely occurs from exposure alone. While talented outliers can pick up languages by informal means, moreover, for many others the pathway to fluency leads through some kind of formal coursework. This support is particularly important for monolingual individuals learning a second language.[1] Yet in the Anglophone world, the public-sector investments that support language learning are often decried as a waste of resources. Lawrence Summers, erstwhile U.S. Treasury secretary and ex-president of Harvard, argued in a 2012 *New York Times* op-ed that "English's emergence as the global language, along with the rapid progress in machine translation and the fragmentation of languages spoken around the world, make it less clear that the substantial investment necessary to speak a foreign tongue is universally worthwhile."[2] Markets and technology rather than taxpayer funding should take care of language learning, Summers suggested, voicing a perspective that is widespread in the twenty-first-century United States.

Neoliberal austerity has not always been the dominant economic model of language training, however. During the middle decades of the twentieth century, the United States invested substantial sums both in strategic language training for Anglophones (covered in Chapter Two) and in bolstering English abroad. Investments

in global English, in particular, were underpinned by economic reasoning as often as they were by diplomacy or ideology. This midcentury economics of language training was scaled not predominantly to individual costs or benefits, but rather to the Keynesian framework of national economies: American policy elites argued that broadening the use of English would help developing and decolonizing countries modernize by facilitating their access to scientific and technical knowledge and by connecting them to the international community. In the words of the revealingly titled 1961 report *Second Language Learning as a Factor in National Development in Asia, Africa, and Latin America*, "all developing countries" shared one thing in common in spite of their cultural and geographic diversity: "the need for increased learning of a language of wider communication (LWC) such as English or French."[3]

Second Language Learning as a Factor in National Development, published by the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Applied Linguistics (CAL), verbalized a worldview that had been in formation in the Anglo-American educational and diplomatic communities throughout the 1950s, as British policymakers sought to shore up their international influence amid imperial disintegration and as Americans extended their global reach. The CAL was during its early years an institution of state in practice if not officially, founded in 1959 with support from the Ford Foundation to coordinate American English-teaching activities abroad.[4] Serving as its first director was the well-connected linguist Charles A. Ferguson, a veteran Army Specialized Training Program instructor who had helped set up Arabic instruction for the State Department after World War II.[5] The product of two years of meetings between primarily American, British, and French linguists, its 1961 report expressed one of the most important, if forgotten, rationales for postwar investments in language teaching,

in particular English-language teaching: It affected economic growth, the carrot that Washington was holding out to developing countries in its Cold War aid activities.[6]

From the 1940s through the 1970s, the English language would become intertwined with American development work in a variety of settings. These included familiar territories of U.S. empire (Latin America, the Philippines) as well as places about which the American policy community knew little (Indonesia, Vietnam). The work extended from modest foundation-supported programs to a sprawling, multi-country USAID initiative known as the South East Asian Regional English Project (SEAREP). And, in 1965, it received the executive imprimatur when the Johnson administration released National Security Action Memorandum 332: "English is a key which opens doors to scientific and technical knowledge indispensable to the economic and political development of vast areas of the world."[7] Even after the United States' stinging defeat in Vietnam and declining faith in development aid in the 1970s, Americans would continue to frame English as an instrument of socioeconomic transformation.

Others agreed. Modernization was an article of faith for a diverse array of regimes in the mid-twentieth century. More powerfully than the anticommunism that fueled some American investments in spreading English, this modernization imperative made American English-language aid palatable to diverse recipient governments.[8] In 1940s Colombia, for instance, liberal elites and a growing urban middle class viewed American English-teaching aid through the prism of their desire for expanded educational access and professional opportunities, previously restricted to a small minority of Colombian society.[9] Three and a half decades later, when the People's Republic of China invited UCLA to set up English-language centers in Guangzhou and Beijing, it was despite Cold War differences: China's turn towards

modernization after the Cultural Revolution had bridged the ideological divide between Beijing and Washington. An official PRC English-language syllabus from 1986 sounded as if ghostwritten by the Johnson administration: "A foreign language is an important tool for learning cultural and scientific knowledge; to acquire information in different fields from around the world; and to develop international communication."[10]

American investments in global English during this period were diverse—disorganized, some policy elites thought at the time. And yet their very diversity was an advantage in experimental terms: While some efforts failed, others took root and became part of the cultural landscape in their host communities. Examples ranged from far-flung State/USIS binational English-language centers, many popular enough to be funded largely by tuition fees, to the spread of the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) from the Beltway offices of the CAL, which developed it, to post-Cultural Revolution China, where demand among prospective applicants to North American universities soon outpaced available testing capacity.[11] Some interventions shed their American trappings by design, like the UCLA English-language centers in Southeast and East Asia set up to be taken over by host countries after a certain number of years. Textbooks developed by military and federal actors became commercialized, their government connections fading even as they formed part of the material juggernaut of postwar American power. All of this activity cuts against the notion that English became a global lingua franca after 1945 as a kind of knock-on effect of American or Anglophone power, rather than through a process shaped by policy choices and investments.[12] The pump of demand was primed, so to speak, by Washington and London.

At same time, the conception of English as a neutral instrument of development would come to paper over important shifts. The macroeconomic framing of national development waxed in the postwar decades but waned sharply thereafter. By the late 1970s, Washington was increasingly displacing the burden of development onto institutions and individuals. In the case of exchanges with Deng's China, the American higher-education sector and Chinese students bore the lion's share of the costs associated with modernization in and through English. Ultimately, these institutions and individuals became the chief beneficiaries of global English—microeconomic actors who conceptualized language learning in terms of private profit more than collective change.

The emergence of English as a development vehicle

The material benefits to be gained from language learning were not a post-1945 discovery. Centuries of cross-cultural trade and imperial conquest had prompted far-flung actors to learn languages. The English language gained a foothold among colonial subject populations because it was viewed as a means of improving one's lot in life. In early nineteenth-century India, demand for English far outstripped East India Company educational funding, leading to a booming sector of private schools and tutoring.[13] Similarly, in early twentieth-century Zimbabwe, Africans forced by colonial land alienation into wage-labor markets recognized the economic and political value of literacy, and demanded more instruction in English from colonial authorities and mission educators.[14]

The notion that language training might have large-scale economic implications also had pre-1945 antecedents. In the early twentieth-century United States, proponents of pan-Americanism argued that the wider teaching of Spanish was

key to American commercial relationships in Latin America, and thus to the U.S. national interest. But economic reasoning tended to take a backseat to defense imperatives when the federal government invested in languages other than English. In World War II and the early Cold War, it was a sense of the United States' strategic vulnerabilities, not of the potential profits to American businesses, that opened the spigot of federal funding for training in other languages.[15]

It was in addressing the potential of English to serve as a lingua franca elsewhere in the world that the Anglophone American policy community advertised language training in terms of developmental transformation—in other words, when the stakes of large-scale language change were externalized. This linguistic discourse had colonial roots. It had emerged in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, as the United States sought to justify its seizure of Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Seeking to disassociate U.S. empire from European colonialisms, Americans argued that Spain had failed in the civilizing mission because of its parsimonious educational provision, which had limited literacy to a narrow stratum of elites in both colonies. Education for the masses, not the classes—in particular, education in English—was framed as a sine qua non of eventual self-government. As David P. Barrows, superintendent for education in the Philippines from 1903 to 1909 and a firm believer in the modernizing effects of mass literacy, put it, "[To] the Filipino the possession of English is the gateway into that busy and fervid life of commerce, of modern science, of diplomacy and politics in which he aspires to shine."[16]

The outcomes of the United States' linguistic civilizing mission were mixed. In Puerto Rico, language policy vacillated in the first decades of the twentieth century amid persistent demands for instruction in Spanish.[17] In the Philippines, meanwhile, English was institutionalized as the official language of instruction in 1901; but the

fledgling public school system faced challenges ranging from underinvestment by the colonial regime to spotty attendance to competition from private Catholic schools.[18] Within the colonial administration, Barrows's designs for mass literacy ran up against a strong counter-current emphasizing manual and practical skills.[19] Nevertheless, the mass thrust of education under U.S. empire—and American social engineering ambitions more broadly—marked a change from Spanish rule. By the moment of the Philippines' independence in 1946, roughly twenty-six percent of the population asserted that they could speak English, versus the less than three percent able to speak Spanish in 1898.[20]

The popular mobilizations that spurred decolonization across Asia and Africa after 1945 weakened civilizational justifications for the spread of western culture through western languages, while amplifying instrumental ones. For the European powers, this often meant an initial move towards broader social and educational provision in late-colonial settings. Then, as decolonization picked up, Britain and France began investing in their languages as a way of maintaining cultural and economic influence in the absence of formal political control. Tellingly, it was not the Colonial Office but the British Council—which, founded in 1934, had little experience operating in colonial Asia or Africa—that spearheaded this work on the British side.[21]

For the United States, mass cultural outreach was a more accustomed tactic, but American English-language initiatives were similarly intended to reinforce American cultural and economic influence in countries devastated by war and testing new national language policies. "The channel through which the substance of education must flow is being blocked," wrote UCLA in a 1956 proposal to the Rockefeller Foundation to bolster English-language education in the Philippines,

which was still recovering from the Japanese occupation and which had adopted Tagalog as its official language. UCLA added: "It would seem to be in our moral obligation—as well as being to our best interests—to offer our fullest cooperation in seeking a solution to the problem."[22] From the late 1940s through the 1960s, a host of federal agencies and American foundations invested in English-language teaching in the Philippines, including the U.S. Educational Foundation in Manila, which administered the Fulbright program there; the Rockefeller Foundation; the Ford Foundation; the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and its successor, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and the Peace Corps.[23]

Practices tested in accustomed spaces of U.S. empire formed a template for American strategies elsewhere after 1945, when U.S. power began to extend into the vast swathes of decolonizing Asia and Africa then throwing off European control. In particular, wartime State Department and Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) programs in Latin America, later absorbed into the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), functioned as a kind of training ground for linguists who would go on to shape English-language programs in other settings. Clifford Prator, the Michigan-trained linguist who headed Rockefeller's program in Manila, had spent part of the war directing the Centro Colombo-Americano de Bogotá. From the Philippines, in turn, Prator would pivot towards Africa.[24] Materials incubated in the western hemisphere also spread. The oral-aural textbook *Let's Learn English*, authored by Audrey Wright and James McGillivray, was based on their experience working at binational State/USIS centers in Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil (for more on the oral-aural method, see Chapter One). In the late 1940s McGillivray had been director of the Bogotá center, where Wright, author of the textbook for adult learners *Practique su inglés* (1949), had also taught.[25] The first edition of *Let's Learn English*

would be commercially published by American Book Company in 1955 and would find its way to, among other places, Indonesia and South Vietnam.[26]

The language activities of the Ford Foundation, an important conduit of U.S. English-language interests, offer a case in point of how Americans' lack of grounded knowledge of much of the ex-colonial world went hand-in-hand with attempts at linguistic engineering—though this time with buy-in from developing-world elites seeking to expand educational access. The foundation, established in 1936, first became involved in English teaching in the early 1950s in Indonesia, which after gaining independence from the Netherlands had declared English, not Dutch, its primary foreign language. In a pattern that repeated itself elsewhere, this policy choice generated an imperative to expand the country's corps of trained English teachers. Within a few years Indonesia was receiving modest assistance from the ICA and the USIA as well as the British Council, Australia, and New Zealand, largely in the form of direct English teaching and study-abroad scholarships for Indonesian English-language teachers-in-training. Meanwhile, the Overseas Development Program of the Ford Foundation, invited by the Sukarno government, invested two million dollars (twenty-one million in 2022 dollars) to help overhaul English instruction in the country's schools through teacher training, curriculum development, and institution-building.[27]

Crossing disparate regimes and regions, Ford's investments in global English would be consistently justified by its representatives and consultants in developmental terms. In Indonesia, development ideology bridged its relations with the Sukarno and the Suharto regimes. Daniel S. Lev, later an influential Indonesian studies scholar and critic of U.S. power in Southeast Asia, concluded in a 1961 foundation report, "When these colonies achieved their independence, it became imperative that English be

taught on a large scale, for on this depended their contact with the world and access to the scientific knowledge they need."[28] Six years later, writing in the wake of the Suharto coup, James E. Ianucci of SUNY Albany echoed, "When Indonesia became an independent nation, it was apparent to its leaders that a language was required in its educational system which could give access to the modern science and technology so desperately needed for the development of the new nation."[29] The same developmental vocabulary was deployed in describing the function of English elsewhere as the foundation began to expand its language investments from Indonesia into South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa in the late 1950s. "The whole possibility of the Ford Foundation's Overseas Development program has depended upon the use of English as a vehicle," the foundation stated.[30]

Around the same moment that the geography of Ford's ELT grant-making began to expand in the late 1950s, calls began to grow for greater coordination in the field of English-language teaching. In the 1950s, Rockefeller's and Ford's funding for global English had been privately urged on by Jane Alden at the State Department, among others: Foundations operated above the scrum of congressional budget battles, and in sensitive political contexts they were thought to be more discreet than official U.S. programs. But many, like Alden, wished for closer cooperation between foundations, government policymakers, and academic linguists nonetheless.[31] In 1957, the Ford Foundation helped sponsor a meeting at the University of Michigan, the Ann Arbor Conference on Linguistics and the Teaching English as a Foreign Language. The conference led to the establishment of CAL, which immediately launched a "World Second Language Survey" in collaboration with British and French counterparts. It also helped build momentum for expanding English-language teacher-training programs at American universities. CAL referred to these western

nodes of expertise in terms of "resource countries" and "resource bases"—and, tellingly, their resources were understood not in the sense of directly exploitable or monetizable assets but as long-term investments that would enable development elsewhere in the world.[32]

This confident reiteration of development bromides coexisted with persistent anxieties that the American applied linguistics community knew little about much of the rest of the world—not even the western hemisphere, let alone the former colonies of other powers. The World Second Language Survey and subsequent research would reveal to American linguists that, for instance, Spanish and Portuguese were not universally spoken in Latin America, where indigenous languages persisted in Peru, Mexico, and elsewhere; and that, in many East African countries, more local fieldwork was needed before English teaching could be refined (down to answering questions as deceptively simple as "What languages are used in the country? By whom are they spoken and where?").[33] Development talk, in effect, functioned as a screen for knowledge deficit.

Nevertheless, the mood among leading American applied linguists and policymakers on the eve of the Kennedy administration was optimistic. Pleas regarding the pressing need for further research were paradoxically twinned with professions of faith in the interlinked processes of modernization, advances in "linguistic science," and the spread of English language. Following the 1957 Ann Arbor conference, Robert Lado, then based at Michigan, underscored the urgent need to globalize American applied linguistics know-how, even while emphasizing the need for more basic research in the next breath.[34] Meanwhile, the World Second Language Survey was referred to informally as the "World ESL Survey" by Ford Foundation higher-ups, who emphasized the desire for a "'practical' survey" that

could "produce results"—in other words, a survey that could support the exportation of English abroad.[35]

The heyday of macroeconomic English

By the early 1960s, U.S. government departments and agencies involved in English-language training abroad included the State Department, through the Fulbright program and various U.S. Operations Missions; the USIA, which then oversaw Voice of America in addition to information outposts around the globe; the ICA/USAID; the Peace Corps; and the Defense Department. These federal actors worked alongside the Rockefeller and Ford foundations and a number of American universities and private contractors. This was the peak period of American efforts to export English abroad.[36] The sums involved were substantial if not huge: In 1963, the State Department spent roughly $3.5 million on English-language teaching, the USIA $5 million, USAID $2.15 million, and Ford $2 million.[37] On the government's part, total expenditures on spreading English ran from roughly $14.8 million in 1964 to a projected $22.2 million in 1966.[38] These figures did not reflect local sources of funding, like the tuition fees charged at the USIA's binational centers that were then pumped back into the agency's programs. They did, however, reflect the understanding, widely shared at the time, that the horizon of development work was longer than short-term profit. Akin to the USIA's reinvestment of its tuition fees, UCLA thought that any royalties from the teaching materials created by its Rockefeller-supported project in the Philippines should be reinvested in further English-language work rather than redounding to the university.[39]

The specialties of these various actors were diverse. Some concentrated on disseminating educational materials as widely as possible (Voice of America through

its "Special English" broadcasting, which began in 1959; State and USIA textbook programs). Others offered direct English teaching (the Peace Corps; Fulbright; USIA in its adult courses). Others facilitated scholarly exchanges of educators and researchers (Fulbright). Still others worked to shape national school curricula and teacher-training programs (Ford; the ICA/USAID; many university projects). While some had a regional flavor—USIA, for instance, had a particularly strong presence in Latin America; while USAID was more active in Africa than in Latin America—in many places there were multiple active English-language projects and collaborations, both among American actors and with British and other partners.

The USIA's programs were ostensibly the most classic avatars of cultural Cold War, with one agency official calling its English-teaching activities a "propaganda program" only secondarily focused on language acquisition. In this sense, the USIA's work was continuous with State Department efforts that, starting in 1949, had pumped hundreds of thousands of English textbooks into East and Southeast Asia to combat communism.[40] But the English-language curricula incubated by the USIA were as much a reflection of the state of the art in American applied linguistics as they were propaganda outlets. *Let's Learn English*, the 1955 commercial textbook authored by USIA veterans Wright and McGillivray, followed the oral-aural principles then being vaunted at the University of Michigan and elsewhere (on the oral-aural method, see Chapter One). A visit to a department store in the chapter titled "Let's Go Shopping," for instance, was as much a vehicle for drilling possessive adjectives and irregular past tenses as it was an advertisement for consumer capitalism.[41] The USIA continued to pursue the development of globally oriented teaching materials into the early 1960s, collaborating with the commercial

publisher McGraw-Hill and the National Council of Teachers of English on a two-year curriculum for teenage learners called *English for Today*.[42]

The USIA's one-size-fits-all approach coexisted in some areas with more localized models of language teaching that, along with the oral-aural method, characterized postwar American applied linguistics. One of the key tenets of many prominent American linguists at the time was that, in order to maximize the effectiveness of language courses, trained linguists needed to perform detailed research contrasting the phonemes of the learner's native language with those of the target language (here, English). This "contrastive analysis" hypothetically enabled researchers to predict where specific learners would have the most difficulty: As the Michigan linguist Charles Fries explained, a speaker of Spanish might have trouble making out the "s" and "z" sounds that distinguish many English word pairs ("*cease—seize*; *niece—knees*; *lacy—lazy*; *seal—zeal*") because "Spanish has these sounds but never uses… them as we do as the sole difference to distinguish meanings"[43]; whereas for French-speaking English-language learner this distinction would not pose a problem because the "s" and "z" sounds also differentiated words in French (e.g., *sel—zèle*). A theory necessitating teaching materials tailored to different linguistic contexts, the contrastive paradigm was also a source of lucrative government and foundation contracts for major academic players such as the University of Michigan and UCLA, whose researchers traveled far and wide in the 1950s and 1960s in order to produce phonemic descriptions of a plethora of languages.[44]

One upshot of these different approaches was that USIA materials were in competition, in some settings, with other American projects that emphasized linguistically customized materials. The USIA ran into opposition, for instance, in

Thailand, where the Michigan-USAID SEAREP project had been working since 1958 to produce contrastive materials; and in the Philippines, where the UCLA-Rockefeller collaboration at the Philippine Center for Language Study (PCLS) was similarly based on contrastive principles. The USIA also met with criticism from other American actors for ignoring local cultural and political sensitivities.[45] But, beyond these transitory tensions, this multiplicity of approaches may have actually facilitated greater geographical and cultural coverage for American English-language materials: In the absence of ambitious contrastive projects, and sometimes alongside them, one-size-fits-all materials popped up at USIA outposts and elsewhere. The Rockefeller-sponsored PCLS library in Manila featured a library for local teachers containing the *General Basic English Dictionary*; like the USIA, the proponents of Basic English, discussed in Chapter Two, took one-size-fits-all approach.[46] In Bangkok, meanwhile, learners who took courses using a curriculum customized for native Thai speakers might then visit the local USIA information center, where they could browse its library of almost 10,000 volumes.[47] As Michigan's SEAREP coordinator, Edward M. Anthony, concluded in 1960, though there was "some overlap" between the many American actors involved in teaching English in Thailand, "the field is so wide and the workers so few that little harm is done."[48]

Alongside the provision of materials, the United States was also sending English-language teachers abroad. The State Department and Fulbright programs had been funding direct teaching since the 1940s. Then, the USIA, founded in 1953, became the biggest federal direct-teaching operator, reaching over 300,000 students in fifty-seven countries in 1965.[49] While domestic audiences were largely unaware of the USIA's operations, the establishment of the Peace Corps in 1961 heightened the visibility of the direct approach. The Peace Corps reported over two thousand of its

personnel engaged in English-language teaching as of 1965, with returned Peace Corps volunteers peopling the nascent field of English as a Second Language in the United States (discussed in Chapter Five).[50] In Thailand, SEAREP observed that even those Peace Corps volunteers not sent in as English teachers "[appeared] to be engaged in English teaching anyway."[51]

However impressive the numbers or high-profile the programs, direct teaching also generated debate in the crowded landscape of American international English-language teaching. The Fulbright program was criticized for inadequately preparing its English-teaching grantees, with one SEAREP teacher facetiously describing Fulbrighters in Thailand as "high school English teachers who don't know from nothin' about this racket."[52] Similarly, the Ford Foundation repeatedly criticized the Peace Corps for its "stop-gap" or "retail" approach and its poorly trained volunteers.[53] For academic linguists, these criticisms functioned as a way of justifying the training programs then sprouting up on the campuses of their universities. For instance, by the mid-1960s, both UCLA and Michigan would offer preservice English-language teacher training to Peace Corps volunteers, and the Asia Foundation would support similar training for Asia-bound Fulbright grantees at Michigan.[54]

Ford and USAID, for their part, preferred "permanent-effect" programs aimed at shaping national school curricula, like the Ford program in Indonesia and the Michigan-USAID SEAREP program in Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam.[55] These interventions entailed high-level collaboration with ministries of education in the decolonizing and developing world rather than direct teaching. By training teachers and teacher trainers and setting up institutions for their training, Ford and USAID hoped to have a multiplier effect. In 1964, for instance, USAID trained 6,202 foreign English-language teachers, most of them in Africa. Hypothetically, if each of these

teachers taught fifty students per year, they could reach over 300,000 students in a single year.[56] This multiplier vision was also illustrated in dramatic fashion by a press release from the University of Michigan's English Language Institute: "Since 1941, ELI has trained more than 2,000 U.S. and foreign teachers of English. They, in turn, have taught more than a million and a half persons this language around the world."[57]

More so than direct teaching, investments focused on national capacity-building entailed political risk. All the planning in the world could come to naught amid the vicissitudes of global Cold War. In Indonesia, the Ford Foundation decried "anti-Western political feeling," noting a "marked deterioration in English language competence throughout Indonesia" by the mid-1960s (a deterioration which the foundation hoped would be reversed by the ascendance of General Suharto, whose murderous purge of the Indonesian left was undertaken with Washington's complicity).[58] Another vivid example of the gap between the theory and practice of capacity-building was SEAREP's work in Vietnam. Active from 1958 to 1963, SEAREP was one of several actors there working in the civilian English-language field; these also included the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM) to Vietnam, the USIA, and the Fulbright program. In Vietnam, SEAREP focused primarily on introducing system-wide improvements at the secondary level through enhanced teacher training and curriculum development.[59] But the project ran into trouble on the ground. As the Kennedy administration began to step up the U.S. military commitment to Vietnam in 1961, SEAREP employees penned worried letters to the Michigan project headquarters about Viet Cong kidnappings and bombings in Saigon.[60] Their struggles to find a foothold amid wartime instability and regime change illustrated the perils of the ICA/USAID's development approach, which relied on intensive partnerships with host governments.[61]

In other instances, however, political risks were mitigated by the logic of capacity-building itself. In a period of struggles for symbolic as well as political autonomy—as in the sought-after Africanization of civil services in many new African states—and cynical western appropriations of this discourse—Nixon's promise to "Vietnamize" the Vietnam War—some English-language funders focused on time-limited projects expressly designed to be taken over by host countries. "Only the assisted countries themselves can ultimately solve the problem of actual teaching of English to their citizens," the Ford Foundation concluded in 1964, proclaiming that its aim was to "help the major underdeveloped nations acquire a capacity to produce their own modern English teachers."[62] In the Philippines, meanwhile, UCLA's and Rockefeller's management of the Philippine Center for Language Study ended in 1965, when the PCLS was absorbed into the Philippine Normal College (PNC). This transfer of responsibilities did not spell an end to American English-language work in the Philippines: The PNC retained ties to UCLA and received support from the Ford Foundation. But it did spell, in UCLA's telling terminology, "filipinization."[63] Even at the USIA, which was more invested in direct teaching and materials dissemination than in capacity building, officials reasoned that the endgame of American aid was to render itself unnecessary. "The advocates of English-teaching tend to think in terms of a job that's never finished," said USIA director Theodore Streibert, "[but] ought always to think in terms of when it will end"—in other words, when American English had become global English.[64]

Defense Department English-teaching activities also faced political risks. During World War II, the increasingly complex war materiel being produced by the United States had generated large-scale experiments in rapid English teaching for allied militaries (discussed in Chapter One). By the early Cold War, the Defense

Department, through the Military Assistance Program, was funding an English-language school at Lackland Air Force Base, in Texas, as well as numerous in-country training programs. By the early 1960s, it had installed language laboratories in forty-three countries, and its programs were supporting some 25,000 foreign soldiers—as well as many Puerto Rican recruits—to study English.[65] In Vietnam, Cornell linguist J. M. Cowan glowed about the linguistic results of militarized modernization after a 1969 visit made at the behest of the State Department's Jane Alden. "They have a bit of a war going there," Cowan commented dryly, remarking on ubiquitous machine-gun emplacements and the shelling of a house next door to a dinner he was scheduled to attend. But this did not negate the fact, triumphantly relayed by Cowan, that "English has replaced French as the language of wider communication." Cowan reported that 15,000 students had passed through the U.S.-run Vietnamese Army Language School (VALS) since 1952, and that the rapidly expanding school anticipated 5,000 students in 1970. Military English-language training also spilled over into civilian life, with 6,300 U.S. military personnel teaching English in "civic action programs," and with "the best teachers at the USAID Teaching Center" coming from the VALS.[66]

In the short run, Vietnamese demand for English, doped by the American military presence in the country, did not outlast the U.S. defeat. After Vietnam's unification by the North in 1975, the government nationalized educational facilities, Russian became the dominant foreign language, and the vibrant commercial sector for English dried up.[67] Yet, even as its helicopters departed Saigon, the U.S. military's support for English-language teaching elsewhere continued apace. The same year, 1975, the branch in charge of military language training, the Defense Language Institute (DLI), reported that, in Lackland's twenty-two years of operation, over

34,000 foreign military personnel had received English-language training there, with roughly 1,000 students from thirty countries enrolled in its fifteen-week intensive courses at any given time, plus additional personnel training to become English teachers.[68] More still were reached by the 375 programs in forty-plus countries set up abroad under DLI supervision, which employed "DLI trained host-country instructors" and DLI curricula: The institute estimated 100,000 students total were reached by its English-language programs every year.[69] The military, like USAID and the Ford Foundation, was alert to the possibilities of having a multiplier effect in its English-language programs.

By the time the DLI reported these impressive numbers in the mid-1970s, the Defense Department had become something of an outlier to an otherwise chastened community of applied linguists and language policymakers. Civilian experts had begun to doubt the role of English in national development, part of a broader loss of confidence in the possibility of engineering development in a self-contained fashion. Charles Ferguson, who had moved from CAL to Stanford University in the late 1960s, admitted in 1971 that there was as yet "no theory to deal with the relationships between language and development"—a stark contrast to CAL's rhetoric a decade earlier, which had firmly linked English to development. The Ford Foundation also changed its tune in the 1970s: "It is no longer considered likely that the various countries we are helping to 'develop' will all wind up speaking English." Perhaps most surprising was the volte-face of Ford's greatest champion of English-language aid, Melvin Fox, who admitted late in his career that it was unclear whether American development efforts had accomplished anything at all.[70]

But if the overreaches of Cold War development aid had undermined the notion that Americans could simply export English outside the United States at will,

they did not spell an end to American English-language initiatives abroad. Rather, these setbacks sharpened Americans' attention to localized demand and transformed the nature of their investments. Since the colonial era, the spread of English as a lingua franca had entailed buy-in from educators and learners. After 1945, local and grassroots actors continued to shape local language dynamics. Sometimes, as in Vietnam, they militated against English's gaining (immediate) traction. But elsewhere—as in places like Colombia where national governments intensified English-language schooling—they smoothed the way.[71] Moreover, Americans did not control modernization discourse. Even as Americans like Charles Ferguson and Melvin Fox had begun to doubt the relationship of English to growth, policymakers elsewhere embraced English as a modernizing tool. Nowhere was this more evident than in post-Cultural Revolution China.

The opening of China and the microeconomics of English

In 1979, the UCLA linguist Russell N. Campbell arrived in the People's Republic of China as part of the first American university delegation to visit the PRC in thirty years. He soon became coordinator of UCLA's English-language efforts in the country, then in the early stages of Deng Xiaoping's "reform and opening," the period when Beijing turned away from class struggle and renewed its relationships with the nonsocialist world.[72] The school was known to the PRC through figures such as Emil Smith, a UCLA biochemist who had served as the inaugural chair of the Committee on Scholarly Communications with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC), a nongovernmental organization that was Washington's preferred arbiter of scientific exchanges in the years leading up to diplomatic normalization.[73] The school's 1979 delegation featured humanists and social scientists who would play an

important role in setting up its Sino-American exchange programs, notably Campbell; Lucie Cheng Hirata, a sociologist and director of UCLA's Asian American Studies Center; and the literature scholar Perry Link.[74] A leader in the field of applied linguistics in the United States, over the course of the 1980s UCLA would build up extensive relationships with Chinese higher-education institutions in Guangzhou and Beijing, opening four in-country English-as-a-foreign-language centers between 1980 and 1985. Over the same period, it would also welcome more U.S.-bound Chinese students and scholars than almost any other American university.[75]

Campbell was no stranger to practicing applied linguistics as a form of U.S. foreign policy. Two decades earlier, he had cut his teeth working in Thailand for the University of Michigan's SEAREP project, writing in his 1958 application letter, "I have always been careful to understand and remember that while abroad, each of us are representing, not only ourselves, but in most instances the whole United States."[76] But Campbell's trajectory also revealed important shifts in American English-language activities abroad. While his work in Bangkok had been structured by American certainty that the English language was a precondition for Asia's modernization, by the time of his inaugural visit to China in 1979, this confidence had taken a nosedive.[77]

Methods had changed, too. In Bangkok, as part of a Michigan team faithful to behaviorist and contrastive paradigms, Campbell had focused on producing drill-intensive oral-aural teaching materials that were linguistically customized for Thai speakers. Twenty years later in China, the UCLA centers under his leadership would emphasize the cultural rather than contrastive tailoring of materials, and their communicative usefulness: "accuracy received less overt attention than fluency." This distinction reflected the emergence of the fields of psycholinguistics and

sociolinguistics and their impact upon applied linguistics in the 1960s and 1970s: New research on language learners' motivations and backgrounds had eroded the dominance of a behaviorist model that had treated learners like identical machines, while also undermining confidence in the relevance of contrastive analysis to language teaching.[78] The move towards creating culturally specific and communicatively focused materials also pointed to the crucial role played by Chinese teachers, researchers, and students in UCLA's project. The process of designing the China centers' curricula originated not with behaviorist or contrastive *a priori*s but inductively, with a survey of Chinese students and their teachers that aimed to identify experiential challenges to learning English.[79] Finally, this newfound focus on student needs dovetailed with the rise of English for Specific Purposes (ESP), a "practitioners' movement" that emerged from the insight that English-language learners in particular fields like science and business might benefit from targeted forms of instruction.[80]

A central irony in UCLA's work in China was that, at a moment of metastasizing American doubt in planned modernization, the concept was being embraced by Beijing as a means of rapidly recovering from the Cultural Revolution, which had devastated Chinese science and higher education. In Deng's China, class struggle had been displaced by the "Four Modernizations" policy framework, which targeted science and technology, industry, agriculture, and defense as key sectors for investment and attention. The elite Chinese delegations that visited the United States under CSCPRC auspices over the course of the 1970s aimed to get up to date on American scientific and technological advances. Then, as Deng fully embraced modernization after Mao's death, Americans were able to use their scientific expertise as a lever with Beijing, to broaden the scope of the exchanges from whirlwind tours

by high-level delegations to longer stays by students and scholars.[81] By the late 1970s, dozens of American universities and colleges including UCLA were negotiating their own exchange agreements with Chinese counterparts.[82] These decentralized programs quickly outpaced official CSCPRC exchanges in terms of the number of Chinese visitors hosted in the United States. Already by early 1981, some two hundred and fifty higher-education institutions in the United States had welcomed nearly five thousand students and scholars from the PRC.[83]

From early on, language training was central to Beijing's modernization agenda. As one of UCLA's Chinese collaborators put it, citing the well-known linguist and English-language educator Xu Guozhang, there was a "built-in relationship between [the] modernization of China and the need for English in an information-saturated world where data updating is 'most advantageously done through English.'"[84] Prior to the broadening of the exchanges in the late 1970s, applied linguistics was one of the only social-science fields that the Chinese were interested in. For instance, in the second year of the CSCPRC delegation visits, 1973, a Chinese delegation devoted to language teaching visited the United States—following delegations in hydrotechnology, high-energy physics, insect hormones, library science, computer science, and biomedical engineering.[85] During the UCLA delegation's 1979 visit to China, English-language training again stood out among the six priority areas of potential cooperation conveyed by Chinese authorities, which read like a game of "one of these things is not like the other": "physics, biology, English as a Second Language (ESL), economics management, mathematics, and chemistry."[86]

Unexpectedly, Deng's pursuit of the Four Modernizations would help the American applied-linguistics community regain a measure of faith in the idea that

English was an essential channel of developmental know-how. Signed in November 1979, UCLA's first agreement with Chinese authorities for an in-country language center was for the Guangzhou English Language Center (GELC), based at Zhongshan (or Sun Yat-sen) University in the southern province of Guangdong. UCLA proudly reported that it was the "first comprehensive English language center ever to be established in the PRC in cooperation with a foreign academic institution."[87] Agreements followed in rapid succession with two Beijing-based institutions, the Graduate School of Science and Technology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Institute of International Economics and Management; their centers were respectively called the Graduate School English Language Center (GSELC) and the Beijing English Language Center (BELC). The three centers opened their doors in September 1980 with several objectives in mind: to develop special English-language curricula suited to the needs of the Chinese science and business communities; to train Chinese English-language teachers; and to provide direct courses for Chinese exchange visitors to the United States. Plans were also made to send a select group of Chinese English-language teachers to UCLA for further training in applied linguistics.[88] UCLA publicity materials noted that such demand for scientific and business English was "spurred by countries seeking modernization."[89]

Multiple factors shaped the joint agreement between Chinese authorities and UCLA to create English centers in China rather than relying wholly on supplemental instruction once visitors reached the United States. Financial constraints made in-country training attractive to Beijing: Covering its nationals' expenses in the United States imposed a heavy burden, particularly as these expenses were incurred in the scarce resource of U.S. dollars. Group language courses offered at Georgetown University and American University in 1978 for the first batch of Chinese exchange

scholars had proven too pricey to justify the mediocre results.[90] In addition, in-country centers made pedagogical sense to the Americans involved, offering the opportunity to make a more accurate assessment of Chinese scholars' English-language abilities and an opportunity to improve them before the visitors were expected to engage in substantive work in the United States. Americans also pushed Chinese counterparts to administer standardized English-language tests before visitors' departure for the United States, specifically the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL), an American property which had been developed by CAL in the 1960s before being taken over by the Educational Testing Service. Initially Chinese authorities appeared reluctant to use the TOEFL, but by the early 1980s they had adopted it.[91]

From UCLA's perspective, research opportunities also fueled the establishment of the in-country centers. Just as Michigan had fought for the SEAREP contract in the late 1950s partly to stem competition from UCLA, Russell Campbell had returned to California from the UCLA delegation's 1979 tour of China and sold his colleagues on the institutional "benefits that might accrue to the [UCLA] TESL Section if it entered into extensive, long-term English-for-Specific Purposes (ESP) projects in the PRC."[92] Under Campbell's leadership, UCLA's English-language centers in China would be seen as an invaluable terrain of research and experimentation for the school's sizable community of applied linguists.

If institutional motivations formed a continuity with prior American English-language work abroad, the American university community also hoped that the PRC programs would find budgetary support in Washington, as had many federally subsidized precedents. The symbolic significance of the PRC exchanges may have given them hope; for the United States, normalization with China was a major foreign-policy success in a decade otherwise marked by crises. Immediately after the

signing of the GELC agreement in late 1979, UCLA vice chancellor Elwin Svenson wrote to the U.S. ambassador to Beijing about this "unique program between institutions of higher learning in the U.S. and the P.R.C. in the field of English language teaching. … We believe this program fills a gap in the developing relations between our two countries and… could appropriately be funded to a large extent by the U.S. government."[93] While a level of boosterism could be expected from Svenson, others would soon confirm the originality of UCLA's China centers: Beijing's representatives to the bilateral U.S.-P.R.C. Joint Commission on Scientific and Technological Cooperation singled out the Zhongshan center (GELC) as an "important model" to watch even before it had opened.[94] Similarly, describing American university involvement in English-language training in China, a federally commissioned report from 1981 devoted the most space to UCLA's work.[95] A few years into GELC's operations, Zhongshan University professor and GELC co-director Yang Xiuzhen reported "great interest" in the center's programs, noting that its curriculum had been "taken as a model on which a unified national curriculum for intensive English training programs was drafted."[96] Svenson's appeal to the U.S. ambassador, then, was not mere bragging; and in an earlier funding climate it might have been successful.

However, the budgetary climate was changing. By the time of China's opening, federal and foundation applied-linguistics investments on the order of USAID's SEAREP or the Ford Foundation's Indonesia project were becoming a thing of the past. Federal budgets for non-defense research plunged around the time Ronald Reagan took office and did not recover in absolute terms until the early 1990s. In related fashion, federal subsidies for the social sciences declined in both absolute terms and in proportion to funding for the "harder" sciences and engineering.[97]

Washington had refused to fund even a central office for coordinating the U.S.-PRC exchanges, let alone the exchanges themselves.[98]

Another fleeting possibility was that China would bear the brunt of the costs associated with the exchanges. While Beijing did subsidize UCLA's in-country centers and provide limited stipends to its exchange nationals abroad, the American academic community had briefly entertained hopes of more robust support. The CSCPRC had concluded in 1978, "It is widely accepted that the Chinese will pay the costs of educating their students in the United States." Discussing the University of California's system-wide involvement in the PRC exchanges the same year, Milton von Damm of the system president's office likewise wrote, "The general feeling is that PRC should pay all costs."[99]

Yet it soon became clear that neither Beijing nor Washington would fully support the exchanges. Americans soon realized that the stipends that Beijing provided to its exchange participants—between $400 and $500 per month—were inadequate, particularly in expensive cities like Los Angeles.[100] Exchange-program representatives at UCLA noted that the need to go "house-hunting" was an "alien idea" to visitors from a country with socialized housing, as was the need to buy private health insurance. Moreover, PRC visitors were under pressure to win funding from their host institutions after just one or two years, with any American support they won then "deducted from the sum paid by the [Chinese] embassy." There was also the issue of remittances: Many visitors tried or were under pressure to eke out savings from whatever dollar funding they received, to send back to China. Sue Fan of UCLA concluded that this combination of financial pressures prevented the PRC visitors from "adequately participating in social activities and… professional activities… [which seems] to defeat one of their main purposes for being here."[101]

The result of these constraints was that American colleges and universities were, by the mid-1980s, bearing the highest proportion of the costs associated with the PRC exchanges. Between 1979 and 1983, their share rose from 18% to 45% of costs, with Beijing's contributions declining from 54% to 32%. "The rapid growth in the number of PRC students and scholars on American campuses is due in part to the willingness of American colleges and universities to assume a substantial share of the costs," concluded the 1986 CSCPRC study *A Relationship Restored*.[102] Meanwhile, these costs continued to increase in absolute terms because of growing student numbers. By 1988-1989, mainland China had pulled ahead of Taiwan to become the number one source of exchange students (29,040) to the United States, growth which was not dampened by the Tiananmen Square repression of June 1989: Their numbers jumped to 33,390 in 1989-1990 and then to 39,600 in 1990-1991.[103]

It is important to note that strict reciprocity had never been the goal of the exchanges on the American side, neither in terms of visitor numbers (many more Chinese participants went to the United States than the other way around), nor in terms of costs borne. In the often zero-sum world of foreign policy, this was an enlightened position—and one that had been promoted by the scholarly community of the CSCPRC.[104] Moreover, from a bottom-line perspective, for many American institutions the PRC exchanges were actually more favorable than other exchanges in percentage terms: From 1979 through 1983, the proportion of costs covered by American colleges and universities for PRC visitors was lower than the roughly 50% of costs they were bearing for exchange students from other countries. At the same time, Beijing's contribution was much higher than the 15% or less of costs typically contributed by foreign governments.[105]

What stands out, rather, is how tightly Washington was holding its purse strings, especially given the foreign-policy significance of the PRC exchanges. The U.S. government's share of costs was never higher than 8% between 1979 and 1983.[106] Beltway policymakers could afford to be sanguine about budgetary asymmetries when costs were effectively being passed along to institutions and individual participants. But for American universities, particularly public ones like UCLA, budgetary concerns persisted beneath the veneer of lofty intentions. Reviewing the results of an extensive survey of the U.S. side of the exchanges, Sue Fan noted that many UCLA faculty members "feel the responsibility of funding these students [is] being unloaded on them."[107] Or, in the blunter language of a comment from 1979 about the exchanges, "Why should UC subsidize the Chinese students so fully? What are we getting in return?"[108]

Ultimately, these constraints provoked a grasping for new economic models. One solution was to diversify funding streams. Lucie Cheng Hirata penned a concerned letter to UCLA provost Raymond Orbach in the winter of 1983, relating the China Exchange Program's budgetary shortfalls. The program oversaw UCLA's exchanges in both directions, as well as sponsoring outgoing faculty from other UC and Southern California campuses. Most of its operations in 1982-1983 were being covered by UCLA itself, with smaller amounts coming from the Luce Foundation and the U.N. Development Program (the latter in support of BELC)—in other words, UCLA was receiving no federal monies for the exchanges.[109] By the following year, 1983-1984, the China Exchange Program had diversified its funding and gained modest support from the USIA as well as money from the Ford Foundation. This had been enough to reduce but not eliminate its operating deficit, which hovered around $67,000.[110] When UCLA opened a fourth English-language center in China in 1985,

called the Social Science English Language Center (SSELC), it did so with support from the Ford and Luce foundations.[111]

Another option was to charge fees to exchange participants. Hirata did not like this solution; as she explained to Orbach, it "creates the problem of depriving students without sufficient financial resources of the opportunity" to participate on exchanges. But UCLA had already begun to do so for its China-bound students in 1982-1983.[112] In this the school was not alone: Other American colleges and universities were testing different ways of covering the costs of their own burgeoning PRC exchange programs. As of 1979, some institutions also planned to charge fees for visitors coming in the other direction, from China to the United States, in spite of the heavy burden that such fees would have imposed upon dollar-strapped newcomers.[113] Two UCLA deans wrote to Vice Chancellor Svenson in April of that year to suggest just such a solution.[114]

The flourishing of the U.S.-PRC exchanges, which coincided with public-sector belt-tightening, crystallized how American higher-education institutions were beginning to internalize a microeconomic mindset by the late 1970s and 1980s: They were coming to view international exchanges less in terms of any putative national interest and more as sources of institutional operating revenue. This shift was conditioned by the broader funding climate. After three decades of expanding low-cost or free higher education in the United States, by the mid-1970s public investments in higher education were being undermined by protracted recession and high inflation.[115] Schools had to think creatively in order to offset declining public support. The China exchanges spurred a range of funding experiments. In 1984, for instance, Hofstra University, a private school on Long Island, signed an agreement with Beijing to act as a middleman for American businesses looking to expand in

China. For Hofstra, the financial benefits of this arrangement were to flow from commissions on any commercial agreements it produced.[116] In the longer term, the China exchanges also highlighted how student demand could be leveraged to cover costs. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, self-paying students bore an increasing burden of universities' operating costs, with international and other out-of-state students especially prized because they could be charged higher tuition than in-state students.[117]

This neoliberal turn in American higher education paralleled the transformation of English-language training over roughly the same period. English, once subsidized by Washington as a channel of (macroeconomic) national development, transformed into a source of (microeconomic) interest for institutions ranging from public universities to private-sector businesses. In the PRC, UCLA's in-country centers collaborated with multinational corporations keen to develop the Chinese market. The BELC, which was housed at the Beijing Institute of Foreign Trade, oversaw the production of a glossary of Chinese and American accounting terminology funded by the accounting firm Price Waterhouse.[118] In Guangzhou, the GELC was approached by Esso China about offering English courses geared towards Chinese employees of the petroleum industry.[119] Meanwhile, at home, schools like UCLA, the University of Michigan, Columbia University, and the University of Washington—leaders in the applied linguistics and TESL fields—were among those that welcomed the largest cohorts of PRC students and scholars in the late 1970s and 1980s.[120] When, in the decades that followed, the number of self-funded Chinese students begun to swell, these institutions were well prepared to transmute student numbers into revenue. In 2016, Columbia ranked fifth, UCLA eighth, Washington

fourteenth, and Michigan sixteenth in a national count of students from mainland China at American universities.[121]

From channeling national-development expertise to helping keep neoliberal universities afloat, American investments in global English not only reflected the dominant economic thinking of their eras, but also shaped how economic paradigms were communicated, institutionalized, and spatialized.

Conclusion: English for Business and the Business of English

At the same moment that transnational demand for business English was growing, the business of teaching English was prospering. In China, a vibrant private TOEFL tutoring sector emerged in the 1980s, such that one journalist and TOEFL tutee marveled at how the "study-abroad craze" of the reform and opening era had coincided with a "mushrooming of continuing education schools teaching foreign languages": "Admission required… no letter of recommendation from one's work unit, and no review of one's political background. It was an educational system regulated by [the] market economy alone."[122] Likewise, English regained a foothold in Vietnam, where after a decade of restrictions following its 1975 reunification, leaders adopted market-oriented policies through the *doi moi* reforms of 1986. These reforms were accompanied by the resurgence of English as a lingua franca, its popularity underwritten by foreign investors and bolstered by new educational policies enabling students to choose which foreign languages they studied.[123] In the years following the openings of China and Vietnam, the collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in surging interest in English in post-socialist Europe.

Some commentators would see all this activity as proof that the English language spread through markets alone rather than governmental action. But, as this

chapter has suggested, this dichotomy is an artificial one. Far-flung demand for English was deeply intertwined with policy choices and investments. The burgeoning for-profit English sector in China emerged to funnel students to Anglophone higher-education institutions under the auspices of Beijing's "Four Modernizations"; and it also interlocked with American gatekeeping mechanisms like the TOEFL, which had originated under Charles Ferguson's tenure at the state-adjacent CAL.[124] In post-socialist Europe, demand for English was likewise shaped by policymaking on both sides of the crumbling iron curtain. Governments that had newly thrown off the Soviet yoke quickly moved to end Russian-language mandates and to offer English in national school systems.[125] Simultaneously, Anglophone aid agencies jumped at the chance to open the region to capitalism through language teaching. In the words of Peace Corps director Paul D. Coverdell, who headed the agency from 1989 to 1991, "English is the language of commerce." In 1990, Hungary and Poland became the first post-communist destinations for Peace Corps volunteers, who arrived by the dozens to help train teachers of English.[126] Perhaps the best example of the intersection between subsidies and markets came in Latin America. Even as federal funding for the USIA's binational centers wound down in the early 1980s, many continued to thrive due to strong local demand for their English courses (and many continued to act as magnets for U.S.-based applied linguists doing field research).[127] Subsidized efforts supported and at times laid the groundwork for private demand.

Meanwhile, over the same period that witnessed major investments in global English, its domestic primacy would be challenged. As we will see in Chapter Four, the bilingual-education movement that emerged in the 1960s powerfully questioned the dominance of English in American schools. Bilingual-education advocates, who included academic linguists but also a much wider array of activists, teachers, and

students, were often more concerned with questions of educational equity for immigrant communities and heritage speakers than they were with foreign policy per se. But ultimately it was this movement, not postsecondary coursework or language-study scholarships which reached most students much too late, that offered the best remedy to woes expressed by the CSCPRC and other insiders to the U.S.-PRC exchanges: Americans' "dismaying" abilities in languages other than English.[128]

[1] Linguists agree that exposure alone does not result in language learning: Active engagement is required. While the relative importance of formal instruction and informal practice have been debated, most linguists agree that formal instruction and informal engagement in a target language reinforce each other. Krashen, "Formal and Informal Linguistic Environments in Language Acquisition and Language Learning," *TESOL Quarterly*, vol. 10, no. 2 (1976): 157-68; Krashen, *Second Language Acquisition and Second Language Learning* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981), chapter 3; Alene Moyer, "Formal and Informal Experiential Realms in German as a Foreign Language: A Preliminary Investigation," *Foreign Language Annals*, vol. 38, no. 3 (2005): 377-87.

[2] Lawrence Summers, "What You (Really) Need To Know," *New York Times*, January 20, 2012.

[3] *Second Language Learning as a Factor in National Development in Asia, Africa, and Latin America* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1961).

[4] On CAL's original mandate see *Second Language Learning*, 12. On Ford's intimate relationship with Washington during this time, see Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century*, TKpp. Also: on Ford as arm of gov't, see RAC notes 21: deflects criticism from nationalists. See also DoD/DLI praise for CAL (RAC notes 42).

[5] Thomas, *American Arabists in the Cold War*. **See also RAC notes 12: Melvin Fox comments that Ferguson was "very close to the activities and interests of the U.S. government." See also RAC notes 30: Jane Alden at State close to Ferguson.**

[6] I discuss the roots of this collaboration in more detail in Diana Lemberg, "'The Universal Language of the Future': Decolonization, Development, and the American Embrace of Global English, 1945-1965," *Modern Intellectual History* 15/2 (2018): 561-92; Diana Lemberg, "The End of Empires and Some Linguistic Turns: British and French Language Policies in Inter- and Post-war Africa," in *British and French Colonialism in Africa, Asia and the Middle East: Connected Empires across the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, ed. James R. Fichter (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

[7] Memorandum #332, U.S. Government Policy on English Language Teaching Abroad, 6/11/1965, "NSAM 332 US Government Policy on English Language Teaching Abroad," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 6, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed February 22, 2022, https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/nsf-nsam332.

[8] Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology*; Odd Arne Westad, *Global Cold War*; Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*; et al.

[9] David Andrew Corcoran, "The Infrastructure of Influence: Transnational Collaboration and the Spread of U.S. Cultural Influence in Colombia, 1930s-1960s" (PhD diss., University of New Mexico, 2011), 51-53.

[10] Quoted in Bob Adamson, *A History of English in Chinese Education* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 156.

[11] On the binational centers, see Corcoran, "Infrastructure of Influence"; Robert Findlay, "Captivating Hearts and Minds." On the TOEFL in 1980s China, see Qian Ning, *Chinese Students Encounter America*, translated by T. K. Chu (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 32-36.

[12] Two recent and otherwise brilliant historical studies argue that bottom-up demand mattered more than policymaking: Michael Gordin, *Scientific Babel*; Daniel Immerwahr, *How To Hide an Empire*. See also David Crystal, *English as a Global Language*; David Northrup, *How English Became the Global Language*.

[13] On Chennai, see Robert Eric Frykenberg, "Modern Education in South India, 1784-1854: Its Roots and Its Role as a Vehicle of Integration under Company Raj," *American Historical Review* 91/1 (1986): 37-65; Robert E. Frykenberg, "The Myth of English as a 'Colonialist' Imposition upon India: A Reappraisal with Special Reference to South India," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* 2 (1988): 305-15. On English in colonial India more generally, see Stephen Evans, "Macaulay's Minute Revisited: Colonial Language Policy in Nineteenth-century India," *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 23:4 (2002): 260-81.

[14] Küster, "The Impact of Phelps-Stokesism on Colonial Education Systems." See also Northrup, *How English Became a Global Language*.

[15] On pan-Americanism, see Rosina Lozano, *An American Language*, p. 15 & ch. 8. Lozano notes the drop-off in federal support for Spanish after WW2.

[16] Barrows quoted in Funie Hsu, "The Coloniality of Neoliberal English," 132. See also Julian Go, "Chains of Empire, Projects of State: Political Education and U.S. Colonial Rule in Puerto Rico and the Philippines," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42/2 (2000), 333-4, 343; Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2006), 203-4; Glenn Anthony May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900–1913* (Westport, CT, 1980), 82-84; Ruanni Tupas and Beatriz P. Lorente, "A 'New' Politics of Language in the Philippines: Bilingual Education and the New Challenge of the Mother Tongues," in Peter Sercombe and Ruanni Tupas, eds., Language, Education and Nation-Building: Assimilation and Shift in Southeast Asia (Basingstoke, 2014), 165-80.

[17] Lozano, *An American Language*, TKpp; Hsu, "The Coloniality of Neoliberal English," TKpp. REREAD ALSO: José-Manuel Navarro, *Creating Tropical Yankees: Social Science Textbooks and U.S. Ideological Control in Puerto Rico, 1898–1908* (New York, 2002), 31–113; Amílcar Antonio Barreto, The Politics of Language in Puerto Rico (Gainesville, 2001), 1-33.

[18] Hsu, "The Coloniality of Neoliberal English," 133; May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, 87-126. REREAD ALSO: Funie Hsu, "Colonial Articulations: English Instruction and the 'Benevolence' of U.S. Overseas Expansion in the Philippines, 1898–1916" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2013).

[19] May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, see esp. chapter 7.

[20] Tupas and Lorente, "A 'New' Politics of Language in the Philippines," 167.

[21] For a more detailed account of this transformation, see Diana Lemberg, "The End of Empires and Some Linguistic Turns: British and French Language Policies in Inter- and Postwar Africa," in *British and French Colonialism in Africa, Asia and the Middle East: Connected Empires across the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, ed. James R. Fichter (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 297-321. On the rise of British support for English teaching in Asia and Africa, see also Clive Whitehead, "The Advisory Committee on Education in the [British] Colonies 1924–1961," *Paedagogica Historica* 27 (3): 408-14; Phillipson, "Linguistic Imperialism," 147-51.

[22] Franklin B. Rolfe, letter to Charles B. Fahs with attachment, October 31, 1956, RF, RAC (RAC notes 113, P1200733).

[23] Ford: see https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED458792.pdf; USAID distributing PCLS textbooks amid publisher opposition: RAC notes 126; Peace Corps volunteers being trained at UCLA before shipping out: RAC notes 125.

[24] Clifford Prator oral history, UCLA archives; Corcoran, "Infrastructure of Influence," 251; Clifford Prator, letter to Boyd Compton, August 17, 1964, RF papers (RAC notes 127). Prator had moved to UCLA with Albert Marckwardt's help.

[25] Audrey L. Wright and James H. McGillivray, *Let's Learn English*, part 2, title page, at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=inu.32000000865990&view=1up&seq=4; Corcoran, "Infrastructure of Influence," 257-58; Sirarpi Ohannessian, ed., "Reference List of Materials for English as a Second Language" (Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1964), 34-35, 133, at https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED014723.pdf.

[26] Findlay, dissertation, 81; FINDLAY IS SOURCE FOR THE FACT THAT BOOK DEVELOPED BY USIA. On spread of Wright and McGillivray, see RAC notes file (for Indonesia) and DH article (Vietnam). Michigan also deployed materials it had developed with State Department funding in Mexico in South Vietnam before it had made proper contrastive materials (Bentley notes 5). ←→ There was opposition to this borrowing of Latin American texts by at least one teacher in Thailand (Bentley notes 10)—but note the opposition is proof it was happening.

[27] Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century*, 124–48; Melvin J. Fox, "The Work of American Foundations in English as a Second Language" (paper for the Anglo-American Conference on English Teaching Abroad, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK, June 26–30, 1961), Report 002236, Box 91, FA739A, FF, RAC; Lev, "A Brief Review of Foreign Assistance"; Melvin J. Fox, "Ford Foundation Foreign or Second Language Activities in the United States and Overseas 1951–1966," May 1967, Folder 6, Box 1, Series I, FA572, FF, RAC. **On the adoption of English in SE Asia and especially Indonesia, see also Marc Frey, "Tools of Empire," *Diplomatic History* 2003, 563n75.**

[28] Daniel S. Lev, "Brief Review… Indonesia" (RAC notes 4). On Lev, see Sebastiaan Pompe, "In Memoriam, Daniel S. Lev, 1933-2006," *Indonesia* 93 (2012): 197-207.

[29] James E. Ianucci, "The English Language Teacher Training Project in Indonesia," June 1967 (RAC notes 33)

[30] "Agenda Paper: Session V: Languages and Linguistics," 1968 (RAC notes 12, P1170229). For a list of Ford's ODP ELT grant recipients, see Appendix B to F. C. Ward, "Ford Foundation Activities in English as a Second Language to October, 1965," (RAC notes 23, P1170596).
[31] On Alden, see CBF diary excerpt, August 31, 1956, RF papers (RAC notes 111); and F. Cawson, "International Activities of CAL," 1973 (RAC notes 30). On the advantages of foundation as opposed to federal support, see BRC diary excerpt, January 30, 1961, and ICA, letter to Boyd Compton, March 2, 1961, RF papers (RAC notes 121-22)); CBF to DR memo (discusses gov't budget short-termism), February 26, 1957, RF papers (RAC notes 114); Melvin Fox, draft memo, May 31, 1961, FF papers (RAC notes 97); and Ward, memo to McPeak et al, 20 December 1963, FF papers (RAC notes 97). On the desire for closer cooperation among federal agencies and between government and other actors, see also Melvin J. Fox, "Notes on English as a Second Language Related to Africa: Attachment: American ESL Overseas Programs," March 6, 1961, FF papers (RAC notes 19).
See also American Embassy, letter to Fahs at Rockefeller, 1956: "English is the common language of Asia"; urges non-gov'tal support (RAC notes 113).
[32] Ohannessian, "Retrospective… Survey," 1973 (RAC notes 38, P1180351); F. C. Ward, "Ford Foundation Activities in English as a Second Language to October, 1965," (RAC notes 23, P1170596); CAL, *Second Language Learning*. On the need to strengthen graduate training in the United States, see also Archibald A. Hill, "Preface," *Language Learning* 8, no. s1 (1958): 11, 15-16.
[33] On indigenous languages in Latin America, see "Meeting on Language," June 22, 1971 (RAC notes 36). On East Africa, see Clifford Prator, "Survey of Language Use and Language Teaching in East Africa," 1968 (RAC notes 100, starts P1200420).
[34] Robert Lado, "Research and Training Needs in Language Teaching with Special Attention to English as a Foreign Language," *Language Learning*, 1958.
[35] CHECK (from MIH article): On the conflation of the survey with English-language teaching, e.g., F. F. Hill, memo to John Howard et al., 2 Dec. 1959 (headed "Copied from Handwritten Notes"), in folder labeled "Africa—Trip to Africa," Box 3, Series I, FA608, FF, RAC; CAL, memo to Ford Foundation re: "Survey of Needs and Resources for Teaching English and Other World Languages," 8 Oct. 1959, in folder labeled "Africa—Trip to Africa," Box 3, Series I, FA608, FF, RAC; F. C. Ward, "Ford Foundation Activities in English as a Second Language to October, 1965" (RAC notes 23, P1170597). Didn't Fox also call it the "World ESL Survey"? FIND SRC. For the foundation's "results"-oriented approach, see Fox, memo to Howard and Gant, November 10, 1959, FF papers (RAC notes 10).
[36] Fox, memo to Francis X. Sutton, December 15, 1978, FF, RAC (RAC notes 14, P1170285).
[37] Ohannassian, "Retrospective… Survey," 1973 (FF papers, RAC notes 38).
[38] "Report on Survey of U.S. Government English Language Programs." This marked the first time the federal government had gathered this data in a single report.
[39] Franklin P. Rolfe, letter to Charles B. Fahs, August 19, 1957, and Charles B. Fahs, diary excerpt, November 13, 1957, Folder 3731, Box 434, Series 200R, RG 1.2, RF (RAC notes 116, P1200927).
[40] On USIA English-teaching activities, see the invaluable dissertation by Robert A. Findlay, "Captivating Hearts and Minds: The Attempted Americanization of Asian Cultures, 1945-1970" (Ph.D. diss., University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, 2016), chapter 2, quotation on 60.
[41] Wright and McGillivray, *Let's Learn English*, part 2, 273-91.
[42] Findlay, "Captivating Hearts and Minds," 81.
[43] WHICH: Charles C. Fries, "Implications of Modern Linguistic Science," *College English* 8/6 (Mar., 1947): 314-20; Charles C. Fries, "Structural Linguistics and Language Teaching," *Classical Journal* 52/6 (Mar., 1957): 265-8.
[44] GET SOURCES: Fries/Michigan; UCLA. See also Lemberg, "The Weaponization of Language Training," *Diplomatic History*, **TKpp**.
[45] On the contrastive approaches of the SEAREP and PCLS projects, **see DH article for sources**. On tensions with USIA, see Findlay, "Captivating Hearts and Minds," 81-84.
[46] Photo in RAC files—get FN from Barriers Down.
[47] On the USIS library in Bangkok, see Amanda Laugesen, *Globalizing the Library: Librarians and Development Work* (Routledge, 2019), chapter 5.
[48] E. Anthony, letter to T. Russell, February 3, 1960, Bentley notes 9.
[49] Findlay, "Captivating Hearts and Minds," 66-75; USIA annual report numbers cited in Albert H. Marckwardt, "Teaching English as a Foreign Language" (1967), Folder 4, Box 3, Series II, FA572, FF, RAC.

[50] "Report on Survey of U.S. Government English Language Programs for Fiscal Years 1964, 1965 and 1966," 20 May 1965, and "Peace Corps Volunteers Employed as English Teachers as of March 31, 1965" (1965?), Folder 13, Box 3, Series III, FA548, FF, RAC. On the flow of Peace Corps volunteers into domestic ESL work, see Ohannessian, "Retrospective… Survey," 1973 (RAC notes 38, ~P1180351).
[51] "The Michigan SEAREP Project: Summary and Projection," 15, Bentley Library notes 6.
[52] Ted Plaister letter, January 2, [1960], Bentley notes 16. For criticisms of Fulbright ELT volunteers, see also: W. Freeman Twaddell, "U.S. Activities of the Center for Applied Linguistics, 1959–1973," spring 1973, Report 004959, Box 220, FA739B, FF, RAC; Charles A. Ferguson, "The Role of the Center for Applied Linguistics, 1959–1967" (1967), Folder 3, Box 3, Series II, FA572, FF, RAC.
[53] For criticisms of the Peace Corps, see RAC notes 1, 12, 19.
[54] Peace Corps being trained at UCLA before shipping out (RAC notes 125) and PCVs to Thailand trained at Michigan (Bentley notes 22); Fulbrighters at Michigan, with Asia Foundation support (Bentley notes 17).
[55] Lev, "Brief Review"; Ianucci, "ELTT in Indonesia" (RAC notes 33).
[56] "English Language Programs of the Agency for International Development,"Department of State, Agency for International Development, Dec. 1967, at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaad469.pdf.
[57] Untitled press release (headed "From the University of Michigan News Service"), [n.d.], Folder labeled "Public Relations," Box 15 Bentley notes 22, P1390265.
[58] [Ted Smith], "Indonesia: Ford Foundation English Language Activities," November 1968 (RAC notes 20, P1170517). On Washington's complicity in the purges see Vincent Bevins, "What the United States Did in Indonesia," *The Atlantic*, October 20, 2017; and Brad Simpson, *Economists with Guns*.
[59] SEAREP contract documents, Box 25, Entry P 578, Record Group 286 (hereafter RG 286): Records of the Agency for International Development, 1948–2003, USNA; Statler, *Replacing France*, 204–13, 258–76; "The University of Michigan South East Asian Regional English Project: The First Year: September, 1958–September, 1959," 1959, Folder labeled "George Edwin Luther, South East Asian Regional English Project, Reports, 1958-1965, Annual Reports, 1958-1963," Box 8, ELI records.
[60] On SEAREP staff concerns, see Warren G. Yates, letter to George Luther, August 2, 1961, Folder labeled "Campus Coordinator Office – Correspondence (Chronologic) 1961," Box 11, ELI records; George E. Luther, letter to Warren G. Yates, February 16, 1961, Folder labeled "Campus Coordinator Office – Correspondence (Chronologic) 1961," Box 11, ELI records; William T. Weir, letter to George E. Luther, November 13, 1961, Folder labeled "Weir, W. T.," Box 12, ELI records; George E. Luther, letter to William T. Weir, December 6, 1961, Folder labeled "Weir, W. T.," Box 12, ELI records; George E. Luther, letter to William T. Weir, October 30, 1961, Folder labeled "Weir, W. T.," Box 12, ELI records; William T. Weir, letter to George E. Luther, October 19, 1961, Folder labeled "Weir, W. T.," Box 12, ELI records.
[61] On the contradictions of "modernization at war" in South Vietnam, see Latham, *Modernization as Ideology*, Ch. 5; Ekbladh, *Great American Mission*, Ch. 6; and David Biggs, *Quagmire*.
[62] "Ford Foundation Activities in Teaching English as a Second Language," 1964 (RAC notes 1, P1160759, pp. 7, 13). See also Lemberg, "'The Universal Language of the Future,'" 588-89.
[63] Clifford Prator, letter to Boyd Compton, July 28, 1965; "Second Report on UCLA's Participation in the Ford Foundation Grant to the Philippine Normal College for Language Research and Training," [1967]. Both in Folder 3737, Box 434, Series 200R, RG 1.2, RF (RAC notes 127, report starts P1210415).
[64] Streibert cited in Findlay, "Captivating Hearts and Minds," 76.
[65] The Lackland school was consolidated into the DLI in the 1960s. James Lawton Collins, Jr., "Defense Language Institute," *Army Information Digest*, 1963 (DLI notes m, P1330919); attachment to Melvin Fox, "Notes on English as a Second Language as Related to Africa," March 7, 1961, Report #002307, Box 96, RG 739A, FF, RAC (RAC notes 19, P1170507).
[66] J. M. Cowan, "J. M. Cowan's Visit to Saigon, February 21-25, 1969," 1969, Report #006678, FA739C, Box 300, FF, RAC (RAC notes 33, P1180193).
[67] Do Huy Thinh, "Foreign Language Education Policy in Vietnam: The Emergence of English and Its Impact on Higher Education," in *Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Language and Development* (1999), accessed April 1, 2022 at http://www.langdevconferences.org/publications/1999-HanoiVietnam/1-3%20Foreign%20Language%20Education%20Policy%20in%20Vietnam-%20The%20Emergence%20of%20English%20and%20Its%20Impact%20on%20Higher%20Education-DoHuy%20Thinh.pdf.

[68] "Defense Language Institute: English Language Center," May 31, 1975, DLI archives (DLI notes r, P1340139).
[69] "Position Paper: Scope of the Defense Language Program (DLP) English Language Training Program (ELTP)," June 25, 1975, DLI archives (DLI notes r, P1340143).
[70] Ferguson quote in RAC notes 35; Ford quote in RAC notes 36; GET FOX QUOTE FROM HIS ORAL FORD FOUNDATION ORAL HISTORY.
[71] Corcoran flags the "decision at mid-century by many Latin American governments to require English language study in national secondary schools." Corcoran, "Infrastructure of Influence," 47; on the case of Colombia see 249-51.
[72] "The UCLA/China Connection," 29 May 1980 (UCLA internal document), Folder 4, Box 152, TKTK collection, UCLA (P1360562); Russell Campbell, "An Interim Report," May 1988 (UCLA Box 155, Folder 2, p. 13, P1360678).
[73] The CSCPRC was a partnership between the National Academy of Sciences, the Social Science Research Council, and the American Council of Learned Societies. On the CSCPRC, see Pete Millwood, "An 'Exceedingly Delicate Undertaking': Sino-American Science Diplomacy, 1966-78," *Journal of Contemporary History* 56, no. 1 (2021): 166-90.
[74] For the 1979 delegation members, see Appendix 2 to UCLA-Zhongshan University Exchange Program, "Application for Grant under the University Linkage Program for East Asia and the Pacific of the United States Information Agency," [n.d., early 1980s], Folder 1, Box 158, TKTK collection, UCLA.
[75] On UCLA's centers in China, see Russell Campbell, "An Interim Report," May 1988, p. 13, Folder 2, Box 155, TKTK Collection, UCLA (P1360678). For Chinese visitors to the United States, see Sue Fan, brief history of UCLA involvement in China, June 16, 1989, Folder 3, Box 155, TKTK Collection, UCLA (P1360759).
[76] Russell Campbell, letter to "Ed," May 21, 1958, Folder labeled "Correspondence—Russell N. Campbell," Box 11, ELI papers, Bentley Library (Bentley notes 12, P1380339).
[77] The idea that English was essential to modernization was shared outside of linguistics circles: see, e.g., Eugene Power, letter to George E. Luther, February 23, 1961, Bentley notes 11, P1380278.
[78] In an article from 1970, Campbell, signaling a familiarity with transformational grammar, rejected the hardcore behaviorist assumption that grammar should be learned in a purely inductive manner (i.e., without instruction in grammar rules). Adult learners, in particular, benefitted from familiarity with grammar rules. Russell N. Campbell, "An Evaluation and Comparison of Present Methods for Teaching English Grammar to Speakers of Other Languages," *TESOL* Quarterly 4/1 (1970): 37-48.
[79] Yang Xiuzhen, "A Summative Evaluation of a Sino-American ESP Program," March 1986 (paper for TESOL Conference) (UCLA notes 13, P1360651).
[80] Quote is from Ann M. Johns, "The History of English for Specific Purposes Research," *The Handbook of English for Specific Purposes*, eds. Brian Partridge and Sue Starfield (John Wiley, 2013), 6.
[81] Millwood, "An Exceedingly Delicate Undertaking."
[82] "Report of Trip" by President Saxon, Hirata et al on trip to China in October-November 1980, 14 January 1981 (UCLA, Box 162, Folder 1, P1370161); "The UCLA/China Connection," 29 May 1980 (UCLA internal document), Folder 4, Box 152, TKTK collection, UCLA (P1360562).
[83] Ralph N. Clough report, UCLA, 60.
[84] Yang Xiuzhen (GELC), "A Summative Evaluation of a Sino-American ESP Program," March 1986 (UCLA, Box 155, Folder 2, P1360652).
[85] *China Exchange Newsletter*, Dec. 1977.
[86] "The UCLA/China Connection."
[87] "The UCLA/China Connection."
[88] Campbell, "An Interim Report."
[89] Sue Fan, letter to C. B. Sung, 7 Jan. 1982 (UCLA, Box 150 Folder 5, P1360411).
[90] WHICH: Ralph N. Clough, "Research Report: A Review of the U.S.-China Exchange Program," Office of Research, Int'l Communication Agency, February 23, 1981 (UCLA, Box 162, Folder 5, P1370430), 45; Sue Fan, letter to C. B. Sung with attachment, 7 Jan. 1982 (UCLA, Box 150 Folder 5, P1360411); Qian, *Chinese Students Encounter America*, 91-92.
[91] On the TOEFL in China: CSCPRC, "Report of the Meeting on Student Exchange with China, August 24, 1978, National Academy of Sciences" (UCLA, Box 150, Folder 1, P1360046); Clough, "Research Report."
[92] Russell Campbell, "An Interim Report," May 1988 (UCLA Box 155, Folder 2, p. 13, P1360678). On the benefits to UCLA, see also Hirata, memo to Albert Barber, November 9, 1981: "one of the main

reasons for our involvement in PRC ELT" = "research opportunities… in applied linguistics" (UCLA notes p. 7). Harvard was a UCLA rival: see UCLA notes p.6.

On Michigan's perception of UCLA as competition, see, e.g., Robert Lado and Edward M. Anthony, memo to Warner G. Rice, March 19, 1958, Folder labeled "George Edwin Luther, South East Asian Regional English Project, Administrative Material, 1958–1964, Rice, Warner, Correspondence, 1958–1959," Box 8, ELI records.

[93] Elwin V. Svensson, letter to Leonard Woodcock (U.S. ambassador to PRC, based in Beijing), 13 December 1979 (UCLA Box 152, Folder 4, P1360556).

[94] Lewis Branscomb of CSCPRC, form letter, 5 March 1980 (UCLA, Box 150, Folder 1, P1360118);

[95] Clough, "Research Report."

[96] Yang Xiuzhen, "A Summative Evaluation of a Sino-American ESP Program," March 1986 (paper for TESOL Conference) (UCLA notes 13, P1360651); see also Yang Xiu-zhen and Ann Hilferty, "Guangzhou English Language Center: An Overview," February 23, 1984, Folder 2, Box 155, TKTK Collection, UCLA (P13606320).

[97] American Association for the Advancement of Science, "Historical Trends in Federal R&D," https://www.aaas.org/programs/r-d-budget-and-policy/historical-trends-federal-rd, accessed February 16, 2022: see the charts "Defense, Nondefense, and Total R&D, 1976-2020" and "Federal Research Funding by Discipline, 1970-2017."

[98] Bullock, "Mission Accomplished," 55.

[99] DOUBLECHECK--REFERS ALSO TO SCHOLARS? CSCPRC, "Report of the Meeting on Student Exchange with China, August 24, 1978, National Academy of Sciences" (UCLA, Box 150, Folder 1, P1360046); DOUBLECHECK THAT VON DAMM IS REFERRING TO CHINESE VISITORS COMING TO U.S.: Milton von Damm, memo to David Wilson, 27 November 1978 (UCLA, Box 162, Folder 1) (P1370061). Ultimately, UCLA hashed out "countertrade mechanisms" to account for China's lack of U.S. dollars: Beijing paid for expenses incurred in China in renminbi and in the form of access to Chinese research institutions, while UCLA covered the lion's share of dollar expenses incurred in the United States. "The UCLA/China Connection," May 29, 1980, Box 152, Folder 4, TKTK collection, UCLA archives (P1360562); "China Relations Committee Meeting, January 17, 1980, Minutes," April 7, 1980, Folder 5, Box 162, TKTK collection, UCLA archives (P1370411).

[100] *A Relationship Restored* suggests $460 on average, with supplements in more expensive markets, 3, 105; UCLA figures from early 1980s suggested closer to $400: see "China Relations Committee Meeting, January 17, 1980, Minutes," April 7, 1980 (UCLA, Box 162, Folder 5, P1370411).

[101] "China Relations Committee Meeting, January 17, 1980, Minutes," April 7, 1980 (UCLA, Box 162, Folder 5, P1370411); Huping Ling, "A History of Chinese Female Students in the United States, 1880s-1990s," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 16/3 (1997), 100; Sue Fan, memo to Carol Saltzman, 23 May 1984, enclosing "Questionnaire on PRC Students & Scholars" (UCLA, Box 158, Folder 2, P1360835); *A Relationship Restored*, 107-108.

[102] *A Relationship Restored*, 3, 46-53.

[103] Li-Wen Zhang, "China's Higher Education Trade and the Impact of the WTO/GATS Liberalization" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2006), 45 (citing IIE *Open Doors* data).

[104] Pete Millwood elegantly makes this point in "An Exceedingly Delicate Undertaking." See also *A Relationship Restored*, 12-13.

[105] *A Relationship Restored*, 46-53.

[106] GET FN: *A Relationship Restored*.

[107] Memo Sue Fan to Carol Saltzman, 23 May 1984, enclosing "Questionnaire on PRC Students & Scholars," UCLA, Box 158, Folder 2 (P1360835).

[108] "Draft—For Discussion Only," 1/30/79, UCLA, Box 162, Folder 2 (P1370178).

[109] Lucie Cheng Hirata, letter to Raymond Orbach with enclosures, January 10, 1983 (UCLA, Box 155, Folder 3, P1360735); budget dated May 5, 1983 (P1360742).

[110] UCLA CEP budgets 1983-1984, 3 Feb. 1984 (UCLA, Box 155, Folder 3, notes p. 15, P1360755).

[111] The fourth center was a collaboration with the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Cambell, "An Interim Report."

[112] Hirata, letter to Orbach, January 10, 1983.

[113] CHECK: James B. Cowan, memo w/ attachment on "Guidelines for Study Group on Assessment of Fees for PRC Visiting Scholars," January 10, 1979 (UCLA, Box 162, Folder 2, P1370221).

[114] R. R. O'Neill and H. K. Ticho, memo to VC Elwin V. Svenson, April 12, 1979 (UCLA Box 162, Folder 4, P1370361).

[115] In the 1970s and 1980s, both federal and state support for education—the latter of which tended to cover the bulk of operating costs at public colleges and universities—came under economic and ideological pressure. Emblematic of this shift, the CUNY system, long a holdout that favored free tuition, began to charge tuition in 1976. Brier and Fabricant, *Austerity Blues*, 91-102; Nicholas Dagen Bloom, How States Shaped Postwar America: State Government and Urban Power, chapters 8-9.
[116] On the Hofstra program see CSCPRC, *A Relationship Restored*, 112.
[117] Brier and Fabricant, *Austerity Blues*, 91-102.
[118] J. B. Farrell, letter to Leslie W. Gordon with enclosure, February 29, 1980, Folder 6, Box 150, TKTK Collection, UCLA (P1360469); J. Clayburn La Force, "Notes on Agreement Reached with Chinese Ministry of Finance on Comparative Study of Accounting Systems in U.S. & China," June 4, 1980, Folder 6, Box 150, TKTK Collection, UCLA (P1360507); Lucie Cheng Hirata, letter to Lou Er-xing with enclosures, February 11, 1981, Folder 6, Box 150, TKTK Collection, UCLA (P1360514); *China Exchange News*, vol. 9, no. 1 (March 1981): 20; *China Exchange News*, vol. 9, no. 4 (December 1981): 4.
[119] M. C. Hudson, letter to Xia Shu Wen, November 30, 1983, Folder 2, Box 155, TKTK Collection, UCLA (P1360618); Ann Hilferty, letter to Russell Campbell, December 3, 1983, Folder 2, Box 155, TKTK Collection, UCLA (P1360621); Ann Hilferty, letter to Russell Campbell with enclosed "Proposed Terms of Agreement," January 6, 1984, Folder 2, Box 155, TKTK Collection, UCLA (P1360627).
[120] Numbers from the late 1970s through the mid-1980s: see CSCPRC, *A Relationship Restored*, 200-201. The University of Washington was known as a hub of English for Specific Purposes (ESP) research: Johns, "The History of English for Specific Purposes Research," 7-8.
[121] The number of self-paying PRC undergraduates in the United States really exploded in the 2000s: Yingyi Ma, *Ambitious and Anxious*, 1-14. For the rankings, see "The Most Chinese Schools in America," *Foreign Policy*, January 4, 2016, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/04/the-most-chinese-schools-in-america-rankings-data-education-china-u/. The rankings are based on based on F-1 visa data.
[122] Qian, *Chinese Students Encounter America*, 32-36.
[123] Do Huy Thinh, "Foreign Language Education Policy in Vietnam."
[124] Likewise, the International English Language Testing System (IELTS), which emerged slightly later, had been partly developed by the British Council. The British Council continues to co-administer the test.
[125] Mandatory Russian courses were quickly abandoned by post-socialist governments from the Baltic (Estonia, 1991) to central Europe (Poland and Hungary, 1989) to central Asia (Kazakhstan, 1991). Jenny Pugsley and Geraldine Kershaw, eds., *Voices from the New Democracies: The Impact of British English Language Teaching in Central and Eastern Europe* (1996), 5, accessed April 26, 2022, at https://www.teachingenglish.org.uk/sites/teacheng/files/F044%20ELT-59%20Voices%20from%20the%20New%20Democracies%20-The%20Impact%20of%20British%20English%20Language%20Teaching%20in%20Central%20and%20Eastern%20Europe_v3.pdf.
[126] "Peace Corps Sets Mission to Hungary," *Washington Post*, July 13, 1989; "Teachers Go To Poland," *New York Times*, January 5, 1990. In addition, the British Council made substantial investments in the region: see Pugsley and Kershaw, *Voices from the New Democracies*.
[127] Corcoran, "Infrastructure of Influence," 15.
[128] On Americans' "dismaying" Chinese-language skills, see CSCPRC, *A Relationship Restored*, 120-21.